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Abstract
International Relations scholars have traditionally expressed little direct 
interest in addressing time and temporality. Yet, assumptions about 
temporality are at the core of many theories of world politics and time is a 
crucial component of the human condition and our social reality. Today, a 
small but emerging strand of literature has emerged to meet questions 
concerning time and temporality and its relationship to International Relations 
head on. This volume provides a platform to continue this work. 
The chapters in this book address subjects such as identity, terrorism, war, 
gender relations, global ethics and governance in order to demonstrate how 
focusing on the temporal aspects of such phenomena can enhance our 
understanding of the world.
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Introduction
ALASDAIR MCKAY
E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UK
Adolf Hitler once said that ‘time in this war, as in all historical process, is not a 
factor valuable in itself but must be weighed up’ (quoted in Maiolo 2013: 229). 
He further opined that time ‘will work against us if we do not use it properly’ 
(quoted in Gellately 2007: 375). As early as 1937, Hitler believed that success 
hinged upon acting at the right time (see Faber 2009). For Hitler, quick 
decisive victories were often seen as preferable to long campaigns because 
he understood that the longer the war went on the harder it would be for the 
Germans to maintain military advantages (Fischer 2011: 144-45). Blitzkrieg 
(lightning war) was deployed to ensure the speedy victories he desired. The 
defeat of France was made possible by Germany’s quick intensity of warfare 
and the failure of the French military to understand ‘the quickened rhythm of 
the times’ that was behind German military strategic thinking during that 
campaign (Bloch 1968: 45). America’s increasing support for the UK meant 
that if Hitler was to realise his plan of creating an Eastern Lebensraum, he 
needed to do it quickly (Fritz 2011: 39). By 1945, when defeat was looming, 
Hitler lamented that ‘the tragedy for us Germans is that we never have 
enough time’ (quoted in Fischer 2011: 145).
This example drawn from the Second World War gives a flavour of how time 
is relevant to major international events. Yet, out of all the books and journals 
that have been published under the rubric of International Relations (IR) very 
few have paused to ponder the role of time or temporality. Time has often 
occupied the role of an entity that sits in the background whilst events 
transpire in the foreground and it essentially ‘functions as context or as 
analytical indicator, but not as a distinct component deserving judicious 
investigation’ (Hom 2008: 2). As Kimberly Hutchings (2008: 11) observes: the 
study of world politics has traditionally been ‘overtly pre-occupied with spatial 
rather than temporal relations’. The pre-occupation with space has meant that 
there has been ‘little space for time’ (Hom 2010: 1) in analyses of world affairs 
from IR scholars.
In recent years some IR scholars have turned their attention to time and the 
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temporal dimension of international politics. Writers have shown how the 
adoption of what could be described as a ‘temporal lens’ (see Hom 2008; 
Stockdale 2013) can greater enhance our understanding of various human 
phenomena. This book seeks to serve as a vessel for this blossoming 
literature.  
Time, Temporality and the Social Sciences
For humans, time has an ambiguous and perhaps paradoxical quality to it. In 
some ways, it is something that we seem to push to the back of our thoughts 
in the same way a timepiece sits unthreateningly on the walls; it is ‘simply 
what the mechanical clock and Gregorian calendar display, a neutral and 
enumerated dimension in which life unfolds’ (Hom 2013: 2). Yet, it is also a 
mysterious concept that has always slipped into the human mind’s ideas 
about change, impermanence, and mortality. 
Humans are, so far as we know, the only animal with a capacity to reflect on 
past events and envision the future. We can, unlike other birds and beasts, 
project ourselves in time (see Routledge and Arndt 2005). The passing of 
time is accompanied by the human observation of change; this can be seen 
by noticing the falling of leaves in autumn, our own bodily changes, or the 
growth and development of others. Whilst time can be affiliated with creation, 
birth, and change for the better, it can also bring destabilising change, decay 
and death. ‘Time’ is very much, as Schwartz wrote, ‘the school in which we 
learn’ and ‘the fire in which we burn’ (Schwartz 1968).
Everything we do is embedded in time and we are in some way fundamentally 
aware of time, yet there is something about time that makes it beyond the 
human mind’s capacity to fully grasp. The mathematician Alfred Whitehead 
(1919: 73) once stated ‘it is impossible to meditate on time and the mystery of 
the creative passage of nature without an overwhelming emotion at the 
limitations of human intelligence’. Centuries earlier, St. Augustine (2008: 217) 
famously made a similar point with his musings on the question ‘what is 
time?’ – ‘If no one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I 
know not’. We seem to think we know what time is, yet it seems difficult to 
precisely express what we mean when we speak of it. Despite time being one 
of the most commonly used words in speech – often we describe how time 
‘flies’, ‘slowed down’, is ‘running out’, was ‘wasted’ or ‘killed’ – there is not a 
universally agreed upon understanding of time. Indeed, throughout history, 
time has been understood and explained in multiple ways. This includes 
moving in a linear direction; cyclical repetitive change; as foundational, 
functional, social and artistic (McCullough 1991:1); as a measure such as 
seconds, minutes and hours; or as lived experience or a form of social 
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regulation, such as ‘clock time’ or ‘Western standard time’ (see Gell 1992, 
1998; Adam 1994, 1995, 2002, 2006; Hughes and Trautmann 1995; Aveni 
2000; Urry 2000, Hom 2010). It is a subject that has served as a muse for 
poets, novelists, musicians, artists and filmmakers. There has also been 
considerable engagement with time and related concepts in philosophy, 
mathematics, the human sciences, the physical sciences and the social 
sciences.
Social scientists have not shied away from confronting these issues. As Helga 
Nowotny (2015:4) observes, ‘libraries are full of detailed and also of general 
investigations on social science and time’. Major thinkers of their times such 
as Emile Durkheim, George Herbert Mead, Marcel Mauss, Henri Hubert, and 
Lewis Mumford all theorised on time from various angles. In more recent 
times, this tradition has been continued by the likes of Eviatar Zerubavel, 
Georges Gurvitch, Karl Mannheim, Julius A. Roth, Alfred Schutz, Ptirim 
Sorokin & Robert K. Merton, Norbert Elias, Niklas Luhmann, Michel Foucault, 
Anthony Giddens, Barbara Adam, Helga Nowotny, Elizabeth Grosz, Bob 
Jessop and Patrick Baert (see Ryan 2004 for an introductory overview of time 
and social theory). Recent work on time and related issues from scholars has 
led some to identify a ‘temporal turn’ in the social sciences (Hassan 2010). 
This renewed interest in time can be seen as a reaction to the ‘spatial turn’, 
that emerged in the late-1970s where globalisation was examined 
predominantly through reference to changes in the spatial contours of 
existence. Undoubtedly, the spatial aspect of globalisation cannot be ignored, 
but time, it is argued, is equally important in this process because changes in 
the temporality of human activity inevitably generate altered experiences of 
space or territory.
With reference to the temporal aspect of globalisation, some have focused 
their work on the fragmentation of ‘linear, irreversible, measurable, 
predictable time’ and the emergence of a detemporalised life in ‘timeless time’ 
(Castells 2000: 429; see also 1998); the increased internalisation of time in 
‘the brains and bodies of the citizens’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 23) or the 
multitemporal multiscalar nature of globalisation (Sassen 1992; 1994; 1999; 
2000). But, perhaps some of the most influential and consistent theorising on 
globalisation has identified the process as embodying a marked shift in the 
perceived acceleration of social life. Marxist geographer David Harvey, who 
interestingly enough criticised other scholars for adopting a dialectical 
approach that privileges time and ignores space (1996: 4), described this 
phenomenon as the ‘time space compression’ (Harvey 1989: 240). For 
Harvey, contemporary developments in capitalism, information, and 
communications technologies have led to the speeding up of the circulation of 
capital and a perceived speeding up of social life in general which is 
simultaneously reducing the significance of space.  
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The perception that life is speeding up has been a subject of much discussion 
for social scientists in the past two decades. The crux of this line of thinking is 
that the rhythms of life and the social and cultural change, aided by the 
invention and spread of technologies—such as mobile phones, personal 
computers, and the Internet—have radically shortened spatial and temporal 
distances. Scholars have used different terms to describe this perceived 
social acceleration and disagree about the exact sources of these recent 
shifts in the spatial and temporal contours of human life. Nevertheless, there 
is some consensus that alterations in humanity’s experiences of space and 
time are working to erode the importance of local and even national 
boundaries in many arenas of human civilisation. In the spirit of those who 
had warned about what this development might entail for humanity, such as 
Virilio (1977) and McLuhan (1964), a significant section of literature has 
examined the political, cultural and ecological consequences of this 
development (Scheuerman 2004; Hassan and Purser 2007; Hope 2011; 
Bastian 2012; Hassan 2012; Rosa 2013; Sharma 2014; Wajcman 2015). 
Whether or not one accepts that a temporal turn in the social sciences has 
occurred, IR has, until recently, not treated time with anything like the same 
level of interest as other schools of the social sciences or academic 
disciplines in general. IR as a whole exhibits something of a ‘temporal 
blindness’ (Stockdale 2013, 5) compared to other disciplines.
IR Scholars and Time
IR scholars are relatively new to theorising on time and placing it at the 
foreground of analysis. As this book will show, scholars are now writing 
explicitly about time and its relationship to world politics. Still, there are earlier 
works to consider. James Der Derian’s writings on diplomacy (1992) and war 
(2001), that owed a considerable intellectual debt to Virilio’s theorisation of 
speed, endeavoured to focus on the temporal aspect of politics. Much of this 
work focuses on the collapse of the importance of space created by the 
previously mentioned perceived increase in the pace of life, and the political 
ramifications of this development. Within this perspective, the increase in the 
pace of the modern world—witnessed in all sorts of areas such as in 
transport, weapons, media—has resulted in a collapse of distance. This 
influences relations between states because what counts more and more in 
their strategic relations is the speed of travel, of weapons, of information and 
so on. Consequently, the political control and management of time is 
becoming more important than the control and distribution of territory, 
meaning that ‘international relations is shifting from a realm defined by 
sovereign places, impermeable borders and rigid geopolitics, to a site of 
accelerating flows, contested borders and fluid chronopolitics’ (Der Derian 
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1992: 129-130). This is what Der Derian (1990) refers to as the ‘(s)pace 
problem in international relations’ – ‘pace’ becomes more important than 
‘space.’
The influence of Der Derian’s writing can be seen in Michael J. Shapiro’s 
work on temporality, the state and citizenship. Understanding citizenship as 
not simply a spatial but also a temporal phenomenon, Shapiro (2000) 
examined the consequences of the perceived quickened pace of life for the 
concept of citizenship and its relationship to the nation-state. Similar themes 
can be seen in the work of R.B.J. Walker (1991, 1993), who was for a while 
one of the few IR theorists to look at time in relation to state sovereignty. 
Essentially much of Walker’s work is designed to ‘draw attention to the 
contradictory, antagonistic, aporetic or radically undecidable character of the 
most consequential principles enabling modern political life, especially in 
relation to prevailing accounts of state sovereignty and its limits’ (Walker 
2010, 16). To Walker, the temporal aspect plays a pivotal role in driving this 
contradictory and antagonistic character. His work Inside/Outside (1993), 
whilst not devoted entirely to time, presented an analysis of problems over 
the concept of state sovereignty caused by the increasing significance of ‘the 
experience of temporality, of speed, velocity and acceleration’ (1993: 5) in 
modern life. For Walker, adequately understanding this development requires 
an examination of the role of not only space, but also time. Indeed, 
‘conceptions of space and time’ he writes ‘cannot be treated as some uniform 
background noise, as abstract ontological conditions to be acknowledged and 
then ignored’ (Walker 1993, 130-131). In Walker’s argument, the principle of 
state sovereignty is first of all a spatial resolution of the relationship between 
universality and particularity (Walker 1993: 11, 78, 177), but, importantly, it 
also serves as a temporal resolution. This is because inside the state there is 
a story of time as linear progress, which makes it possible for universalist 
aspirations such as perpetual peace and prosperity to come true. Outside the 
state, time is seen as cyclical repetition of conflicts and wars.
State sovereignty attempts to reconcile time and space, but with ‘the startling 
velocity of contemporary accelerations’ (Walker 1993: 178) comes the reality 
that temporality can no longer be contained within spatial boundaries. Indeed, 
‘the hope that temporality may be tamed within the territorial spaces of 
sovereign states alone is visibly evaporating’ (Walker 1993: 155). In Walker’s 
words, the acceleration of modern life has caused the distinction between 
time inside the state and outside the state to collapse. Today’s world is a time 
of speed and acceleration, in which space is compressed and borders are 
becoming less significant, and so too is state sovereignty. For Walker, the 
brightest future for global politics lies in reframing it in a new light that avoids 
this paradoxical conflict between the national and the international, which 
would involve redefining the concepts that we use to explore the nature of 
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political relations.
Elsewhere in the literature, Time and Revolution by Stephen Hanson (1997) 
argued that the history of Marxism and Leninism reveals an unsuccessful 
revolutionary effort to reorder the human relationship with time and that this 
failure had a direct impact on the design of the political, socioeconomic, and 
cultural institutions of the Soviet Union. Trauma and the Memory of Politics by 
Jenny Edkins (2003) explored the remembrance of traumatic events such as 
war, genocide and terrorist attacks, and how these seek to serve as methods 
to reinforce feelings of nationhood – and yet also challenge it. Through 
several case studies, employing various scholarly approaches, she illustrated 
that some forms of trauma remembrance focus on the horror of the traumatic 
event and harness its memory to promote change and to challenge the 
political systems that initially spawned the violence of wars and genocides. 
William Callahan (2006) examined time and its role in national identity 
formation in international society through his work on China’s ‘National 
Humiliation Day’—a special holiday declared by the head of state during 
wartime which is celebrated in local churches throughout the country. In 
Times of Terror (2008), Lee Jarvis noted that narratives, such as claims to 
temporal discontinuity, linearity and timelessness, were all central to the 
narration of the George W. Bush administration’s War on Terror.
Kimberly Hutchings’ Time and World Politics (2008) was the first work in IR 
dedicated entirely to time and its relationship with global politics. She 
investigated the thoughts about time which inhabit Western political 
philosophies, illuminating the significance of the ancient Greek concepts 
Chronos and Kairos in intellectual thought and political life. Chronos is 
understood as a medium through which we can measure lifespans, periods 
and empires which ensures the certainty of death and decay. It comprehends 
time as predictable, inevitable and in a sense ‘normal’. Kairos (meaning the 
right or opportune moment), is the ‘transformational time of action, in which 
the certainty of death and decay is challenged’ (Hutchings 2008: 5). It is 
‘exceptional time’, affording a sense of human agency. Hutchings argues 
chronotic time makes it simple to view life, and politics, as ticking along to the 
rhythms of a linear, unimpeded process of history. But, granting a role for 
Kairos in politics makes the flow of Chronos uncertain and problematic 
because through its ascription of human agency, it is essentially struggling 
with Chronos’ seemingly inevitable course and steering it in a different 
direction. She later shows that this struggle between Chronos and Kairos 
applies to both international theorists and political actors, illustrating them to 
be tormented by the idea that politics is a project of controlling time as 
Chronos and creating a different kind of time through Kairos. ‘World political 
time’, to Hutchings (2008: 21), represents an effort to balance these two 
concepts into a singular understanding of time. 
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The Time behind IR
Despite the neglect of time in the discipline, IR theories are heavily anchored 
by temporal assumptions. Generally, there are two main templates for 
understanding temporality that underpin the discipline – the cyclical and the 
linear. For those unfamiliar with such terms, it is worth briefly discussing 
them. Cyclical theories of time are influenced largely by classical cosmology, 
where, drawing upon observations of nature, all aspects of the world are 
temporally organised in a rotational pattern of the seasons, tides, menstrual 
cycles, birth and death, rise and fall, growth and decay, and structured in 
relation to the rotation of the planets (Adam 2004: 18). It has been noted that 
in many ancient societies historical time was construed as ‘cyclical’, where 
time was generally represented as a wheel, whose revolutions symbolised the 
circularity of history playing out in an endlessly recurrent pattern (see Rosen 
2014).  
In IR, realists generally posit a cyclical view of history. They conceive 
international relations as a ‘realm of recurrence and repetition’ (Wight 1966: 
26), where self-interested states are ‘doomed to repeat the behaviour 
appropriate to rational actors with differing capabilities in an anarchic context’ 
(Hutchings 2008: 13). Neorealists do not explicitly assume that human nature 
is evil, but they do posit that the only rational behaviour for states in an 
anarchical international system is to assume that all other states are 
potentially aggressive and must be defended against, a reality that they see 
continually repeating itself (Kaufman 2014: 2). In sum, realism implies a static 
temporality because ‘the substance of nations’ relentless struggle for power—
their ascent, then decline, then eclipse in international politics—remains 
essentially the same’ (Kaufman 1996: 349). 
Linear time tells a different story to cyclical time as it sees time flowing in a 
particular direction and following a teleological trend. This more modern 
account of temporality has two main historical intellectual influences. The first 
is the rise of Christian historiography which, drawing on the teleological 
representations of temporality in the Judeo-Christian tradition, construed 
history as a sequence of events unfolding in a linear fashion. Events in 
biblical scripture clearly indicate a unidirectional notion of time moving from 
Creation to Apocalypse. The consequence of this understanding was that 
episodes in life were understood as having a beginning, middle and end and 
this ordering of experience had ‘the potential to redeem human existence 
from the futility of nature’s endless repetition’ (Schaap 2005: 83). 
The second intellectual resource is the historical progressivism of the 
European Enlightenment, which relies on an inference of the future from the 
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known present or past which gave rise to a sequential understanding of 
historical development. No longer perceived as reliant on divine will, human 
destiny now lay in the hands of humans themselves—who could guide it 
towards a victory for reason and rationality. Modernity was and still is, 
‘revolutionary time’, because it is ‘the time in which progress through human 
intervention is possible, if not inevitable’ (Hutchings 2008: 112). Within this 
type of thinking, then, there is also a belief in a moral direction to human 
history (Russell 1990:143–45; see also Hom and Steele 2010). Rousseau, 
Hegel and Marx expressed this idea in different ways but nonetheless argued 
for a dialectical progression towards the universal, though they diverged on 
what form the universal would take (Hom and Steele 2010, 276). 
Nevertheless, they all believed in a universalising aspect of time’s arrow. 
Linear time displaced cyclical time in societies and is essentially the dominant 
method for how we understand and measure time today. Hom (2010) has 
chronicled the rise of this conception of time to the status of the ‘hegemonic 
metronome’. This regime of time’s ascension went hand in hand with the rise 
of territorial sovereignty. Together these two drove to standardise a precise 
and coordinated measurement of time which ‘buttressed the edifice of political 
modernity’ (Ibid: 1156) as it spread globally. Western standard time, once 
established, was then exported to other civilisations. Hom (2010: 1168) 
concludes that Western standard time constitutes ‘modernity’s most global 
hegemon’ having achieved an almost unquestioned position as the dominant 
method of time measurement cross-culturally (see also Attrill 2013: 6-35).
The concept of linear time flows through much writing from the traditions of 
liberalism and neoliberalism in IR. Liberals tend to see the historical 
development of man’s power and freedom as inevitable, irreversible, and 
achievable. Whilst liberals do not write explicitly about the perfectibility of the 
human form, they insist that the international system holds widespread 
opportunities for international cooperation (Kaufman 2014: 2). As Hutchings 
(2008: 13) observes, liberal thought exhibits a temporality of limited teleology 
where a more peaceful world, characterised by global democratisation, can 
be arrived at through international cooperation.  
Whilst this line of thought is most common amongst contemporary liberals, 
they are not the sole heirs to this linear-progressive understanding of time. 
Some forms of constructivism lean towards embracing a progressive linear 
temporality. Wendt’s (1992) belief in the inevitability of global government is 
an example of this as it assumes that history is essentially moving towards a 
world state (see also Hom 2008: 35). Some Critical Theories draw heavily on 
classical Marxism’s views of history as a linear image of progress through 
stages of economic development from feudalism to capitalism, and then after 
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revolution, on to communism. But other Critical Theories adopt a more 
pessimistic view of linear time that could be characterised as linear-
regressive, seeing history as heading towards decline, because no feasible 
political alternative to liberal capitalism can be found. In particular, the works 
of Virilio and Agamben have been accused of leaving ‘very little room for 
worldly hope’ in their understandings of temporality (Hutchings 2008: 131).
Following the traditions of social theorists, some IR theorists have critiqued 
these dominant models of temporality and proposed alternative approaches 
to understanding time. For Hutchings, a key problem with our dominant 
understanding of time is that it is so committed to forging a singular 
understanding of time that it excludes any alternative accounts of temporality, 
a practice which has significant political consequences. Drawing upon 
postcolonial and feminist thinking, Hutchings argues that we should entertain 
the possibility of multiple, co-existing, and diverse visions of temporality, 
described as ‘heterotemporality’ (Hutchings 2008: 4) which would ‘undermine 
the idea that we can theorise world-political time in homogeneous or unified 
terms’ (Ibid: 155). Hom and Steele (2010) in their critiques of conceptions of 
time in IR have discussed an ‘open time’ that moves beyond the constraints 
of popular paradigms and ‘encourages creativity while cautioning against a 
simulated, idealised self, thus assisting in the classically realist self-limitation 
of political action that preserves both present ethical concerns and the 
possibility of progress in the near and distant future.’
Accounting for the Neglect
The reasons for IR’s neglect of time are difficult to identify. One could argue 
that the elusive, stealthy dynamic of time makes it hard to analyse in the 
same way as space. After all, we can observe the effects of time in the world, 
but there is a seemingly invisible quality to it and it is taken for granted as 
being represented by clock time. As Adam (1992: 175) observed of time as an 
analytical category for social scientists, it is ‘deeply taken for granted in our 
daily lives and our social theories, it is not easily accessible to conscious 
reflection and social science analysis. This means that time needs to be 
made visible before its pervasive role in modernity can be appreciated’. This 
may provide a partial explanation but not a reliable excuse, because, after all, 
‘many IR scholars spend much of their working day analysing similarly 
invisible and imperceptible concepts, such as social structures, discourses, 
and identities’ (Morini, 2012). Other reasons may be found in the history of IR 
as a discipline. Hutchings (2008: 11) writes that for much of the Cold War ‘the 
space of international politics was thought of as frozen in time’, which became 
reflected in academe. Assuming that inter-state relations would always 
consist of the balance of power where states would pursue self-interest in a 
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timeless historical vacuum, IR theorists devoted many hours, days, and years 
developing models to support this, with neorealist texts leading the way. 
Theorists simply compared political units and tried to explain and predict 
political outcomes. This period has been described as the ‘behaviouralist 
revolution’ in which ‘space gradually became privileged over time and context 
in analyses of world politics’ (Vaughn-Williams 2005: 115). As an object of 
scholarly interest, time only became a real consideration for IR scholars when 
the Cold War ended, because, in the words of Walker (1993: 3), ‘the 
demolition of the Berlin Wall may have signalled an opening across territorial 
space, but it equally signalled an awareness of temporal velocities and 
incongruities.’
According to Hutchings (2008:14) ‘the themes of temporality and history have 
come centre stage in debates about world politics in International Relations 
since the end of the Cold War’ (Hutchings 2008: 14). Perhaps the two largest 
issues were whether we had come to ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological 
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government’ (Fukuyama 1989) or a world in which mankind 
was doomed to engage in an endless clash of civilisations (Huntington 1993, 
1996). Yet, such writing has largely relied on assumptions about time and 
temporality without any real critical reflection on such concepts. 
The so called ‘historical turn’ in IR, merits brief discussion here. This research 
enterprise in IR arguably stemmed from ‘an emerging consensus that history 
is taken far more seriously within the discipline’ (Vaughan-Williams 2005: 
117). Over the past two or three decades, many scholars have attempted to 
historicise the concepts which underpin international relations and inject 
temporality into the study of historical processes. Whilst there has been 
important work conducted in this ‘turn’—much writing in historical sociology 
has done a good job of critiquing the ahistorical assumptions underpinning 
realism and neorealism (Lundborg 2016: 18)—there has been little 
willingness from this intellectual turn to confront temporality or time directly.
As Stevens (2016: 37) observes, ‘important though the renewed emphasis on 
history is in IR, other aspects of time and temporality should also be of 
interest to students of the international, as they are elsewhere in the social 
sciences and humanities’. Not only do the chapters in this book address many 
other aspects of time and temporality in relation to global politics, they also 
provide a more critical approach to how we understand, and use, such 
concepts.
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The Book
Andrew Hom and Ty Solomon’s opening chapter addresses a key concept in 
IR theory: the construction of identity. The authors suggest that the key to 
unlocking identity’s temporal qualities can be found by unpacking the 
emotional elements of the human activity of timing. 
Kimberly Hutchings’ chapter explores the relationship between assumptions 
about time and temporality and global ethics. Hutchings shows how thought 
experiments tend to reflect assumptions that are specific to the time and 
place of the theorist. 
Tim Luecke introduces a generational framework as a device to understand 
the relationship between temporality and international relations. He shows 
how a generational analysis can be applied and illustrates its analytical value 
through a discussion of his research into changes in Germany’s culture and 
foreign policy from World War II to the present. 
Tim Stevens’ chapter draws attention to the nature of chronometric 
administration as a form of global governance. The chapter explores how 
global time is governed through an assemblage of institutions, norms, 
standards, multilateral agreements and technologies that produce the 
sociotechnical chronos, the dynamic and negotiated ‘time of the world’. 
The chapter from Robert Hassan explores how in the network society, politics 
takes place upon a radically different communicative basis but that we have 
so far failed to appreciate the actual extent of the transformation. The chapter 
discusses that in its communicative basis, digital networks, unlike analogue 
ones, have no equivalence in nature, and serve only to alienate people from 
democracy and political power. 
Kevin K. Birth’s chapter discusses the tensions generated by the global 
distribution of Western timekeeping and shows the relationship between the 
values celebrated in calendars and the rhetorical strategies used by nations 
in two very different international debates: climate change and the leap 
second.
Valerie Bryson’s chapter focuses on gender relations, labour and time. 
Focusing on the access to leisure or discretionary time between genders, the 
economic and cultural assumptions that underpin the global market economy, 
and the devaluing of non-market activities, Bryson argues that such 
developments are having a damaging effect in many societies and argues 
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that it is in the interests of us all to rethink our human relationship with time. 
In his chapter, Christopher McIntosh seeks to illustrate some of the ways in 
which attention to the temporal dimension in IR can better inform our 
understanding of war. This chapter uses a temporal frame to sketch out some 
of the important aspects of the concept of war as it is produced and 
reproduced in IR scholarship and practice.
Shahzad Bashir discusses temporality through reference to the contemporary 
politics of Islam. To Bashir, temporality is a crucial issue for the study of Islam 
because the (erroneous) sense of homogeneity attributed to Islam stems from 
the attribution of a single history to Islam. The chapter demonstrates how ISIS 
has leveraged twenty-first century technology to create a shallow temporality 
through its vision of the Islamic past, which serves as a weapon against its 
detractors. 
Kathryn Fisher’s chapter explores how temporal assumptions position the 
‘homegrown’ terrorist threat as a ‘conditional self’: an actor from within and 
without. To Fisher, signposts, such as ‘domestic’, ‘international’, and 
‘homegrown’, generalise actors along sweeping categorical assumptions 
which enable an ongoing exclusion from full belonging and an increase in 
insecurity for many with no relation to terroristic violence.
Liam Stockdale’s chapter explores how the post-9/11 profusion of pre-emptive 
rationalities has transformed the politics of (in)security into a politics of time, 
and how this has significant implications for the way political power is 
organised and exercised in the global security context. Stockdale fleshes out 
these concepts through an examination of the Obama administration’s 
targeting of American citizens such as Anwar al-Awlaki in its drone warfare 
programme. 
The concluding chapter from Lundborg and Holmqvist raises four topics of 
contemporary world politics to illustrate the constitutive impact of time and 
temporality on political discourse: the politics embedded in the United Nations 
system, the climate crisis, global information flows, and practices of war and 
‘counterterrorism’. By tracing the competing temporalities at work in these 
examples, the chapter provides an overview of the types of inquiry that a 
focus on time can open up for future research.
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While time and temporality have been mostly neglected in social identity 
theory, the idea of timing is wholly absent in any substantive sense. It 
receives no mention in seminal critical works on identity in IR (e.g. Lapid and 
Kratochwil 1996) and even efforts specifically attuned to the interplay of 
identity, narrative, and temporality (Ringmar 1996; Hall 1999; Callahan 2006; 
Steele 2008),1 do not engage with timing as a theoretical category or a core 
empirical phenomenon. This silence about timing echoes in broader 
International Relations (IR) scholarship otherwise concerned with time (e.g. 
Walker 1993; Hutchings 2008; Hom and Steele 2010; Berenskoetter 2011; 
Lundborg 2011; Stockdale 2013; McIntosh 2015) as well as in temporally 
sensitive identity scholarship outside IR (Campbell, O’Rourke, and Silverstein 
2010).
To be clear, by timing, we mean much more than the intuitive or idiomatic 
sense in which one exclaims ‘nice timing!’ after an unexpected or intentional 
concurrence of two events that help things work out in a desired way. 
Referring to such occurrences as colloquial matters of timing implies that they 
require little further explication and, more importantly, that they hold little 
potential for advancing knowledge about social phenomena. Rather, we 
understand timing as a fundamental human activity, a basic means of 
synthesising pertinent changes for practical and political effect. In the course 
of this chapter, we argue that combining social identity theory with this sense 
1  Ringmar (1996:125), Hall (1999:126), Callahan (2006:404), and Steele (2008:77–
83) do mention timing but none engage it as a theoretical resource or conceptual 
category in its own right. In later work, Steele (2010 chp. 3) focuses on timing as a key 
component of parrhesia, speaking truth to power.
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of timing holds significant benefits for IR: in general, a better understanding of 
time and its relationship to various political processes; in particular, a clearer 
formulation of the laborious and fraught work by which social selves come 
into being ‘over time’.
Using Timing to Unlock Time and Identity
Although the absence of ‘timing’ in social identity research is understandable, 
it is also regrettable because a fuller and more explicit treatment of timing 
holds the potential to highlight important and interesting aspects of identity in 
international politics. In particular, it helps explain the desirous dimensions of 
identity, which in turn explain the central emotional element of timing as a 
basic human activity. By desire, we refer to the affective dimensions of 
subjectivity that stem from the subject’s fundamental lack of foundations, 
which engender desire for a stable sense of self. This desire often constitutes 
the emotional ‘grip’ (Glynos 1999) factor that helps to account for subjects’ 
identifications with narratives that offer a seemingly stable vision of ‘fullness.’ 
Taken together, emotion and timing help clarify the political implications of any 
temporal, constructed identity. Before discussing these issues, however, we 
need to explicate just what we mean by ‘timing’.
Timing
Following Hom’s (2013, 2016) recent work on time and IR theory and drawing 
on the social theory of Norbert Elias (2007), we deploy ‘timing’ not merely as 
an intuitive matter of when something happens but as a substantive 
theoretical concept in its own right that is distinct from and indeed analytically 
and practically prior to ‘time’ and ‘temporality’. Elias (2007:38–39) locates 
‘time’ and ‘temporality’ as linguistic artefacts that emerge to symbolise a 
dynamic and practical timing activity, which is a process of creative synthesis 
that proceeds by reference to a timing standard. For him, ‘time’ refers not to 
an existential or metaphysical thing, object, or dimension, but to a socially 
established relationship between two or more changing phenomena, one of 
which has been used as the frame of reference for organising the other(s). 
More specifically, timing proceeds by integrating and coordinating pertinent 
changes according to the chosen timing standard.2
2  Timing’s analytical priority to ‘time/temporality’ complements Elias’ historical account 
of the rise of social time consciousness. Elias’ argument is that timing first emerged as 
social groups developed agricultural practices that benefited from coordination with 
seasonal variations. Agricultural civilisations subsequently attached religious 
significance to both recurrent and unique changes in the natural environment due to 
their impact on timing, which concomitantly became the concern of priesthoods (Elias 
2007:42–44). As timing became necessary to societal survival and development, ‘time’ 
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Although Elias (2007:43–44) focuses primarily on repeatable and natural 
changes as the standards for successful human timing, any change 
continuum can provide a standard so long as social agents can use it to 
successfully synthesise the ‘when-aspects’ of various change continua they 
care about.3 The timing standard does so by establishing priorities (which 
changes matter, and which of these matter more/most?), indicating how 
integration and coordination should proceed (what should happen and 
when?), and suggesting what compromises and sacrifices will be necessary. 
When successful, the timing standard organises changes in such a way that 
we are better able to orient ourselves in the (social) world, direct our 
individual and collective actions, and exercise self- and social control. When 
we have timed them successfully, we understand the relations between and 
importance of various changes and can decide how and when to act upon 
them. Thus a ‘good sense of timing’ not only indicates that we have a kairotic 
sense of when to take a specific action (Hutchings 2008) but also that we 
occupy a qualitatively intelligible and perhaps predictable realm in which it is 
feasible to do so, as in chronos. Likewise, a breakdown in timing or ‘bad 
sense of timing’ robs us of the capacity for effective intervention but also 
destabilises our larger worldview and sense that things hang together in an 
orderly, manageable fashion. Two implications of this view of timing are worth 
highlighting here. First, timing is always relative and positional, insofar as the 
relevance of various changes and the timing standard chosen are intrinsically 
matters of perspective. Second, and flowing from the first, timing is always for 
someone and something—it has a positionally-specific purpose.4
How do such timing activities and experiences produce the various ‘times’ or 
‘temporalities’ we often find in IR, including linear, cyclical, and national-state 
variants (e.g. Walker 1993; Edkins 2003:1–13)? The ‘figural’ qualities of 
symbolic language, which tend to work ‘in terms of reifying substantives’ 
rather than dynamic relations (Elias 1989a:193–96, 1989b:342), provide the 
key link. For example, we regularly refer to the ‘wind blowing’ or a ‘river 
flowing’ even though wind is inseparable from its constitutive quality of 
blowing and a river is characterised by flowing (Elias 2007:36). Much the 
same, symbolic language transfigures the constitutive or characteristic 
features of a given timing activity into the objective or ‘thingy’ noun ‘time’. So 
came to feature more and more in symbolic systems. This was abetted by the figural 
qualities of human language (more on this below) (Elias 2007:43, 1989b:342). In other 
words, human capacities for symbolic language transposed features of timing activities 
into attributes of the noun ‘time’. Over centuries these transpositions settled into a 
multifaceted conception of ‘time’.
3  Although he does not spend any reflection on the difference, Elias (2007:39) 
suggests as much when he discusses the use of a human lifespan—which is non-
repeatable and unpredictable—as a timing standard.
4  This connects timing with the critical IR of Robert Cox (1981).
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when we hear about linear time in IR, an Eliasian perspective suggests that 
there is a timing activity behind it that synthesises changes as unique, 
sequential, and unidirectional; whereas a cyclical time refers to changes 
organised in a recurrent sequence that implicitly allows for progress or 
regress (as in ‘cycles of violence’); while national-state time refers to the 
admixture of a particular origin story, national holidays, and the teleological 
promise of political perfection sedimented over time by successive iterations 
of collective identity.5 
At the limit, our highly successful and widely institutionalised practices for 
timing a huge variety of activities using solar (clock) and lunar (calendar) 
cycles has, through symbolic language, produced the idea of a freestanding, 
existential dimension of ‘natural time’ (Elias 2007:96). Such linguistic 
reification serves the crucial purpose of transferring knowledge about a timing 
mode from generation to generation but it can also elide the dynamic and 
practical aspects of timing by convincing us that there are ‘times’ independent 
of human effort. If we want to better understand ‘time’, ‘temporality’, and their 
relationship to various socio-political processes, we need to foreground their 
dynamic and human origin in timing (Elias 2007:35) so that we do not 
unintentionally reify the very activities we are trying to unpack and in so doing 
elide the relative and positional character of any particular time or temporality, 
which only emerges to the extent that it ably serves some purpose for 
someone.
Identity as a Timing Standard
Identity formation is one such process. It has already been noted that identity 
formation is a dynamic and social practice with temporal qualities 
(Berenskoetter 2012; Prozorov 2011). We take no issue with such 
observations, but think that the discussion can be pushed much further by 
scrutinising the constitution of selfhood as a timing process with identity 
commitments as its timing standard. 
In any timing activity, changes are synthesised into a coherent and orderly 
whole according to the timing standard. Although the aforementioned clock-
based time reckoning is by now second nature for most, when timing in this 
way we implicitly prioritise the mensurable, quantified, and regularised 
changes produced by an internal escapement or quartz crystal (Landes 
2000:8–18) as the frame of reference by which to coordinate our actions and 
5  In IR, ‘the time of the nation-state’ has often been used less precisely to refer to 
some nebulous but generally unilinear-progressive promise thought to adhere to the 
sovereign statist way of doing politics (see Shapiro 2000; Edkins 2003:xiv; Stephens 
2010:34; Lundborg 2011).
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lives. ‘Let’s meet at 9:30’ has no functional meaning if we do not both possess 
an understanding of this way of timing—that the ‘9’ refers to a morning hour of 
day and the ‘30’ to minutes, or half an hour beyond—as well as clocks 
coordinated to the same time zone, which allow us to plan ahead in order to 
arrive at the café at the same time.6 
Clock reckoning is the most prevalent and likely intuitive example of a timing 
standard today, but it is in no way exclusive. Narrative theorists like Paul 
Ricoeur (1984, 1985, 1988) and David Carr (1986) have shown how the 
theme of a story provides a synoptic vision by which elements of experience 
are chosen, combined, and ordered to produce a followable sequence of 
events or vision of time leading as if by necessity to a conclusion that marks 
the narrative’s chronological endpoint but also its hermeneutical fulfilment 
(see Hom 2013 chp. 2). In narrative, the theme provides the standard by 
which the story’s other components are selected, integrated, coordinated—
that is, by which the story is timed into a workable ‘plot’ that unfolds a 
particular temporality. 
Given how important narrative is to a sense of self (Steele 2008; also 
Freeman 1993) we suggest that all this points to the idea that identity, or ‘who’ 
the social agent thinks she is, provides the timing standard by which to 
construct her self. In most autobiographies, the chronological conclusion also 
renders the subject in full. Inasmuch as the theme of a story is a timing 
standard and the theme of any autobiography is the self, we can think of 
identity commitments as the timing standard for the story of the self.
Along these lines, Solomon’s (2014:679) recent work on time and subjectivity 
shows social identities are not fixed, stable, and comprehensive attributes but 
rather fluid and ‘temporally decentred.’ This means they necessarily contain 
forward- and backward-facing perspectives that make sense of past 
experiences and future possibilities in a way that allows the subject to come 
into being by acting in the present. This idea of temporal decentring calls out 
the importance of timing to identity construction.
Identities are constructed through retrospective autobiographical or ‘self-
reflexive’ monitoring of how various past events experienced and actions 
already taken ‘fit’ into one’s story of her self, where ‘fit’ refers to how 
consistent those actions and experiences are with her overarching idea of 
who she is (see Steele 2008:60–63). The overarching identity a social agent 
adopts also exerts a prospective or futural pull insofar as she envisions ‘how 
someone like me would act if/when certain situations arise’. For Solomon 
(2014: 672), drawing upon Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, the subject is 
6  Elsewhere, Hom (2010, 2012) has dubbed this ‘Western standard time’.
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continually constructed through a retroactive temporality, where the subject 
posits itself as ‘having always been’ a full or ‘whole’ self. Yet, this is a kind of 
‘fantasy’ (in Lacanian terms), since the subject is always marked by a lack, a 
perpetual sense of incompleteness. Subjects are never fully self-present, 
since there is no extra-discursive or biological foundation upon which 
subjectivity ultimately rests. The subject is unstable, in this sense, insofar as it 
can never hook into a fixed foundation once and for all. This instability of 
subjectivity is part and parcel of the subject ‘not having fully been’ in the past 
yet ‘not quite yet being’ in the future. The subject only ever ‘will have been’ 
since it never fully reaches the future image of wholeness and centredness 
that it strives towards in its identity practices. As Lacan (2006: 78) puts it, the 
process of subject formation ‘is a drama whose internal pressure pushes 
precipitously from insufficiency to anticipation.’ The subject is thus an open 
self, produced at the ever-changing nexus of these ‘backward’ and ‘forward’ 
temporalities and constituted through identity practices simultaneously facing 
in both temporal directions (Solomon 2014: 674). Both retro- and pro-spection 
come together in an evolving present, where the subject takes actions or 
reacts to situations in accordance with her commitments. All of which is to say 
that the social agent’s identity poses the standard by which all the changes 
she experiences are integrated and coordinated into a coherent, consistent, 
and intelligible story of her life that produces and confirms who she is.7 
By helping us determine what matters, how to (re)act, and when to do so, 
identity provides a timing standard. When successful, identity commitments 
help a social agent to produce a smooth and compelling account of herself 
that unfolds in an orderly and predictable manner—e.g. from birth through 
schooling to a successful professional career. When unsuccessful, the social 
agent’s life may seem disjointed, unpredictable, and devoid of intelligible 
connections between her past development, her present state, and her future 
direction. All of these latter outcomes suggest some misfit, either between her 
chosen identity and her environment (e.g. a very slow runner who identifies 
as a sprinter) or her ability to integrate and coordinate herself to that 
environment (e.g. ‘I should have known better’ or ‘I knew what to do but I just 
couldn’t bring myself to follow through’) and will thus require much more work 
to transform into a smooth and intelligible story of who she is. Most 
importantly, perhaps, unlike a wholly retrospective story, in lived experience 
the adequacy of one’s chosen identity as a standard for timing her life is an 
open practical question, just as the stability of her sense of self is an ongoing 
and constant task of simultaneous retroactive and prospective (re-) 
7  While we do not argue that this is the only temporal account of identity formation, 
we do suggest that it may travel beyond the particular issues that we examine here.  
Many disciplines, for example, have productively drawn upon Lacan’s theories of 
subject formation, including geography (Kingsbury 2007), urban planning (Gunder 
2005), and organisation studies (Contu, Driver, and Jones 2010).  
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production.
These backward and forward-facing orientations of the temporally decentred 
self also mimic the way in which timing enables the serial perception of time 
as such. Although we tend to think of generally linear time as something 
external to ourselves along or through which we move, this is a product of 
timing. Creative synthesis enables this when we recall ‘distinctly what 
happened earlier and … seeing it in [our] minds’ eyes as a single picture, 
together with what happened later and what is happening now’ (Elias 
2007:31). In the case of serial time consciousness, this is a most basic sort of 
timing that coordinates the changing mind with a continuum of external stimuli 
and facilitates ‘the perception of events which happen one after another as a 
“sequence in time”’ (Elias 2007:31). When it concerns identity construction, 
we are usually interested in a more selective yet lengthier continuum of 
changes pertinent to who we think we are. Rather than the welter of 
immediate and often mundane experience from which we select and arrange 
elements such that ‘time’ seems to ‘pass’ one moment after another, our 
identity is based on more important and older recollections that we configure 
into a coherent narrative from which our sense of self springs.
The forward-facing temporality of identity similarly mirrors our basic 
prospective grasp of the continued flow of time (see Husserl 1964; Ricoeur 
1984; Carr 1986). In basic time consciousness, we intuitively grasp what is 
likely to happen next based on our immediate context—e.g. if a ball is rolling 
along a table we expect it to fall towards the ground once it passes the table 
edge. If something novel happens instead—e.g. if the ball disappears or falls 
upwards—our ‘sense of time’ may falter.8 If only one unexpected thing 
happens we may perceive that ‘time stands still’, but if many unexpected 
things happen at once or in quick succession we may perceive just the 
opposite, that ‘time moves too quickly’ or that ‘chaos’ replaces any 
apprehensible temporal flow. Once again, these possibilities and their 
implications for time are intensely relative and positional—that is, they pertain 
to our sense of time or feeling of chaos, which may not seem as such to 
others.9 Much the same, our sense of who we are entails expectations about 
who we will become10 and how we should and will react to future 
8  Although the example posed here is utterly banal, this relationship between novel 
change and time consciousness lies at the heart of trauma research, which argues that 
acts and experiences so unprecedented and violent as to be ‘unspeakable’ actually 
‘rupture’ our sense of time because we cannot accommodate them in our ongoing 
perception of how things fit together (see, e.g. Edkins 2003).
9  For example, a surprise attack might ‘sow chaos’ through a military base and cause 
soldiers to feel that time is ‘rushing by’ but also represent the orderly unfolding of a 
temporality planned and executed by the sneak attackers.
10  For a related discussion, see Berenskoetter’s (2011) investigation of the temporal 
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developments. If our expectations are confounded by events that are 
unprecedented or not easily accommodated in our autobiography, this may 
throw off our sense of time as well as challenge our identity because we do 
not know how to react, which in turn causes our well-ordered serial 
perception and our coherent, comprehensive, and clean vision of our self to 
falter. 
These dynamics and tensions in identity construction and maintenance are 
well-known to social construction theorists, who often characterise self-
identity as a sense of personal continuity or ‘ontological security’ that persists 
‘through’ or ‘over’ time (Steele 2008; also Freeman 1993). However, in the 
account proposed here, both identity and time are matters of timing insofar as 
they involve a thinking subject who integrates and coordinates her personal 
change continuum with a variety of experiences in order to preserve or 
reproduce both a sense of orderly temporal continuity and a sense of 
coherent self. On this view, instead of understanding self-identity as a matter 
of establishing continuity ‘through’ or ‘over time’, it is more useful and 
accurate to approach it as a matter of self-identifying through timing. Similarly, 
the way in which a subject is ‘stitching across’ (Solomon 2014:675) multiple 
temporalities and constantly negotiating changes in the past and future that 
appear external to it underscores that subjectivity is an active, ongoing, and 
continuous effort to synthesise an autobiographical vision with multiple 
changes in the world of experience in a way which reaffirms one’s self as 
consistent, ‘full’, and stable. In other words, it is an individual timing process 
that requires us to encompass our past and future in order to enable both 
action in an intelligible ‘present’ and an overarching, consistent, and coherent 
idea of who we are.
Timing, Identity, and Desire
It is through the nexus of retroactive and anticipatory temporalities that the 
emotional element of desire arises.11 Following Lacan (2006), we understand 
desire as the continual longing for ontological stability and wholeness which, 
though ultimately illusory, the subject nevertheless continually seeks.12 Desire 
emerges through the subject’s ‘lack’ – that it is never fully present in a 
discursive or temporal sense. This lack of—and desire for—a ‘whole’ identity 
is what sparks the subject’s identity practices, even in the face of continual 
qualities of visions. 
11  While IR has recently shown much interest in affect and emotions (Crawford 2000; 
Fierke 2013; Hutchison and Bleiker 2014; Ross 2014; Solomon 2012), little of this work 
has explored the relationships between time, timing, and identity.  
12  For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between desire, discourse, and 
subjectivity, see Solomon (2015).
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frustration in never quite achieving the pursued sense of self-unity (Solomon 
2014: 675).  This is why Lacan terms such identity narratives as ‘fantasies’, in 
the sense that while they may seem to subjects to promise ontological 
stability, they can never fully deliver this since lack continually re-emerges 
due to the subject’s absence of foundations. Since desire is an effect of lack, 
it can never be fully satisfied or extinguished. As such, the subject is always a 
subject of desire; desire is the propellant pushing the subject to continue its 
identity narrating practices.  
Slavoj Žižek offers a political example of how these temporal dynamics help 
to elicit subjects’ desire to reach stability via narratives of the nation-state. He 
(2002: 197) argues that the ‘basic paradox of the psychoanalytic notion of 
fantasy consists in a kind of time loop—the ‘original’ fantasy’ is always the 
fantasy of the origins.’ Here, one of the most common political narratives is 
the foundation myth of the nation. A nation’s politics often revolve around 
efforts to re-narrate the nation’s ‘origins’ in order to co-opt them into 
contemporary agendas. Yet as Žižek (1993: 127) points out, national origins 
‘are never simple given facts: We can never refer to them as a found 
condition, context, or pre-supposition of our activity. Precisely as 
presuppositions, such narratives are always already posited’ by us. Tradition 
is tradition insofar as we constitute it as such’ (Žižek 1993:127). The national 
desire for ontological stability via collective unity leads to the positing of a 
‘fullness’ that never in fact existed at the supposed point of origin (Solomon 
2014: 675).  
These insights can be extended to more fully draw out how the 
entanglements of desire, temporality, and identity often function at collective 
levels. For example, the social construction of the post-9/11 war on terror can 
be more comprehensively analysed through a temporal-desire lens. Many 
constructivist studies of the war on terror have emphasised longstanding 
themes of identity in IR, such as the argument that the war on terror was a 
historically contingent discourse rather than a natural one, and that the 
language of ‘evil,’ ‘civilization,’ and ‘barbarism’ produced a series of identities 
that were relationally structured through binaries of self/other (see Croft 2006; 
Holland 2009; Hülsse and Spencer 2008; Jackson 2005). Yet, it is the 
interweaving of timing and desire that can provide a more comprehensive 
picture of the social construction of identity in the war on terror.
The social construction of the subject ‘America’ in the war on terror points to 
not only the contingency and othering processes involved. It also reveals the 
role of this retroactive temporality and desire that helped to pull subjects to 
identify with its narrative. In a 20 September 2001 speech before a special 
joint session of the U.S. Congress, President George W. Bush offers a 
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narrative of the events nine days before. Here, the collective subject of the 
nation’ (‘America’) suffered a ‘wound’. Three thousand lives lost is recognised 
as a tragedy, yet throughout the discourse there seems to be 
something else that was lost on 9/11. Bush alludes to it several times and in 
several different ways, something beyond the loss of lives: ‘Great harm has 
been done to us. We have suffered a great loss’; ‘night fell on a different 
world, a world where freedom itself is under attack’; ‘a threat to our way of 
life.’ ‘These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way 
of life.’ ‘Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not 
touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work, and 
creativity, and enterprise of our people.’ ‘This is a fight for all who believe in 
progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.’ (Bush 2001) These 
discursive attempts to pin down exactly what was lost – yet without ever 
definitively doing so – illustrate the prospective fullness that is seen as 
desirable. ‘Our way of life’ and so on is discursively as close as one can get 
to the perceived ‘essence’ of the nation. Yet, these are ways of covering over 
the incompleteness—the lack—of a ‘whole’ nation by re-synthesising, that is, 
re-timing ‘America’ as a coherent and complete entity intelligibly oriented and 
capable of effective action in a ruptured world. Bush’s numerous attempts to 
discursively ‘button down’ what exactly ‘we’ are points to the very 
indefinability of that which must be defended from the terrorist enemy 
(Solomon 2014: 677-78; Solomon 2015). The war on terror narrative (re)
constructs the fantasy of a ‘whole’ ‘America’ (the subject of the discourse) that 
is partially represented in discourse, yet is also ‘missing’ something that is 
posited as central to its ‘sense of self’.
The ideal of a ‘whole’ nation free of threats and ambiguities is an image that 
covers over the constitutive lack of such an entity. A unified ‘America’ is 
posited as lost, yet, such an ‘America’ did not, in fact, exist before 9/11. This 
retroactively projected ideal of ‘America’ is posited as having been lost at the 
moment of trauma, yet it had never been fully constructed before then. 
It must be assumed to have existed, though, in order for the war on terror 
discourse to be meaningful. In this sense, the retroactive presupposition of 
the ideal drives the desire for it, and helps to account for the ‘pull’ factor that 
elicited audiences’ identifications with the war on terror discourse in the wake 
of 9/11 (Solomon 2014: 679).
Assessing identity as a timing project locates the driver of desire as part of 
the process of the ongoing drama of the subject, i.e. the timing agent. His 
desire for fullness is precisely a desire to comprehensively coordinate his own 
personal change continuum with those changes that impact him and thereby 
gain a whole ‘sense of self’ and a ‘sense of time’. We might say here that a 
sense of self and sense of time are co-constitutive products of effective 
timing. On this view, desire cannot be reduced to some primitive id or 
30Timing, Identity, and Emotion in International Relations
biological drive, nor does it depend on some subject-independent and 
antagonistic past and future (see Solomon 2014:675). Instead, desire wells 
up from the challenges of internal, subjective, and identity-based timing, a 
difficult and continuous work that, when less successful, leaves us feeling 
incomplete, ‘partly present’ yet ‘partly missing’ (Solomon 2014:678) or, when 
more successful, grants a sense of closure-in-wholeness, of consistency with 
the world around us, and of ‘being present’. As Johnston (2008: 260-1) 
argues, desire arises from the subject’s construction through these 
overlapping temporalities. ‘Drives and desires aren’t simply quotas of 
energetic force welling up from the brute corporality of a primitive id. Rather, 
they are the aftershocks generated by the repeated collisions of incompatible 
temporal dynamics’ (Johnston 2008: 260-1). In this sense, the subject’s 
attempts to stabilise its self-narrations is a form of timing in its own right. 
Crucially, such fullness or completion is always temporary. Good timing never 
lasts and we are never fully timed due to uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity, 
and emergent changes that require further synthesis—while we desire 
closure, we remain engaged in an open-ended project to time our self to the 
world disclosed to us through experience. 
In these ways, a theory of timing helps locate emotion and desire within the 
dynamic construction of the self. Emotion and desire reflect back on timing, 
helping to further clarify the stakes and challenges of timing as a basic human 
activity. Because timing is never finished so long as meanings remain fluid or 
change continues to occur, the issues that impel timing in the first place are 
ever-present, namely: complexity, puzzles about how things hang together 
and how we relate to them, concerns about novel changes, and a variety of 
questions about who we are. Successful timing reduces complexity, proffers a 
working model of how things hang together and where we fit in, 
accommodates novel changes in a smooth trajectory, and helps establish our 
sense of self. However, if any of these issues present intractable difficulties—
if complexity shades into utter chaos, if we cannot explain a surprising 
development, or if we cannot establish clear links between our sense of self 
and our environment—timing falters and with it our sense of wholeness, so 
we must re-interpret or ‘retro-fit’ the problematic experience, revise the timing 
mode, or search for a new standard altogether.13 As may be apparent, these 
possibilities entail significant effort and—as we move closer to jettisoning our 
timing standard in search of an alternative—pose the limit possibility of an 
utter breakdown in timing: the possibility that no standards or modes of 
synthesis can be found that are adequate to all the pertinent aspects of a 
developing situation. In such a setting, our sense of time as well as any 
confidence about who we are comes under severe threat.
13  See Hom  (2016) for further discussion and an example of retrofitting drawn from 
scholarship of the ‘Arab Spring’.
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These intimate links between a solid sense of self and a stable sense of time 
highlight the emotional and desirous nature of timing in general. It makes 
sense that identity commitments produce a desire for stability and fullness in 
the sense of a consistent, synoptic, and coherent sense of self. However, we 
think this sort of desire can be scaled ‘up’ from the individual’s conception of 
her own self to her model of how the wider world in which she finds herself 
hangs together. After all, it is not just that the self must remain stable and 
coherent ‘through time’; time as such must also seem to flow in a manageable 
way or else it threatens to overwhelm the self with unremitting flux, disorder, 
and chaos.14 Put differently, it is not just that we want a stable sense of who 
we are, we also desire a stable and full sense that the time we inhabit is 
consistent, reliable, and orderly rather than some onrushing and untamable 
river of unintelligible events. Thus, just as acts or experiences that confound 
our sense of self may engender identity crises replete with emotional facets, 
unexpected developments may signal breaks or ruptures in the smooth flow 
of time that engender fear, anxiety, and dread in us. This is because both 
augur an utter dissolution of timing, the thoroughgoing failure of a chosen 
standard to provide orientation, intelligibility, and control by synthesising 
relevant environmental changes with our own personal continuum. Such a 
problem can only be resolved by colossal efforts and may require us to 
completely change our understanding of how the world works and/or who we 
actually are. No wonder, then, that we desire a fullness of self in a 
manageable flow of time, for both are necessary conditions for a social agent 
to go on in life.
This framework can be scaled ‘up’ in a second sense, from the individual 
agent to the sort of collective selves from which international politics is 
composed. The earlier discussion of 9/11 shows how a state works to 
reconstitute its sense of self and of time after a shocking experience. Indeed, 
if anything, timing of a collective self is much more difficult and politically 
fraught than timing an individual identity. The timing standard of identity 
commitments must synthesise a much larger quantity and range of change 
continua, the potential sources and sites of novel changes that disrupt a 
collective self and its sense of time are far greater,15 and the backward and 
forward temporal views often extend much further than in an individual life 
since the nation is both older and more durable than its constituent citizens 
(see Niebuhr 2001). All of these features proliferate the complexity of the 
timing challenge involved in identity formation and maintenance. They also up 
its stakes inasmuch as both political practitioners and subjects, on the one 
hand, and the international system itself, on the other, depend on raison 
14  These problematic qualities are some of the oldest attributed to time’s natural 
essence or force (see Brandon 1965; Hom 2012).
15  This includes ‘internal’ sources in the form of domestic actions or challenges to the 
state’s authority (see Steele 2010:133–64).
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d’état for their raison d’être.
Conclusion
In making the case for the emotional/desirous aspect of timing, this chapter 
hopes to raise a few key issues for the study of time and identity in IR. First, 
despite the recent interest in time and temporality in IR, the notion of timing 
can be viewed as the more primary process through which various 
conceptions of ‘time’ are produced. The use of language contracts our notions 
of time and transfigures the constitutive aspects of a particular timing activity 
into the noun ‘time’. This holds insight for understanding processes of identity 
and subject formation. While IR scholars have long interrogated the social 
construction of identity, and although others have recently pointed out the 
importance of time to identity, we suggest that timing may prove to be a more 
fruitful avenue through which to investigate the temporal politics of identity. 
Viewing identity itself as a timing process, we argue that identity poses the 
standard by which changes the subject experiences are integrated and 
synthesised into a coherent and intelligible self-narrative. Identity, then, is not 
merely an image of a self in relation to an other (Wendt 1999). Rather, it is 
able to function in such a manner because of its prior function as a timing 
standard by which the self initially coheres.
Second, the chapter draws together this understanding of time and timing 
with the emotional element of desire. Although IR has recently shown much 
interest in emotions, we contend that examining the relationships among 
timing, identity, and desire offers a richer account of the social construction of 
subjectivity than most extant accounts. Drawing upon insights from 
psychoanalytic theory, the chapter argues that not only is timing a key 
element of identity, but also that this timing process occurs alongside (and 
likely because of) multiple overlapping temporalities. In this view, the subject’s 
decentring is partly due to its construction at the nexus of these retroactive 
and anticipatory temporalities. It is this decentring – along with the subject’s 
ontological lack – that sparks the emotional pull of desire. Subjects desire 
identity narratives that promise a closed timing mode in the form of a ‘whole’ 
or ‘complete’ identity, even if such wholeness is ultimately illusory. In short, 
the subject’s efforts at stabilising its self-narrative in the face of continual 
decentring at the point of multiple overlapping and conflicting temporalities is 
a crucial form of timing. Timing, time, and emotion/desire, in this sense, 
compound a much more complex relationship than is normally recognised. 
This relationship is politically challenging because it is intrinsically positional, 
holds implications for others (either within or without this identity), and is 
contestable by them. 
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Finally, this understanding of the entanglement of timing, identity, and desire 
suggest a different strategy of critique of dominant discourses than IR usually 
recognises. Much of critical IR’s understanding of critique lies in the general 
notion of de-naturalisation – that is, that effective critique must aim not at 
engaging a problem or issue necessarily on its own terms, but rather to show 
the historical and contingent constitution of the problem itself. In other words, 
critical IR often aims (rightly so) at demonstrating the contingency of 
contemporary arrangements – that since things could have been different, 
they can change and be changed. Cox’s (1981) distinction between problem-
solving and critical theory comes to mind here. Yet, as sensible as this 
seems, critiques of dominant discourses often fall flat. This chapter suggests 
instead that criticism should incorporate the temporal and desirous 
dimensions of identities. Criticism should be aimed not merely at pointing out 
the historical contingency of an issue. Rather, it should also aim at displacing 
the emotional investments in the identity narratives in question from 
wholeness and closure to an explicitly open politics of identity and timing. If 
social subjects can only ever engage in the open-ended timing of the Self, 
then we should explicitly develop a politics from this rather than pining for its 
impossible alternative (see Hom and Steele 2010; Hom 2016). By disrupting 
the timing standards and concomitant modes of coordination and control that 
implicitly underpin dominant identity narratives for the positive purpose of 
fostering a politics of open timing, and also thereby helping to shake up the 
investments of desire that fortify their hegemony, social criticism may be more 
able to make some headway against discourses of violence and control, such 
as the war on terror. If we enrich our models of subjectivity and identity by 
integrating notions of timing and emotion/desire, our critiques may be more 
effective in shaking these very elements that help to constitute the power and 
pull of identity.  
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Truth as the Father of Time
Rousseau’s jibe, that Hobbes showed us not man but Englishmen in a state 
of nature, makes a profound and perennially relevant point about the nature 
of rationalist theorising about ethics and politics. Specifically here my concern 
is with ethical theorists who believe that answers to ethical questions about 
world politics can be arrived at through the exercise of impartial reason at the 
level of ideal theory, often using thought experiments as a way of clarifying 
and resolving moral dilemmas about war or global justice (see Hutchings 
2010: 28-53 for an overview of rationalist ethical theories; Simmons 2010 for 
a discussion of the ideal/ non-ideal theory distinction). Thought experiments 
construct scenarios in order to test out moral intuitions, and may range from 
Singer’s famous use of the example of the passing adult’s obligation to save 
a child from drowning in order to demonstrate the moral obligations of the 
globally affluent towards the starving (Singer 1972) to increasingly fantastical 
articulations of the ‘trolley problem’ to tease out circumstances in which killing 
the innocent may be justified.16 This kind of moral reasoning is particularly 
characteristic of certain trends in cosmopolitan moral theory based on 
deontological, consequentialist or contractualist assumptions, especially 
recent developments in the ethics of war (see McMahan 2009; Fabre 2012). 
As critics of ideal theory have persistently pointed out, the principles, actors 
16  see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem
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and situations that make up the worlds of thought experiments tend to reflect 
and incorporate assumptions that are specific to the time and place of the 
theorist, whether the theorist is conscious of this or not (Mills 2005; Miller 
2008). In what follows I suggest that one such set of assumptions that 
remains in place, and continues to do a lot of work in the articulation and 
reception of rationalist international ethical and political theory, is a set of 
assumptions about the temporality of world politics. The ways in which 
traditions of moral thought are mobilised in ethical rationalism is indifferent to 
historical context. But this very indifference is premised on assumptions about 
time and the role of the theorist in relation to it that are highly historically 
specific. They are assumptions that follow from the subsumption of moral 
theory under an epistemic, Baconian model of science (Hutchings 2008: 32-
34). On this account, truth (science) has priority over time (nature) and 
provides the key to controlling and making time (second nature). Within this 
worldview, as I have explained elsewhere, the temporality of the ethical and 
political present (within the possible worlds of ethical argumentation and 
thought experiment) is a temporality of creative action in which creative time-
making (Kairos) imposes itself on natural, chronological time (Chronos). In 
keeping with Baconian rationalism, agents within the simplified worlds of 
ethical theory, who are depicted as making decisions about what it would be 
right to do in particular situations (e.g. when faced with choices between 
killing and letting die in the contest of war) are, insofar as they enact true 
principles, time-makers. This temporal positioning is confirmed by the fact that 
the imagined situations in which agents in these scenarios are caught, 
necessitate that the capacity to master time is not universally shared. 
Shadowy ‘other’ actors accompany the moral agents in the spotlight of the 
possible world. Without these other actors, there is no situation, there are no 
moral dilemmas and questions. 
The focus in scenarios imagined by ethical theorists is on the question of 
what would be right in certain situations for moral agents to do, but in order 
for this question to be raised moral agents require the presence of those who 
are not competent moral agents in the fullest sense. They are the mistaken, 
the wicked, the ignorant and the incapable. Without them, no moral dilemmas 
would arise. The temporality of the simplified world of ethical thought 
experiments, therefore, is double and paradoxical, it is one in which time 
creators and time creatures share and do not share the same temporality of 
action, the (hypothetical) present. This unevenness is underlined by the 
abstracted practices and institutions that also shape the situation, and that 
reflect a skew towards the perspective of those moral agents for whom 
certain questions are particularly relevant. Questions about the criteria for 
intervention, about who should be killable and who should not, about whether 
there is an obligation to give aid, to reform global governance, or to 
redistribute wealth. Such questions presuppose asymmetrical power relations 
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within the simplified world and are addressed to the strong, who are strong in 
two interrelated senses: first in the sense that they are full moral agents; 
second, in the sense that they occupy positions of power. 
The scenarios constructed by ethical theorists do their work at the level of 
ideal theory through the identification of the theorist (truth teller) and their 
audience with idealised moral agency. The purpose of the exercise is to 
illuminate what should be done in a context in which what ought to be done 
can be done. This means that the theorist and audience see their situation 
from the perspective of the time-makers. This identification is cemented 
through the examples and analogies used to bring the argument home. 
Where these illustrations are fictional, they typically place the moral agent in a 
relation in which moral hierarchy and asymmetrical power are obvious: adults 
and children; perpetrators and victims; punishers and criminals. Where these 
illustrations are historical, they typically draw on events specific to histories 
and experiences that will be familiar to theorist and audience. The reason, I 
suggest, why these kinds of illustrations are so important for rationalist moral 
and political theory is that they make clear the homology between the fictional 
temporality of the possible world of thought experimentation and 
unquestioned assumptions about the temporality of actual world politics, and 
thus enable theorist and audience to recognise themselves within the 
imagined scenarios through which they develop their arguments. These 
unquestioned assumptions not only presume a world in which the time of 
action is unevenly distributed, but map this uneven distribution so as to 
identify the truth that generates time with the time and place of the theorist 
and audience. Possible worlds incorporate precisely the assumptions of 
simultaneous equality and hierarchy that characterise predominant narratives 
of world politics and economics in the post-Cold War period. Moreover, they 
reproduce the same mapping of strength and weakness, goodness and 
badness and the same recipe for how weakness and badness may be 
addressed through the good offices of the strong and the good, the time 
makers amongst us. In effect, the possible world accomplishes for moral 
rationalism, what philosophical history accomplishes for historicism; it grants 
a universal and unifying significance to the time making powers of western 
modernity for the world as a whole. 
The implications of the reproduction of the western moral imaginary for the 
practice of theory are evident in Singer’s previously cited argument for the 
moral requirement on individuals to give aid to famine victims. In order to 
make his point, Singer makes an analogy between the obligation for the 
affluent to give aid in a specified situation of famine in which certain 
conditions are assumed, and the obligation of an adult passing by to save a 
child from drowning in a puddle. Singer’s adult/ child analogy works 
powerfully to dramatise his point about the nature of the obligation of affluent 
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westerners to aid victims of famine. But it does so by explicitly characterising 
the relation between the affluent west and the victim other in terms of a 
protective relation between the mature adult and the immature child. Singer’s 
argument could not be addressed to the victim/ child, because the latter is a 
subject position defined through incapacity, an incapacity that, by implication, 
is spiritual as well as material. What is being set up is not just a hierarchical 
way of seeing the world, but also the exclusion of victim/ child from the moral 
conversation, because in addition to being incapable of action, the victim/ 
child does not know anything morally or empirically valuable. This endows the 
ethical theorist and the addressees of his arguments with a position of ethical 
privilege, one that empowers both theorist and audience, within the moral 
imaginary of the simplified world, to act unilaterally because of their grasp of 
moral and empirical truth. Moral reasoning, on this account, becomes a 
profoundly hierarchical and exclusive business, even while it aims to forward 
universal principles of moral equality. The moral equality of theorist, audience 
and hypothetical moral agents in the possible world is inseparable from a 
distinction between those who grasp moral equality as a truth and those that 
do not. 
To suggest that this is corrupting of the ambitions of rationalist cosmopolitan 
arguments may sound hyperbolic, but I do not think it overstates the case. It 
is corrupting because of its implicit identification of an audience capable of 
learning with those who already share the same world, and because of the 
limitations that it places on what can be learnt. And also because of the 
dispositional relations it sets up between moral theorists and those on behalf 
of whom they claim to speak - the shadowy, less than fully competent agents, 
who are stuck in time and not, by definition, going to learn from their role in 
the moral theorists’ thought experiments. The explicit purpose of such 
arguments is to provide critical standards for thought, yet scenarios are 
constructed in such a way that no fundamental shifting of established ways of 
thinking about the ethics of world politics is possible. Thus one may argue 
over the principles or even the permissibility of aid, development, resistant 
violence or humanitarian intervention, but always within the terms of moral 
and empirical reference points that are fused within a particular moral 
imaginary. Those terms keep meaningful conversation to a restricted group of 
participants – perhaps best captured by the term ‘the beneficent powerful’. To 
engage with the moral imaginaries of the vulnerable, the immature, the 
wicked, or the incapable would be to ‘go back’ to times that have been 
transcended by truth. Each time cosmopolitan ethical theorists replay their 
account of moral agency situated in the context of its shadowy others 
(perpetrators and victims), the moral superiority and historical advantage of 
the theorist and of their audience is reaffirmed. 
The co-existence of equality and inequality in the worlds of moral rationalism 
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is rendered comprehensible by being embedded in a temporal imaginary 
specific to Baconian assumptions about the relation between truth and time. 
Within this imaginary, the dispositional relation between the moral theorist 
and those on behalf of whom she speaks most commonly manifests itself in 
one of three modalities: protective; educative and punitive. Moral rationalists 
use their simplified worlds to enable identification between theorist, 
addressee and idealised moral agency. This means that they identify with the 
moral position, choices and dilemmas of the protector, the teacher and the 
law enforcer. This way of approaching ethical questions is epistemic and 
technocratic, for rationalist moral theorists the holder of moral truth within the 
possible world is beyond the reach of affect and power, and able to be 
effective in implementing the requirements of truth. In this respect, although 
theorists and their addressees make mistakes, these mistakes are of a 
particular kind, they do not disturb the fundamental subject position of the 
truth teller and truth seeker. Of course, theorists know that they can get things 
wrong – as is evident from ongoing disputes between different rationalist 
positions – but they can never be fundamentally wrong in the world-shifting 
way that time creatures are wrong. At the same time as having a conversation 
between themselves, therefore, a hierarchical relation with others is being 
reproduced. In this respect, the moral sensibilities and sensitivities cultivated 
in the hypothetical worlds of moral rationalism are those of authority derived 
from superiority. 
Truth as the Daughter of Time
It might be argued that the corruption I identify follows not from the 
assumptions of moral rationalism but from the illicit smuggling in of elements 
of western bias into imagined worlds, for instance through the analogy 
between developed world and adult. If this is the case, then it implies that a 
moral technocracy that can demonstrate to all what ought to be done through 
access to the realm of truth (beyond time) is a viable possibility. But unless 
the actual world has already achieved moral perfection from the point of view 
of all (in which case the moral technocracy would be redundant) then this 
would still leave the hierarchy between time creators and time creatures, and 
the reproduction of that world in place. Although it undoubtedly provides a 
way of ensuring rigorous clarification of what the truth is claimed be, any 
normative theory modelled on Baconian assumptions elevates those that 
grasp the truth over those that don’t. When it comes to normative theories 
about world politics it is hard to see how any particular band of moral 
technocrats can avoid reproducing the hierarchies that have enabled the 
leisure and provided the tools to exercise that technocracy in the first place. If 
we are to counter this tendency, then the chances are higher if rather than 
seeking to inhabit an imaginary that is completely out of this world, we 
replace Bacon’s vision of truth as the masculine progenitor of time with the 
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alternative conceit of a feminised truth, the daughter of time, and use this to 
multiply the worldly imaginaries that are expressed in our hypothetical worlds. 
If moral truth is the daughter of time rather than its father, then there are no 
timeless ethical truths that have the capacity to make time, and the temporal 
parameters of judgment have to become an explicit focus of attention for 
international ethical and political theory. The coincidence of moral superiority 
and historical advantage that is rationalised in the possible worlds of moral 
rationalism (and the developmental philosophies of history of liberalism and 
Marxism) relies on accounts of world political temporality as singular, 
unevenly progressive and led by the West. If this temporal framing is put into 
question, then so is the mutual reinforcement between claims to moral 
superiority and historical privilege, and therefore between moral superiority 
and particular ways of organising human relations: interpersonally, socially, 
economically and politically. If one is interested in doing international ethical 
and political theory in a way that does not take the modernist moral/ historical 
link for granted, then provincialising work is necessary. This is essentially 
work of disorientation and reorientation as part of the construction of moral 
imaginaries less hidebound by the assumptions that structure the possible 
worlds of rationalism. So, how is this to be done? And what are the 
implications in terms of the concerns of international ethical and political 
theory? 
First of all, the moral theorist has to recognise and acknowledge the moral 
imaginary that he or she takes for granted. Moral rationalism encourages the 
equation of a moral imaginary with a set of epistemic premises, but in practice 
no moral imaginary is confined to articulable ethical principles and values, it 
also includes assumptions about situations, about protagonists, about 
empirical facts, about lived experience and about the space and time of moral 
engagement. All of this, I suggest, when trying to think ethically about world 
politics is underwritten and made intelligible by a reading of world political 
time, a set of assumptions about the nature and meaning of the world political 
present in relation to past and future, and the place of one’s theoretical voice 
within that narrative. The process of disorientation I am recommending 
requires the rationalist moral theorist to leave the comfort zone of this 
identification between moral superiority and their own particular place and 
time and to embrace an ‘out of jointness’ in which their own ‘backwardness’ or 
‘wickedness’ could be possible. This may sound like a reintroduction of some 
kind of transcendental move beyond time, but this would only be the case if 
the temporality of ethical judgment prevalent within the western academy is 
the only possible temporality, and if truth is the daughter not the father of time 
then that is something that could not self-evidently be the case. In fact, we 
know it is not the case, in the banal sense that the moral superiority/ historical 
advantage story has not always framed ethical and political thinking and has 
44Time Creators and Time Creatures in the Ethics of World Politics
been, and continues to be, consistently contested from inside and outside the 
political communities that have been its key proselytisers. The only way to 
suspend dependence on a particular reading of the present is to open up 
one’s moral imaginary to other orientations. Very often, historically, such 
opening up has been violently enforced rather than willingly embraced. 
Nevertheless, for most of the populations that occupy the shadowy ‘other’ 
positions in the possible worlds of moral rationalism, engagement between 
different moral imaginaries and different temporal orderings is commonplace. 
Borrowing Chakrabarty’s terminology, I have suggested elsewhere that 
international ethical and political theorists need to cultivate a heterotemporal 
orientation towards ethical judgment (Chakrabarty 2000; Hutchings 2011).
A heterotemporal orientation to cosmopolitanism decentres the position of the 
ethical theorist by questioning the assumption of a fusion between his or her 
particular present and ‘the’ present of world politics. It raises the question as 
to why, for example, humanitarian intervention or the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ should be taken as a sign of the distinctiveness of the world-political 
present. For whom, and from whose perspective is this a novel development? 
Does it mark a normative difference in the conduct of world politics or simply 
confirm a set of longstanding patterns? To raise the question of novelty is to 
disturb the kinds of subjective certainty, of ‘at homeness’ in thought, that 
render phenomena such as humanitarian intervention straightforwardly timely. 
In this respect, a heterotemporal orientation makes the work of the theorist 
much harder, since it requires the painful, political effort of cross-temporal 
engagement without the short cuts enabled by the taken for granted fusion of 
his or her particular present with the end of history.  
If humanitarian intervention is identified with the potential globalisation of 
justice, then a heterotemporal orientation would suggest that what is needed 
is to begin by acknowledging and examining political temporalities of 
violation, in order to understand the meanings of injustice in the present. This 
would enable judgment of the likely effects of the institutionalisation of 
particular normative priorities in the principles and practices of international 
humanitarianism. But it would also open up the question of what kinds of 
violation matter and why, and offer a different route to the establishment of 
international hierarchies of outrage than that reflected in the moral priorities of 
existing international human rights regimes. Within predominant 
contemporary diagnoses of, and prescriptions for, world politics the problem 
is not that the co-existence of a plurality of orientations goes unrecognised, 
so much as that the meaning of this plurality is always already homogenised 
by reference to the authoritative space/time of western modernity. It is the 
subjective certainty of this orientation that not only grounds the theorist’s 
judgment but also enables it to make a difference in practice, through timely 
prescription and through example. Instead of being the one who already 
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knows the time, the heterotemporally oriented theorist is fundamentally 
uncertain of his own punctuality (see Thaler 2014 for an attempt to complicate 
temporal assumptions in just war theory). The extent to which his 
interventions are or are not timely will depend on the moral/temporal 
certainties and uncertainties (orientations) of his interlocutors. To engage with 
alternative temporal framings for judgment is well within the limits of logical 
possibility, but to take seriously a challenge to one’s investment in a narrative 
of truth and progress that cannot live with provincialisation, is profoundly 
disturbing for those of us educated in rationalist traditions of moral theorising. 
It is, however, the only way to shift the ground of ethical debate about world 
politics away from an agenda that is incapable of seriously questioning its 
own timeliness.
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The Epistemological 
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Generational Analysis in IR
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As the very existence of this volume demonstrates, scholars of International 
Relations (IR) are increasingly paying attention to the importance of time and 
how time affects processes and outcomes in international politics. In this 
chapter, I will not make the case for why we should incorporate time into our 
analysis, but assume that we can take it for granted that it is an endeavour 
worthwhile pursuing. Once we assume that there is a case for taking time 
seriously, two questions pose themselves. First, how do we actually take time 
and the temporality of international politics more explicitly into account, and 
incorporate time into our existing theoretical frameworks? Second, what are 
the epistemological implications of incorporating time into the ontology of our 
theoretical frameworks and how do we address them in our research.17 
Pointing out that taking temporality seriously requires us to rethink our 
epistemological commitments is one thing, showing how to actually 
incorporate those epistemological implications is another.
In the pages below, I will argue that one particularly promising way to 
incorporate the temporal dimension of international politics into our theoretical 
apparatuses is to adopt a generational method of analysis. The ‘generation’ in 
essence constitutes a temporal unit of analysis, which locates individuals and 
17  Loosely defined, while ‘ontology’ is concerned with what the world is ‘made of’, 
‘epistemology’ is concerned with how we know that world. 
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collectives in the process of time. A generational method therefore allows us 
to study how groups that are located at different positions in time interact and 
consequently affect political outcomes. 
My answer to the second question is that adopting a generational method and 
taking the temporality of political ideas and practice more seriously implies 
that we, students and scholars of international politics, cannot claim to occupy 
a timeless position from which to evaluate international relations and foreign 
policy. Taking time seriously implies that the knowledge we produce as a 
discipline is always time-dependent, since we always interpret the world from 
the temporal position of our own generation. This implies the possibility that 
the validity and ‘truth’ of our research varies historically. One could 
consequently question whether our research and the knowledge we produce 
can therefore be judged and evaluated in an objective fashion. This threat of 
relativism, however, can be countered by making the observer’s position, i.e. 
our own position, in time explicit and by incorporating it directly into our own 
research. I show that generational analysis helps us to take a first step in 
addressing the epistemological implications of taking time seriously by 
allowing us to study our own perspective in the temporal process via an 
analysis of our own generation and how it relates to the people whose actions 
and ideas we study. 
In order to illustrate how to apply generational analysis and how to address 
the epistemological consequences outlined above, I will discuss my own 
research on the role of the WWII Generation in post-war Germany. I have 
only recently begun this project, which builds on my dissertation, and the 
pages to follow will consequently help me to think through some of the issues 
that I will have to address in this project. You should therefore consider this 
an initial ‘think piece’ which contains a lot of ideas that will need to be 
developed much more carefully in the future. At the same time, however, I 
hope that drawing on my own work will not only show the complexities of 
dealing with time in our research, but also provide a somewhat concrete 
example of how one can possibly address these complexities. 
Temporality and Generations
Time is, alongside space, one of the most fundamental conditions of our 
existence. We are temporal beings in so far as we are born, age, and die, and 
we experience the social world around us as a constant stream of events that 
signify the passage of time. In order to understand how temporality affects 
outcomes in international politics, we therefore ideally possess theoretical 
frameworks that are dynamic, by which I mean that they are capable of 
incorporating changes and processes that occur over time. Most theories in 
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IR, however, are static and a-temporal, in so far as they focus on the structure 
of incentives, the international system at any given point in time, etc.18 In my 
own work, I have tried to demonstrate that generational analysis provides one 
powerful complement to our theoretical toolbox that enables us to take the 
temporal nature of international politics and foreign policy into account more 
explicitly.  
In this section I will explain how the concept of generations and generational 
analysis provide one particularly fruitful way to take the temporality of our 
‘objects of study,’ and therefore the temporality of foreign policy and 
international politics, more seriously. By ‘temporality’ I mean the experience of 
time (McIntosh 2015: fn 2), and we experience time through the passage of 
events, our actions in the present, and our expectations for the future. The 
analytical value of the concept of ‘generations’ is that it locates individuals 
and groups at the intersection of two of the most fundamental temporal 
dimensions, collective and individual time. Collective time refers to events 
which are experienced by society as a whole. Elections, national sports 
tournaments, or, most extremely, war, are just some examples of such 
collective events. How we experience these events and therefore our time, 
however, also depends on the particular life stage we occupy, or on our 
individual time. Events experienced during childhood will have a different 
effect on someone than events experienced as an adult. Most generation 
scholars agree that the age of youth plays an especially important stage in life 
given that this is the time when most individuals develop and solidify their 
basic political orientations and worldviews.19 
The generation then signifies the intersection between individual life stage 
and collective events. As such, it constitutes a unit of analysis that locates 
people in the process of time, similarly to how the concept of ‘class’ locates 
people in the existing social structure. However, in contrast to analytical 
concepts, such as social class, the state, or the international system, all of 
which capture a particular aspect of social reality at any given point in time, 
the concept of generations constitutes a temporal unit of analysis which 
captures the different experiences of groups of people located at different 
intersections of individual and collective time. This implies that different 
generations live, quite literally, in different times because 1) they experienced 
a particular set of events during a different life stage than their predecessors 
or successors, or because 2) they experienced different sets of events during 
18  See, for example, McIntosh (2015).
19  On the relevance of the age period of youth and for good general introductions to 
the concept of generations and its explanatory contribution see, for example, Eisenstadt 
2003 (1956); Edmunds and Turner (2002, 2005; Fogt (1982); and Mannheim 1997 
(1952). For a discussion of the concept of generations and its application to foreign 
policy analysis and the study of IR, see Jervis (1976) and Steele and Acuff (2012).
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the same life stage. Importantly, this means that different generations share a 
different worldview and attach different meanings to the ideas that they inherit 
from preceding generations. ‘Democracy’ does mean something different to 
me than it did to my grandparents. Generational analysis allows us to study 
the interaction of differently positioned generations and how those 
interactions affect political outcomes. 
In contrast to a linear conception of time, where time moves forward as a 
singular stream of events, a generational perspective implies a conception of 
time which is comprised of multiple temporal experiences, or generations, 
which co-exist simultaneously while still living in different ‘times’.
The potential range of applications of generational analysis to the study of 
foreign policy and international relations is enormous, given that most of the 
processes we study take place, by definition, over the course of time. Instead 
of going through a list of applications of a generational approach,20 I will focus 
on the concept of political generations and use my own work as an example 
to illustrate how to actually apply generational analysis. This will also set up 
my argument that adopting a generational approach, and more generally 
taking temporality seriously, has important implications for how we study 
international politics and for the status of knowledge that we produce in the 
discipline. 
Political Generations
In my work I have drawn on the concept of generations in order to develop a 
theory of political generations and to show that political generations have the 
potential to explain periods of change and stability in foreign policy and 
international politics. I define political generations as cohorts in their youth 
who, in response to a series of events that seem to challenge the existing 
social and political order, develop a sense of generational consciousness and 
belonging. 21 As a result, they develop distinct, historically specific, sets of 
political worldviews and act in the world on the basis of shared background 
beliefs that make political practice and discourse possible in the first place. 
20  See Steele and Acuff (2012) for an excellent showcase of the potential breadth of 
applications of generational analysis. Also, for a much more modest attempt, see 
Luecke (2013b). 
21  Note that only events which ‘seem to challenge the established political’ qualify as 
events capable of resulting in new political generations. For example, while the war in 
Korea was not perceived as challenging the political order of the U.S. at the time, the 
war in Vietnam certainly was perceived as such a challenge by both the political right 
and left. In the end, whether or not a particular series of events results in the 
emergence of a new political generation is an empirical question. 
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The fact that generational experiences are shared by entire cohorts, however, 
does not imply that the members of a generation agree on how to respond to 
the challenges facing their society. Quite the contrary, members of one and 
the same generation might disagree heavily how to address those challenges. 
What makes a generation a political generation is that its members have to 
deal with the same set of historical circumstances at a similar stage in their 
life cycles. The members of political generations identify with one another 
through the challenges that formative events pose, but they often disagree 
heavily on how to respond to those challenges.
Political generations can be more ‘radical’ or ‘traditional’, depending on 
whether their members perceive the old generation in power to respond to the 
challenge facing society successfully or not. If elites, and therefore the old 
generation, are perceived as failing to address the challenge, members of the 
newly emerging generation will attempt to change the existing political 
culture. The Sixties Generation is maybe the most famous example of such a 
radical political generation. However, as the fate of the Sixties Generation has 
shown, attempts by the young generation to change the established order are 
often doomed to failure. The reason for this is that power is largely 
concentrated in the hands of the older generation, which will often attempt to 
resist the challenges of the young generation. However, even if political 
generations fail to bring about change at the time of their ‘birth’, their 
members eventually age and start to replace the older generation from 
positions of power. One of the most interesting and potentially valuable 
insights of a theory of political generations is therefore that the initial cause of 
change, a series of formative events, and its effect do not follow immediately 
upon each other, but only occur with a time lag of roughly 15-25 years.22 A 
generational approach is therefore able to provide new answers to old 
questions, especially when it comes to investigating the long term effects 
domestically and internationally of events such as World War I and II, 
Vietnam, the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Arab Spring, or the 
economic crisis that started in 2008. 
Whereas generational change that brings to power a radical generation is 
likely to result in changes in political culture and political practice, the coming 
22  If we define the age of ‘youth’ as roughly the age of 18-25 and consider that most 
people in positions of power are at least 35 years of age or older, we can project that 
generational change will begin about 15-25 years after the generation experiences its 
formative events. In general, the boundaries of political generations are always slightly 
fuzzy since even individuals who do not fall exactly into the age bracket defined as 
formative might identify with the formative experiences of a generation. However, most 
concepts we employ in IR, such as the state or culture, have fuzzy boundaries that are 
difficult to define with precision, which does not stop us from drawing on them in our 
research. 
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to power of traditional generations is marked by stability. Traditional political 
generations emerge when cohorts in their youth perceive the response of the 
old generation to challenges facing the political order as successful. Instead 
of trying to radically change the existing political order, traditional generations 
therefore adopt the political culture of the old generation, even though they 
might adjust it to new circumstances. 
Political generations therefore constitute one potentially powerful mechanism 
to adjust political culture, and by extension ideas and beliefs about foreign 
policy and international politics, to an ever changing world. Based on this 
argument, I suggest that radical and traditional political generations alternate 
across time, thereby giving rise to cycles of change and stability in foreign 
policy and international politics.23 In my dissertation, I subject this theory of 
political generations and generational change to an initial plausibility probe 
through an examination of U.S. foreign policy and the emergence of the West 
in the 20th century. While not conclusive, the results show that the timing of 
generational changes matches the timing of periods of change and stability in 
U.S. foreign policy and international politics. 
Epistemological Implications 
The argument that I have tried to make so far is that generational analysis 
can provide us with access to the temporality of the people whose ideas and 
practices we study in the context of foreign policy and international politics. 
However, adopting a generational perspective and thereby incorporating 
temporality into the ontology of our theoretical frameworks also has important 
epistemological implications, or put differently, implications for how we can 
know, understand, and consequently study the world. Namely, if different 
generations experience the world differently and therefore interpret the world 
differently, then we, as researchers, cannot occupy a ‘timeless’ position from 
which to study those generations, since we ourselves occupy a particular 
generational location in the process of time. This implies that the knowledge 
that the discipline of IR, and all social science for that matter, produces 
cannot be a-temporal and ‘objective’, but is always temporal itself, time-
bound, and contextual.24 The contribution of a generational approach to the 
study of foreign policy and IR, however, rests in not only alerting us to the 
epistemological implications of taking time seriously, but primarily in providing 
a first step in addressing these implications in our research. 
Let me briefly illustrate through my own current research how this problem 
manifests itself in research practice and how generational analysis provides a 
23  For a more detailed discussion see Luecke (2013a). 
24  I am certainly not the first one to make this claim. See especially Kratochwil (2006). 
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solution to said problem. About a year ago I began working on a new 
research project, which investigates the role of the WWII Generation, those 
who experienced the Second World War during their formative years of youth, 
in post-war Germany. I am German myself and the question that made me 
study IR and enter academia was ‘how is it possible that a country, such as 
Germany, starts two world wars, brings incredible destruction to the world, 
and then changes into one of the most stable, economically successful, and 
peaceful nations on earth?’ Obviously there already exists a wide range of 
answers to this question, provided by realist, liberal, or constructivist theories. 
However, most of these answer focus on external factors, such as the 
occupying forces, the balance of power, etc. Yet, few accounts in IR that I am 
aware of have examined the role of Germans and especially of those 
Germans who had fought during the war.25 
However, there is also a more personal motivation to pursue this project. My 
grandfather, Paul Lücke, had been minister of housing and for a brief period 
minister of the interior for the Conservative Democratic Union (CDU) during 
the post-war years in Germany. He died before I was born and since we had 
never spoken much about him in my family, I had planned to write a 
biography for some years already. Paul Lücke was born in 1914 and had 
fought as a soldier of the Wehrmacht during the entire course of the war from 
1939 and 1945. Despite his participation in the war, he had never joined the 
Nazi party and actively opposed the Nazis during his youth on the basis of his 
Christian-Conservative values. Those values also informed his latter public 
housing policies and his efforts to house the millions of refugees that were 
returning to Germany after the war. His biography therefore provides a perfect 
starting point and analytical foil to examine the contribution of members of the 
WWII Generation who were not convinced Nazis and who contributed 
significantly to the successful reconstruction and re-integration of Western 
Germany. For that reason, I decided to channel both these motivations into a 
single project.  
However, in the context of discussing this project with colleagues, friends, 
and a very observant archivist at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, I was 
asked repeatedly whether the relationship to my grandfather would not affect 
my interpretation of history and make it impossible to remain objective and 
unbiased. I was obviously aware of the issue already and knew that I had to 
address the question. However, I also quickly noticed that I needed to 
address not only the question of my personal relationship to my grandfather, 
but my relationship to his generation as a whole. The WWII Generation 
obviously has a particular public image in Germany, given that many of its 
members were implicated in the Nazi regime, the Holocaust, and other mass 
25  Jackson (2006) is a notable exception. 
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atrocities. Moreover, this public image of the WWII generation in Germany 
has clearly been shaped by the public discourse of another political 
generation, the Sixties Generation, or the ‘68er Generation’ (Generation of 
1968), as it is best known in Germany. The Generation of 1968 emerged, just 
like in the United States, in large part as a response to the war in Vietnam, 
racial unrest, the perception that liberal Western countries were supporting 
repressive regimes in Third World countries, but also in response to the fact 
that many former Nazis or Nazi supporters were still occupying positions of 
public power in Western Germany. Unquestionably, the Generation of 1968 
and the fact that it contributed significantly to an actual engagement with the 
past and the crimes that were committed by those who started and fought in 
the Second World War has been a positive influence and a significant reason 
for the political and cultural change that has made Germany the country that it 
is today. 
At the same time, the public discourses and images of the WWII Generation 
that the Sixties Generation created in Germany, and which still dominate the 
political discourse today, have also resulted in the fact that the contribution of 
members of the WWII Generation who were not Nazis has often been ignored 
or ‘forgotten’. Now, I myself was raised and socialised by members of the 
Generation of 1968. Not only my parents, but my teachers, high school 
teachers, and many adult role models during my youth belonged to the Sixties 
Generation. As a result, my political worldview and also my perspective on 
the WWII Generation are already shaped and biased by the interpretations of 
the Generation of 1968. The complicated relationship between the WWII 
Generation, the Generation of 1968, and my own generation therefore 
already makes it difficult to see how an ‘objective history’ of the WWII 
Generation is possible, and it shows that taking temporality seriously does 
come at the cost of increasing complexity and intricate epistemological 
problems. 
How should one deal with the problem that there seems to be no timeless, 
and therefore no objective, position from which to evaluate the contributions 
of the WWII Generation in Germany? I think that the only defensible course of 
action is to confront this problem head on and to explicitly address and 
incorporate the temporal nature of my position and consequently of the 
results that I generate into the analysis. Put differently, we should not merely 
accept, but embrace the fact that we evaluate the past and try to predict the 
future from a particular perspective in time which will inevitably affect the 
results of our research. Generational analysis provides a clear answer to the 
question of how to uncover this position in time; namely, by studying our own 
generation and the particular worldview and formative challenges that 
characterise it. In the case of my research project, which tries to examine the 
role of the WWII Generation in Germany, I will therefore not only examine the 
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political orientations of the WWII Generation, but also those of the Generation 
of 1968, and of my own generation. More importantly, I will need to 
disentangle the complicated ways with which these three generations relate 
to one another. 
The Threat of Relativism
Taking time seriously, for example by studying generations from one’s own 
generational location, means to accept that there is no ‘objective’ or ‘timeless’ 
position from which to study social life. Even though this is a discussion that I 
can clearly not engage in much detail here, the lack of a timeless position 
runs contrary to the tenets of positivism, which still dominates the field of IR 
and it raises the question of the status of knowledge thus generated. 
Indeed, it is no coincidence that the author of the most seminal essay on 
generations, Karl Mannheim, was first and foremost famous for his attempts 
to develop a sociology of knowledge, which he understood to consist of a 
‘theory of the social or existential conditioning of knowledge by location in a 
socio-historical structure’ (Pilcher 1994:482). Much of Mannheim’s work 
rested on a critique of the Enlightenment idea that reason or truth are 
temporally static. Instead, he argued that reason is historically dynamic 
(Hekman 1986: 54), or put differently, the criteria for evaluating good 
arguments and by extension good research vary across time. This is much in 
line with the thought of the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (1996), who 
argued that science progresses not in linear fashion but in paradigm shifts 
which (coincidence?) are caused by generational changes. 
The critique that Mannheim encountered, and which bedevils any attempt at a 
sociology of knowledge more generally, is that his arguments ended up in 
relativism, the idea that there is no way at all to differentiate between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ reasons, research, or ‘truths’. If reason varies historically and if 
there are therefore no objective criteria with which to evaluate knowledge, 
isn’t all knowledge and therefore also all IR research entirely up to our, or in 
this case my own, subjective standards? 
My answer to this question is a cautious and preliminary ‘no’. Yes, knowledge 
from a particular generational location or temporal perspective is not 
‘objective knowledge’, understood as knowledge from some ultimate timeless 
Archimedean viewpoint. Yet, it is neither merely subjective. Instead 
knowledge, and therefore the research we produce, is intersubjective in so far 
as it rests on standards of evaluating reasons that are shared in the 
community that is ‘IR’. More generally, the knowledge and practices we 
produce and engage in can be evaluated by members of our generation, who 
56Taking Time Seriously and the Value of Generational Analysis in IR
share the same temporal location and therefore similar standards of 
evaluation. In addition, once we make our own generation location explicit, 
our research can be assessed by older or younger generations, since they 
will be able to locate themselves vis-à-vis our generation in the historical 
process and thereby be able to understand the particular context in which our 
research was generated. 
Conclusion
As I already stated up front, this is only a very first cut at the question of how 
to address the epistemological implications of taking time seriously. This 
question requires a much more in-depth discussion and a careful 
engagement with the relevant literature in social theory, sociology of 
knowledge, and obviously IR. My primary goal in the pages above was to take 
a first initial stab at thinking through the consequences of taking temporality 
seriously and to use my own work as an example for how one can potentially 
deal with those issues. I hope that I have been able to show that generational 
analysis is one promising way to incorporate the temporality of international 
politics into our theoretical frameworks. However, adopting the notion that 
generational membership shapes the way we perceive, interpret, and act in 
the world implies that we ourselves, the knowledge we produce, the practices 
we engage in, are shaped by our generation, which is the location we occupy 
in the temporal process. I think that this requires us to explicitly incorporate 
our own temporal location into our research and accept the fact that our 
results are judged by community standards that are upheld and changed by 
generations of IR scholars and students. This argument therefore comes to 
similar conclusions to those of Friedrich Kratochwil, who argued that history 
understood as memory ‘is always viewed from a particular vantage point of 
the present’ (Kratochwil 2006: 21). Kratochwil arrives at this conclusion 
through a discussion of the role of history and the ability of the discipline to 
generate practical, rather than merely theoretical, knowledge. The fact that 
we seem to arrive at similar conclusions, however, suggests that if we want to 
take time seriously in IR research we will actually need to think through the 
epistemological implications and complications that are entailed in making 
such an analytical shift. In my opinion it will certainly be worth the costs. Yet, 
developing these ideas further will require a collective effort. I therefore hope 
that the next generation of IR students and scholars will take up the 
challenge.  
* The ideas developed here benefited greatly from discussions with Lise 
Herman and Alexander Wendt. My thanks and gratitude go out to both of 
them. All mistakes and errors are obviously my own. 
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4
Governing the Time of the 
World
TIM STEVENS
ROYAL HOLLOWAY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, UK
Recent scholarship in International Relations (IR) is concerned with how 
political actors conceive of time and experience temporality and, specifically, 
how these ontological and epistemological considerations affect political 
theory and practice (Hutchings 2008; Stevens 2016). Drawing upon diverse 
empirical and theoretical resources, it emphasises both the political nature of 
‘time’ and the temporalities of politics. This chronopolitical sensitivity 
augments our understanding of international relations as practices whose 
temporal dimensions are as fundamental to their operations as those 
revealed by more established critiques of spatiality, materiality and discourse 
(see also Klinke 2013). This transforms our understanding of time as a mere 
backdrop to ‘history’ and other core concerns of IR (Kütting 2001) and 
provides opportunities to reflect upon the constitutive role of time in IR theory 
itself (Berenskoetter 2011; Hom and Steele 2010; Hutchings 2007; McIntosh 
2015).
One strand of IR scholarship problematises the historical emergence of a 
hegemonic global time that subsumed within it local and indigenous times to 
become the time by which global trade and communications are transacted 
(Hom 2010, 2012). This linear and mechanical time evolved in lock-step with 
industrialisation and the globalisation of capital and through the internet, in 
particular, a temporal infrastructure has emerged that supports the greater 
infrastructures of global exchange across a range of massively distributed yet 
tightly interdependent sociotechnical systems. This form of time-reckoning is 
contrasted with the complex heterotemporality of actual human lives under 
conditions of late modernity (Hutchings 2008: 1172-6) but relatively little 
attention has been directed towards the nature and character of global time 
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itself. Terms like ‘Western standard time’ have served more as placeholders 
for critique than objects of empirical analysis in their own right (Hom 2010: 
1169). This chapter attends to this analytical deficit by asserting the internal 
heterogeneity of ‘global time’ but at the same time describing how the global 
governance of time seeks to render this temporal assemblage unified, 
meaningful and useful. It asks the simple question: who governs the time of 
the world? Who and what is responsible for producing the hypermodern, 
technological chronos, the ‘always-synchronised time of life, society and 
world history’? (Stevens 2016: 188) The focus of this chapter is the 
production of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), the foundation of global 
broadcast and civil time since 1961.
The first section of this chapter explains what is being governed and why. A 
brief historical review establishes the context and development of UTC and 
shows how the times of the universe are translated into the time of the world 
for the purposes of global synchronisation and communication. The second 
section identifies the key actors and mechanisms involved in UTC and 
therefore in the global governance of time. This includes a range of 
intergovernmental organisations, non-state actors and expert networks. The 
third section introduces some issues and problems arising from this form of 
global governance, particularly those surrounding ‘leap seconds’. The chapter 
concludes by suggesting possible avenues of enquiry for IR and global 
governance scholars concerned with the political construction and 
contestation of time and temporality in the contemporary world.
A Brief History of Time
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) is the basis for worldwide broadcast and 
civil time. It informs multiple time scales from Global Positioning System 
(GPS) time and internet time protocols to radio time signals and national 
speaking clock services. It is the most widely used global time scale and 
underpins every imaginable human activity relying upon precise time 
reckoning at the local, national and global levels. The production of UTC 
demonstrates that global time is not a matter of simply ‘reading off’ time from 
the universe but is a process of assembling and negotiating different ways of 
calculating and thinking about time. This section outlines the essential 
scientific dynamics of this process; the subsequent section will explore in 
greater detail the actors responsible for the production of UTC and the global 
governance of time.
The foundation of UTC is the second, the base unit of time in the International 
System of Units (SI) and the basis of all modern time-reckoning and 
measurement. Since at least the 15th century, seconds, minutes and hours 
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have been calculated as divisions of the solar day, itself derived from 
astronomical observations of the Sun ‘rising’ or ‘setting’ relative to fixed 
terrestrial markers. The precise length of the solar day changes due to 
geological, astronomical and relativistic factors; units derived from its length 
have therefore always been somewhat approximate. Nevertheless, the 
calculation of the mean solar second as 1/86,400th of a mean solar day not 
only persisted into the twentieth century, but in 1935 was adopted by formal 
international agreement as the fundamental scientific unit of time (Kennelly 
1935).
By 1928, the mean solar second was informing Universal Time (UT), a global 
time scale therefore also derived from the axial rotation of the Earth relative to 
the Sun. The recognition that the length of the solar day fluctuated led to the 
development of new time scales that took account of factors like atmospheric 
drag, the gravitation of the Moon and a slow but discernible deceleration in 
axial rotation speed.26 One such was Ephemeris Time (ET), adopted in 1952 
by the International Astronomical Union, and calculated not on the length of 
the solar day but on the duration of the Earth’s annual transit around the Sun 
(i.e. the year). In 1960, the 11th General Conference on Weights and 
Measures (CGPM), which adjudicates on international metrological issues, 
further refined this ‘ephemeris’ second as a fraction of the length of the 
baseline year 1900. This marked a formal shift from using observed solar time 
to derive the SI second – and, therefore, global time scales founded on the 
second – to its definition through Newtonian celestial mechanics and, 
subsequently, by other techniques that accounted for the effects of relativistic 
motion. All were calculated with reference to physical and observable objects 
amenable to visual identification and measurement.
In 1967, the 13th CGPM adopted the atomic second as the SI base unit of 
time. Advances in atomic clock technology presented more precise means of 
establishing consistently the duration to be known as a ‘second’. Global time 
was tethered for the first time not to the observable passage of astronomical 
objects but to invisible radioactive events, specifically the frequency of 
oscillations of the caesium-133 atom (Audoin and Guinot 2000).27 The new 
International Atomic Time (TAI) surpassed astronomical time in accuracy but 
for reasons of continuity with the existing system the specific qualities of the 
atomic second were chosen to match that of the ephemeris second. However, 
these two values have since drifted apart, not least due to the persistent 
slowing of the axial rotation of the Earth. The challenge for the new 
26  The following account is drawn principally from Nelson et al. 2001.
27  The second is defined in the SI system as ‘the duration of 9 192 631 770 periods of 
the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the 
ground state of the caesium 133 atom’ (BIPM 2006: 133).
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Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), introduced in 1961, was to harmonise 
astronomical time (UT) with atomic time (TAI) to produce a time scale (UTC) 
that could be used by all the disparate communities dependent upon accurate 
time measurement. Then as now, laboratory-based sciences preferred atomic 
time—on account of its regularity and reliability—whereas spatially dependent 
activities like astronomy and navigation required time derived from solar and 
other forms of astronomical time-reckoning. The very existence of UTC can 
be read as an attempt to reconcile divergent disciplinary requirements under 
a unifying temporal rubric.
Various experiments were undertaken throughout the 1960s to implement 
irregular ‘jumps’ or ‘time steps’ of fractions of seconds in TAI to align it with 
UT and therefore to be harmonised within UTC. Stepped Atomic Time (SAT), 
for instance, ‘ticked’ at an identical rate to TAI but interpolated jumps of 200 
milliseconds to keep it synchronised with UT. Measures like SAT failed to 
resolve the situation and global time continued to be reliant on two ‘seconds’ 
of slightly different length, one of whose length also varied. Proposals 
emerged that all UTC and TAI seconds should correspond to the SI definition 
and that any changes to UT should be via the addition or subtraction of 
integer (whole) seconds to keep astronomical and atomic time coordinated. 
On 1 January 1972, this system of ‘leap seconds’ was inaugurated formally 
and continues to keep the offset between UT and TAI to an integer value that 
makes the calculation of UTC more straightforward and respectful of both 
atomic and solar time scales.28 Leap seconds have been described as a 
‘crude hack’ (Kamp 2011) in the structure of time and are in effect a 
metrological response to the heterotemporality of technological time-
reckoning. One fundamental distinction is between times derived from atomic 
sources and those from astronomical observation, which, despite their 
superficial similarity, are quite different qualitatively and quantitatively. The 
foregoing abridged description does not exhaust this heterotemporality, as 
many other time scales exist, but three key observations emerge from the 
brief discussion of UTC alone. First, there is no single global time scale for 
the unequivocal reckoning of time. This is because of the relativistic nature of 
time itself: what we think of as objective time cannot simply be ‘read off’ a 
physical universe in which all time is local if it exists at all (Barbour 1999). The 
atomic second was mapped to the solar second, not the other way around, 
and, as the two diverge in quantity, ways must be found to account for and 
accommodate those changes. This leads to the second point, that global time 
– in this case, UTC – is a matrix of competing times based on different 
calculations, techniques, material objects and practical imperatives that must 
be negotiated and, ultimately, governed. The third observation is that 
28  This is summarised by the basic formula, UTC = TAI – leap seconds. The leap 
seconds ensure that UTC (essentially an atomic time) never differs from solar (or 
rotational) time (UT1) by more than 0.9 seconds.
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temporal or, perhaps better, global chronometric governance is enacted in 
and through assemblages of actors and institutions. Who or what these are, 
and how they do it, is the topic of the following section.
Actors and Mechanisms in Global Chronometric Governance
Space precludes an extended discussion of global governance but its central 
intended meaning in IR is the description and explanation of the multiple 
activities that result in coordinated political action at the global scale, in the 
absence of a world government (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). The 
emergence of global governance as an analytical lens coincided with 
globalisation and the end of the Cold War and indicated a concomitant 
commitment to exploring new ways of ordering in a post-bilateral world 
(Zumbansen 2012: 84). Historically, however, global governance as political 
practice has a longer heritage than its recent analytical introduction suggests. 
The global governance of time, for instance, dates to the 1870s and 1880s 
and to the first international attempts to harmonise and standardise scientific 
and technological ways and means on a global scale (Mazower 2012). The 
global governance of time pre-dates many other forms of global governance 
and, indeed, has made many of them possible. These early attempts to 
govern global time were contested, for reasons of national pride as much as 
disagreement over technical standards and scientific accuracy. Having failed 
to convince the British and Americans to adopt the metric system of 
measurement it developed, France abstained from voting for the adoption of 
Greenwich Mean Time at the International Meridian Conference (1884). Paris 
Mean Time would instead persist into the twentieth century, an awkward nine 
minutes and 21 seconds out of step with the rest of the world (Palmer 2002). 
The governance of time has always been a key aspect of modernity and 
continues to be highly political, if not always rendered as such.  
Specifically, the study of global governance has four principal concerns: the 
global nature of contemporary problems and their potential solutions; the 
agency of non-state and transnational actors; the conception of ‘order’ as a 
dynamic phenomenon having diverse foundations other than political-legal 
authority; and, a normative concern with how best to effect positive 
sociopolitical change (Hofferberth 2015: 601). These four aspects are 
discernible in the discussion of global chronometric governance. Its essential 
purpose is to translate the unruly localism of all possible times into one 
unifying time with which the world can transact its business. It does this 
through state and non-state actors acting transnationally across borders and 
continents. The order so derived is contingent principally on domains of 
scientific knowledge rather than political-legal authority and is informed by 
normative concerns, the contestation of which will be discussed in a later 
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section.
This section will focus on what Avant et al. (2010) call ‘global governors’. 
These are ‘authorities who exercise power across borders for purposes of 
affecting policy’, and who ‘create issues, set agendas, establish and 
implement rules of programmes, and evaluate and/or adjudicate outcomes’ 
(Avant et al. 2010: 2). This attention to agents and agency within global 
governance structures emphasises the constructed and dynamic nature of 
global governance, in which ‘[n]othing is ever governed once and for all time’ 
(Avant et al. 2010: 17) but is subject to iterative processes of mediation and 
negotiation. Whilst this is true of chronometric governance too, the 
persistence of many of the key actors is striking. For instance, The 
Convention du Mètre (Metre Convention) of 1875 brought into being three 
intergovernmental organisations to coordinate international metrology and 
internationalise what was originally the European metric system. Since 1960, 
they have also been responsible for maintaining the International System of 
Units (SI). The senior decision-making body is the General Conference on 
Weights and Measures (CGPM), which meets every four to six years to 
discuss and adjudicate on significant metrological issues. One instance was 
mentioned previously, the adoption of the atomic second by the 13th CGPM 
in 1967. More recently, the 25th CGPM discussed but did not decide on the 
redefinition of the kilogram, the last remaining SI base unit derived from a 
physical artefact rather than a physical constant (Karol 2014). The CGPM is 
advised by an expert panel that meets annually, the International Committee 
on Weights and Measures (CIPM), which also informs the work of the third 
organisation, the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM), of 
most concern here. 
One of BIPM’s many roles is to ensure the proper administration of 
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), although the technical specifications for 
doing so are defined by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a 
specialist agency of the United Nations. This requires that the BIPM produces 
a time scale accurate to within one-tenth of a second (ITU 2002). The ITU 
fulfils this slightly incongruous role on account of its historical status as the 
regulator of the shortwave radio networks through which global time scales 
were disseminated prior to satellites and the internet (Beard 2011). Like the 
BIPM and its peer organisations, the ITU has its origins in 19th-century 
international attempts to regulate scientific and technological issues and its 
earlier incarnation, the International Telegraphy Union, should probably be 
considered one of the first public international unions (Mazower 2012: 102). It 
was founded in 1865 and is still the world’s premier forum for the global 
governance of information and communications technologies, even if it no 
longer enjoys universal support. 
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BIPM produces UTC from a combination of International Atomic Time (TAI) 
and Universal Time (UT). As described previously, UT is defined by the 
rotation of the Earth, based originally on astronomical observations but now 
calculated on measurements provided by satellites. Since 2003, the principal 
form of UT has been UT1, produced by the International Earth Rotation and 
Reference Systems Service (IERS), the various components of which are 
distributed across the US, Europe and Australia.29 The IERS Sub-bureau for 
Rapid Service and Predictions of Earth Orientation Parameters located at the 
US Naval Observatory (USNO) in Washington, DC, publishes a weekly 
forecast of the next year’s daily values of UT1 in its weekly Bulletin A. These 
values are derived from data obtained by a variety of large-scale 
observational techniques, including Very Long Baseline Interferometry (VLBI), 
GPS satellites, Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR) and Lunar Laser Ranging 
(LLR), which requires collaboration with multiple scientific institutions and 
organisations.30 IERS also publishes Bulletin C, which provides six months’ 
notice of the introduction of leap seconds. Since leap seconds are principally 
to keep the offset between TAI and UT1 to an integer value, Bulletin C is the 
primary document of concern to the BIPM’s calculation of UTC.
UT1 gives UTC the ‘time’ we recognise intuitively, calculated from the rotation 
of the Earth, but atomic time (TAI) gives it stability. The initial step in 
calculating TAI is the production of ‘free atomic time’ (Échelle atomique libre, 
or EAL), which is obtained from over 420 atomic clocks based at 72 time 
laboratories on every continent except Antarctica.31 These communicate with 
each other via a complex array of navigation and communications satellites, a 
‘time transfer’ system managed by BIPM but locally calibrated by various 
actors, including manufacturers of atomic clock technologies. TAI is 
calculated by comparing EAL to primary frequency standards calculated by 
atomic clocks like the NIST-F1 at the US National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) laboratory in Boulder, Colorado.32 This newest generation 
of atomic clocks is accurate to fractions of a second over geological time 
scales and continues to improve. If EAL drifts from these standards, a 
correction is applied at the level of nanoseconds and TAI is produced. The 
final step in calculating UTC involves the addition of leap seconds from IERS 
Bulletin C to UTC when necessary. At present, each terrestrial day is about 
2.5 milliseconds longer than the last, while atomic time remains constant. This 
incremental lengthening equates to approximately one second per year, 
requiring the addition of a leap second every one or two years, always in 
June or December.
29  http://www.iers.org/IERS/EN/Home/home_node.html. 
30  http://www.usno.navy.mil/USNO/earth-orientation/eo-info/general/input-data/
input-data-series-used-in-iers-bulletin-a. 
31  http://www.bipm.org/en/bipm/tai/tai.html. 
32  http://www.nist.gov/pml/div688/grp50/primary-frequency-standards.cfm. 
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The resulting UTC values are disseminated in BIPM’s monthly Circular T, 
which allows participating laboratories to adjust their local time scales. A 
curiosity of the system is that it is not possible to know the precise value of 
UTC at any given time or place: there is no absolute value or physical artefact 
to which reference might be made. Local values known as UTC(k) can be 
tracked at particular laboratory sites but UTC is only approximate on account 
of its compiled nature. Since 2013, the BIPM has released a weekly ‘Rapid 
UTC’ solution (UTCr), to enable more frequent steering of local atomic clock 
times, with an error relative to UTC of less than two nanoseconds. BIPM also 
publishes TT(BIPM), a realisation of Terrestrial Time defined by the 
International Astronomical Union (IAU) and used for location-dependent 
astronomical purposes. 
A picture emerges that demonstrates the constructed nature of global time 
and the complex actor-networks that enable its production. These include 
intergovernmental organisations, expert groups, national and independent 
laboratories, international scientific collaborations and equipment 
manufacturers. Crucially, they also rely on a global material infrastructure that 
includes satellites and scientific observational facilities, digital texts and 
memoranda, computer networks and atomic clocks, and the supply chains 
that support them. The machinery of chronometric governance is a 
sociotechnical infrastructure that in turn supports the greater undertakings of 
other large technical systems (Mayer and Acuto 2015). The present 
description of this infrastructure is necessarily brief but illustrates how 
extensive and pervasive in space and time is this network of chronometric 
endeavour. 
Issues and Problems
The preceding narrative might easily give the impression that chronometric 
governance is a principally technocratic form of global governance in which 
intergovernmental organisations like the BIPM and ITU rub along in 
frictionless harmony with public scientific bodies, research institutions and 
specialist industries. This would be understandable, although misplaced. After 
all, the product of their mutually reinforcing activities is precisely that which 
they intend: a global time scale of utility to diverse practitioners, commerce, 
communications and which affords all the peoples of the world a firm 
reference point upon which to found their localised temporal practices, 
including, most visibly, national time zones and calendars. However, the 
mention of time zones reminds us that time is always exploitable, on account 
of its essentially constructed nature. Time zones are marked by abstract 
longitudinal lines that can be shifted to suit political and economic priorities, 
which also shift in time and space. North Korea’s recent adoption of 
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‘Pyongyang Time’ – a snub to historical Japanese imperialism – is but the 
latest example of political manipulation of time zones (Harding 2015). In 
2013, Samoa shifted the International Date Line eastward, bringing the 
country closer in time to its Australasian major trading partners and reversing 
a 19th-century decision that had taken it the other way (BBC 2011). In 2007, 
Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez shunted the national meridian westwards 
and national time thirty minutes back into a ‘fractional time zone’, ostensibly 
seeking ‘a more fair distribution of the sunrise’ (Reuters 2007). In 1949, Mao 
Zedong dispensed with the five time zones respected by the ousted 
nationalist government, unifying China into a single national time that persists 
today, despite its inconvenience to far-flung western provinces (Hassid and 
Watson 2014). The de facto adoption by western Uighurs of their own ‘Urumqi 
Time’ in resistance to ‘Beijing Time’, for example, continues not to be 
recognised by a Party-state concerned more with centralising control over 
‘national unity’ than with respecting claims to provincial and ethnic autonomy 
(Schiavenza 2013).
States can elect to change national time, or to reject or embrace other 
measures like daylight-saving time, but they cannot easily opt out of the 
structures of chronometric governance. Technically, most countries are not 
signatories to many of the treaty instruments that govern time and other 
international standards – from the 1875 Metre Convention onwards – but they 
abide by those standards and implement changes when handed down by 
intergovernmental organisations like the BIPM and the International 
Organisation of Legal Metrology (OIML). Nor are the ordinary decisions of the 
ITU binding on its members unless implemented in national law. It is not legal 
sanctions that deter states from leaving but the benefits of ‘membership’ that 
make them stay (see Prakash and Potoski 2010). It is difficult to imagine any 
state wanting or being able to leave the system of global chronometric 
governance, given the imbrication of temporal standards with the 
sociomateriality of everyday life and national activity. This is not to condone 
the apparent homogenisation of global time through this system of global 
governance but it is to note the potency of its integrating logic.
As noted previously, the global temporal assemblage is more heterogeneous 
than perhaps meets the eye. Time is constructed but it is also contested, as a 
century-and-a-half of unresolved chronometric issues attests. Interest groups 
within the expert communities of metrologists and other scientists compete to 
produce temporal regimes most amenable to their interests. For many years, 
one such field of contention has been the issue of leap seconds. In 2015, 
leap seconds are, if not headline news, certainly a matter of public and 
therefore political concern. Since their formal inception in 1972, twenty-six 
leap seconds have been intercalated to align atomic time and astronomical 
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time.33 The most recent leap second was inserted at midnight on 30 June 
2015. On that date, the stroke of midnight occurred twice, as clocks rolled 
over from 23:59:59 to 00:00:00 via 23:59:60, a phantom midnight that only 
exists on those occasions – about once every eighteen months – a leap 
second is required (BBC News 2015). There are ongoing discussions over 
whether to abolish leap seconds. Technically, this will depend on the 
redefinition (or not) of the word ‘day’. Under a host of extant international 
agreements, a day is defined with reference to the rotation or location of the 
earth relative to the sun. To abolish leap seconds would require the 
decoupling of the day from the sun and linking it permanently to atomic time.
Abolitionists argue the link to solar time is no longer necessary on account of 
GPS and other satellite navigation systems that support location-dependent 
technologies like navigation and astronomy. They also make a strong case 
that leap seconds pose a threat to time-dependent technologies like the 
internet that were not designed to accommodate discontinuous time jumps. 
Serious disruptions to global communications networks and dependent 
technologies like banking and air traffic control have yet to occur when leap 
seconds have been added but the argument is that they might (Kamp 2011). 
Given the impossibility of re-engineering the internet, for instance, and the 
relative simplicity of abolishing leap seconds, this is a convincing argument to 
many. Proponents recognise that atomic and solar time will drift apart – albeit 
slowly – and argue that money is better spent preparing for occasional, longer 
time jumps (minutes or more) than on more frequent leap seconds introduced 
often at very short notice. Opponents argue that location-dependent tasks will 
require huge investments in software and hardware to allow for the continual 
divergence of solar and atomic time. Government consultations suggest that 
some members of the public recognise that leap seconds represent ‘a 
symbolically important link with our past’ (OPM Group 2014: 6). At the 
November 2015 World Radiocommunication Conference in Geneva, the ITU 
decided to retain leap seconds and therefore continue this link between 
atomic and solar time (ITU 2015). However, it also committed to further 
investigation into the feasibility of a new reference time scale, leaving open 
the possibility that there may be in future a final move towards a fully 
technological chronos.
Conclusion
This contribution to the emerging literature on time and temporality in 
International Relations introduces the idea that global time, principally 
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), is the product of global governors 
operating in and through sociotechnical assemblages. Global chronometric 
33  See, http://maia.usno.navy.mil/ser7/tai-utc.dat. 
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governance constructs UTC as a useful and unitary global time but this 
provisional analysis suggests that aspects of the global governance of time 
are contested. The example given here is of leap seconds but there are other 
topics that could be explored. The task of IR is to explore the modalities and 
topologies of global chronometric governance in order to better discern the 
activities and normative priorities of global governors and the constraints and 
opportunities provided by the structures of global chronometric governance. 
This is partly a matter of methods, as many of the actors involved – especially 
the ITU – operate under conditions approaching diplomatic secrecy and are 
somewhat opaque to outside observers. Careful empirical work is required to 
construct models of chronometric governance that can be tested against 
theories of global governance in IR.
Explorations of this type can also help to extend and strengthen our 
understanding of the mutually co-constitutive relations between time and 
politics. It is insufficient to identify the political nature of global time through its 
status as an object of global governance without also recognising the 
temporal nature of global politics. World politics is, as Kimberly Hutchings 
asserts, ‘a shifting and unpredictable conjunction of times’ (Hutchings 2008: 
176), unified only by the analytical lens chosen to examine them. There is no 
pristine ontological chronos but rather a heterotemporal assemblage of times 
and temporalities that is both the cause and outcome of political behaviours 
seeking to maximise self-interest and effect social change. Time is not a 
‘background condition’ of global life but is ‘socially constructed and therefore 
amenable to manipulation by human agency’ (Porter and Stockdale 2015: 
12). As this discussion of UTC aims to have shown, this manipulation extends 
to the scientific and technocratic construction of global time, derived from 
modern physics as much as ancient astronomy.
The purpose of the present enquiry is to provide empirical support for the 
proposed heterotemporality of global time, an inherently political activity about 
a richly textured political ‘object’. If we accept its political nature, how else do 
we open up this particular ‘black box’ to scrutiny and critique? What avenues 
of contestation are available, if indeed such a thing is necessary? What does 
it mean in the present discussion to cast off from our nearest star and look 
inwards to the oscillations of an invisible atom? Does it matter if pragmatism 
trumps philosophy? These are all questions that might be addressed through 
further exploration of the global governance of time.
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Calendar Time, Cultural 
Sensibilities, and Strategies of 
Persuasion
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QUEENS COLLEGE, CUNY, USA
In considering the relationship of time, globalisation, and international 
relations, time cannot be viewed as an abstract, uniform yardstick that merely 
provides a chronological organisation of events. Instead, there is a close 
relationship between cultural ideas of time and political sensibilities. There 
are many elements to this connection that one could explore, but here I shall 
limit myself to the relationship between calendars, holidays, and styles of 
persuasion. To do this, I shall discuss the tensions generated from the global 
distribution of Western timekeeping; describe the values latent in the secular 
holidays of the United States, the United Kingdom, and People’s Republic of 
China; and show the relationship between the values celebrated in calendars 
and the rhetorical strategies used by these nations in two very different 
international debates: climate change and the leap second.
There are relatively few political debates about concepts of time. Yet, there 
are few ideas that pervade almost everything to the same extent as temporal 
ideas. The value of money and securities is influenced by trading protocols in 
which the sequence of trades is documented by means of synchronised 
timestamps. Getting directions from a Global Positioning System (GPS) 
involves relying on a suite of satellites that are basically orbiting clocks 
transmitting time signals. National security relies on the analysis of big data 
sets in which precise timestamps are crucial to understanding the sequence 
and pattern of events.  
Anthropologists are interested in how concepts of time are related to the 
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exercising of power and the structuring of political and social action (Rutz 
1992; Greenhouse 1996). Public consciousness of this fact is probably not as 
great now as it was in the past when heads of state controlled calendars and 
state defined holidays and thereby controlled the rhythms and celebrations in 
people’s lives (see Stern 2012). Until the seventeenth century, many 
European chronologies referred to the reigns of monarchs (Wilcox 1987), and 
many civilisations—China, the Maya, Rome—involved explicit links between 
those who defined time and the ruling elite.  
The currently dominant system of clock and calendar time emerged in 
association with European imperialism, and it gained its current distribution as 
a result of colonialism and global trade (Bartky 2007; Birth 2012; Quinn 
2012). Capitalism has been shaped by the logic of fixed terms and timed 
transactions and wages have been defined in terms of units of time rather 
than directly in terms of the ideal timing for most the most productive work. 
The time grid, established by the Gregorian calendar and clock time, is also a 
tool in bookkeeping—time becomes represented as containers to be filled 
and/or audited. Modern governance would be quite different without the 
relationships among global units of time, management, and bookkeeping, 
particularly since these units of time are used as a means of control and 
discipline. In late June 2015, there was a confrontation between the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Greece over a debt repayment due 1 
July 2015. The head of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, stated unequivocally that 
the 1 July deadline was non-negotiable. There is no solar, lunar, 
astronomical, or biological cycle that defines 1 July, however. Its reality is due 
to cultural convention, but that cultural convention is a political tool.
The European Cultural Logic behind the Global Time System
This time system now reaches into the structure and design of computer 
systems.  Everything a computer does receives a timestamp, and commands 
are often executed in a sequence based on these timestamps. Timestamps 
are globally synchronised to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)—a timescale 
maintained by the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM). The 
BIPM determines UTC using measurements received from atomic clocks 
distributed across the globe. As a result, the definition and distribution of time 
has reached unprecedented levels of precision and accuracy.
It must be pointed out, however, that the emphasis on hyper precision is the 
result of a cultural, not a global, choice. Unlike timekeeping in other parts of 
the world, European timekeeping came to emphasise the use of uniform units 
of duration divorced from observable astronomical cycles to represent time 
(Birth 2012). This temporal logic is embedded in European-style clocks (Borst 
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1993; Dohrn-van Rossum 1996; Landes 1983), the default form of clock 
found in the world today. Other cultures have had other logics.  Jewish 
zmanim and Christian canonical hours are defined in terms of seasonally 
variable hours that served as points in time rather than as set durations. Edo 
period Japanese clocks divided the day into six daylight and six nighttime 
seasonally variable hours, and they created clocks to represent these 
seasonal variations. Chinese timekeeping and Hindu jyotish (astrology) are 
anchored to the interaction of celestial cycles. European timekeeping 
privileges uniform oscillations for defining time over the irregular rotational 
behaviour of Earth.
The Global Distribution of Western Time Concepts
The current use of Western time standards across the globe was not the 
result of an election or national leaders signing a treaty. It is a Western 
scientific preference riding on the coattails of colonialism (see Barak 2013). 
The fixed and uniform nature of time metrology makes it appear as if it is 
apolitical, yet decisions such as where to place the prime meridian for 
timekeeping purposes were hotly contested (see Barrows 2011), and there 
continue to be global debates about the definition of time, such as the leap 
second debate that is discussed later. 
The far reach of Western time technology and Western time logics creates 
peculiarities in the world. GPS was developed as a United States military 
technology. It consists of clocks mounted on satellites that emit time signals. 
GPS is now critical to the functioning of all sorts of software applications, 
including those used to indicate Islamic prayer times and the direction of 
Mecca from any position on the globe on mobile devices. Somewhere, a 
member of ISIS is using a Muslim prayer application for this purpose—his/her 
devotion is achievable with great precision in timing and orientation because 
of the assistance of the US military’s navigation satellites. In effect, even the 
sworn enemies of the US employ US military technology to know time and 
place.
Adaptation versus Adoption
While GPS and precision time technology might be viewed as being of great 
benefit to all of humanity, GPS time represents the imposed Western time. 
Much of the world has figured out how to adapt itself to Western clock and 
calendar time, but for many, it is an adaptation, not an adoption. In some 
parts of the world, the Gregorian calendar is associated with a religion 
(Christianity) and colonising nations towards which there is antipathy.  
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To get a sense of adaptation rather than adoption, try to place a special 
holiday in a different calendar. Here, I shall use the example of Christmas. Its 
date is determined by the Gregorian calendar—it is always December 25. But 
if the Gregorian calendar was not dominant, then Christmas would appear 
differently in calendars.
For the sake of imagination, let us conceive that the dominant calendar was 
the Islamic calendar, and that Christmas would need to be determined first 
using the Gregorian calendar, and then placed within the Islamic calendar. 
This situation is already what many people throughout the world have to do—
indeed, there are more Hindus, Chinese, Jews, and Muslims adapting their 
holy days to a Gregorian rubric than Westerners for whom the Gregorian 
calendar represents their heritage. To place Christmas in a non-Gregorian 
calendar would involve using algorithms such as those in Dershowtiz and 
Reingold’s Calendrical Calculations (1997). Such algorithms are now 
commonplace in applications that take computer dates and times that are in a 
Gregorian and UTC format and convert them into religiously significant times 
for Jews, Hindus, and Muslims.  
Placing Christmas in the Islamic calendar faces an additional complication 
however—there is no single, globally agreed-upon Islamic calendar. This 
emerges from a debate about whether the beginning of the lunar month can 
be predicted or can only be announced after the new moon is observed. It is 
also complicated by the debate over whether it is the local sighting of the 
moon that is important, or the appearance of the moon in Mecca. Important 
Muslim holy days, like the month of Ramadan, can begin on different days for 
different Muslims depending on which calendrical authorities they follow. As a 
result, any attempt to relate Christmas to an Islamic calendar also involves a 
political choice of which Islamic calendrical method to use—a choice that 
brings with it an implicit privileging of one source of Islamic calendrical 
authority over others.
Once the problem of placing Christmas in the Islamic calendar has been 
resolved, there is another question of what to do when Christmas occurs 
during Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting. This happens because the 
Islamic year consists of 12 lunar months and is about 11-12 days shorter than 
the solar year that forms the basis of the Gregorian calendar. As a result, 
holidays in the Gregorian and Islamic calendars drift in relation to one 
another. The last time Christmas was held during Ramadan would have been 
the period from approximately 1419-1421 in the Islamic chronology (1998-
2000 in the Christian chronology). 
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Adaptation and Conflict
It does not take much imagination, then, to realise the extent to which 
calendrical differences can highlight differences in a globalised world. The 
domination of the Gregorian calendar and Western clock time allows those 
who know no other calendar or clock to avoid seeing the calendrical conflicts. 
Indeed, Western clock and calendar time come to be viewed as natural and 
beyond question. With increased contact between people of different cultural 
traditions, conflicts can occur along with entrenched misunderstandings.
For instance, a few years ago, a temporary instructor at my institution 
complained bitterly about the Jewish High Holy Days. She wanted to give an 
exam on one of those days and did not want to excuse Jewish students from 
the exam. Her argument was that since the university was a secular 
institution it used a secular calendar and should not recognise religious 
holidays. Because such clashes have been a problem in the past, the 
university has adopted a policy that such students are entitled to take the 
exam on another day. The commonly held Gregorian calendar does not 
eliminate difference—it merely elides it. Conflicts occur, sometimes with 
unhappy results. While my department forced the instructor to comply with 
university guidelines, this did not make the instructor very happy, and she 
continued to express resentment towards the Jewish students in question.   
This type of situation is not new. While it seems to have little bearing on 
modern globalisation, I shall use the example of medieval European Judaism 
to briefly explore how antagonism gets intermingled with calendars. The 
choice of this example is that the time that has passed since this case makes 
it easier to discuss than some current events, but the lessons that can be 
learned are still relevant. Many medieval European Jewish populations 
recorded the days of Christian saints in their calendars. At a functional level, 
this makes sense. Stern (n.d.) points out that markets and fairs were tied to 
Christian saints’ days and that this information would have been useful to 
Jewish traders. He also suggests that dating official documents would have 
also benefited from knowledge of saints’ days. After all, many of the 
commercial cycles were directly tied to the liturgical calendar, such as the 
British banking cycle that defined the quarterly periods with reference to 
Trinity Sunday and Michaelmas.  
While Jewish calendars made reference to saints’ days, this was not a sign of 
collegial ecumenicalism between Jews and Christians in the Middle Ages. 
Anti-Semitism and persecution of Jews by Christians in the Middle Ages are 
well documented, and Jewish sentiments about Christianity are expressed in 
their calendars. Stern (n.d.) has described the anti-Christian rhetoric found in 
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them. For instance, in several calendars, the Hebrew spelling of the word 
‘saints’ can be read qedeshim, which means ‘prostitutes’ (Stern n.d., 14, 28). 
In another example, Stern studies a North French calendar from 1278 which 
begins with the statement ‘these are the months of the non-Jews and their 
abominations’ (Stern n.d., 4).  
Holidays and Cultural Sentiments
The annual cycle of holidays reveals cultural sentiments. One can look at the 
secular holidays adopted by different nations and quickly ascertain different 
emphases on the sorts of events and people commemorated (Callahan 
2006). One can also look at school curricula and often see these emphases 
reflected in education. But what is most disconcerting is to look at national 
policies and see how the logics that guide the holidays and the schooling 
shape policy arguments. In thinking about time and politics, it is not merely a 
matter of how Western time reckoning has been imposed on the globe, but 
how the sentiments reflected in the holidays shape how global events and 
conflicts are discussed. There is a striking correspondence between the 
values embodied in holidays, and the types of arguments and evidence policy 
makers use in staking out their positions. In drawing this connection, my point 
is less to identify policy differences than to highlight differences in the sorts of 
arguments and evidence thought to be persuasive, but which might, in fact, 
be unpersuasive across cultural differences.
The national secular holidays in the United States are: Martin Luther King Jr. 
Day, President’s Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, 
Columbus Day, Veteran’s Day, and Christmas. New Year’s is left off of this list 
because of its religious origins within the British Empire and its former 
colonies—it was the Feast of the Circumcision whereas 25 March was the 
beginning of the new year until 1752. Among the secular American holidays, 
four directly refer to war: Presidents’ Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, 
and Veterans’ Day. Two refer to martyrs for social causes: Martin Luther King 
Jr. Day and Labor Day. Christmas’s history is actually tied to war since it was 
moved to November by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War in order to 
celebrate what he perceived as the turning point in the conflict. Moreover, 
many people, particularly Native Americans, associate Christmas and 
Columbus Day with the killing of America’s indigenous population. In effect, 
every single secular holiday in the United States has an association with a 
war, an armed conflict, or people being killed.
In contrast, the United Kingdom’s secular holidays are known as bank 
holidays. These holidays include Spring Bank Holiday, Late Summer Bank 
Holiday, and Boxing Day. The Spring Bank Holiday replaced the religious 
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holiday Whit Monday. Whit Monday’s date varied because its timing was tied 
to Easter. Now, The Spring Bank Holiday falls on the last Monday in May 
regardless of when Easter occurs. Boxing Day does not celebrate banking, 
but it does emphasise social stratification. If one looks for themes in British 
secular holidays, they are banking and social stratification.
In the People’s Republic of China, secular holidays come in two varieties. 
One set of holidays celebrates the traditional holidays of the Chinese 
calendar. As a result, these holidays shift from one year to the next in the 
Gregorian calendar. Several holidays within the traditional calendar have 
clear religious connotations, such as Chinese New Year’s Day and the 
Qingming Festival. Others, such as the Duanwu Festival (Dragon Boat 
Festival) and the Mid-Autumn Festival emphasise astronomical events: the 
summer sun and the harvest moon, respectively. As such, they are 
associated with food, feasting and agriculture. China also has three holidays 
tied to the Gregorian calendar: New Year’s Day, Labour Day, and National 
Day. National Day not only celebrates Chinese Nationalism, but Chinese 
industry and economic development, as well. There is a twofold theme in the 
holidays of the People’s Republic of China, then: traditional time reckoning, 
and an emphasis on labour, agriculture, industry, and economic development.
Holidays indicate important cultural sentiments. The sentiments reflected in 
national holidays also manifest in styles of persuasion—an uncanny and 
sometimes unsettling relationship between how time is structured and 
celebrated and how nations participate in global debates. To demonstrate 
this, I shall focus on two sets of governmental statements of policy positions: 
climate change and the leap second.
Time, Cultural Sentiments, and Climate Change Rhetoric
Of these two policy debates, the issue of climate change is well known. While 
one normally thinks of this debate as framed in scientific terms, one can see 
cultural differences in the approach to the climate change issue in the key 
documents released by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the 
People’s Republic of China. All three nations are very concerned about 
climate change, but the ways in which the concerns are stated is quite 
different from one another.
The key document in stating the US position is the report Climate Change 
Impacts in the United States (Melillo et al., 2014). This is an 841-page report 
in which something is described as being killed or dying approximately every 
10 pages. In addition, whereas most of the report addresses how climate 
change will affect food production, the conclusion emphasises the need to 
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understand how climate change will affect the military. The fascination with 
death and the military is consistent with the sentiments cultivated by 
American holidays. Moreover, the second most important document about 
climate change is the 2014 US Department of Defense’s Climate Change 
Adaptation Roadmap (2014). In fact, President Obama often cites this 
document generated by the military rather than the more thorough Climate 
Change Impacts. American holidays focus on death and war; the United 
States government’s articulation of climate change policy focuses on death 
and war.
In contrast, Great Britain’s key document, The National Adaptation 
Programme (HM Government, 2013) emphasises investments. As the 
ministerial foreword to this report states, ‘Britain has a long history of 
overcoming the challenges that our famously changeable weather poses and 
harnessing our natural resources to support growth. New investments and 
innovation in both the private and public sectors continue this tradition today’ 
(2013, 1). Banking or investment is discussed on average once every two 
pages in this document. In contrast to the United States’ documents, the 
British document does not mention anything dying or being killed, and the 
military is only mentioned once.  
The key document from the People’s Republic of China is China’s Policies 
and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (People’s Republic of China, The 
National Development and Reform Commission 2013). In this report, industry 
or industrialisation is mentioned on every single page. Like the British 
document, there is no killing or dying, and there is no mention of the military, 
either.  
In effect, the ways of thinking about climate change in public policy reports 
reflects the cultural sentiments found in the national holidays: the US 
emphasises the military, death, and dying; the UK emphasises banking and 
investment; the People’s Republic of China emphasises industry.
This is just one example of how the structure of time throughout the year 
subtly shapes policy rhetoric if not policy initiatives. This pattern also holds 
true for the leap second debate—a debate almost entirely unrelated to 
climate change.
Time, Cultural Sentiments, and the Leap Second Debate
The term ‘leap second’ refers to a solution to the problem of reconciling a 
timescale defined by means of atomic timekeepers with the Earth’s rotation 
(see Stevens 2015).   
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A consequence of the leap second policy is that the majority of the world’s 
population, concentrated as it is in east Asia, has to put up with the leap 
second being implemented at the beginning of the business day—the time 
equivalent to midnight at the prime meridian. This is an unconscious 
consequence of the explicit Eurocentric assumptions that guided the original 
definition of Universal Time in 1884, such as the following statement by Great 
Britain’s Astronomer Royal W. H. M. Christie in 1886: 
The advantage of making the world day coincide with the 
Greenwich civil day is that the change of date at the 
commencement of a new day falls in the hours of the night 
throughout Europe, Africa, and Asia, and that it does not occur 
in the ordinary office hours (10 a.m. to 4 p.m.) in any important 
country except New Zealand’ (1886, 523). 
This logic has, over a century later, resulted in a European minority of the 
world’s population sleeping through any disruptions caused by the leap 
second while others have to contend with the leap second coinciding with the 
beginning of morning business cycles.
Eventually, problems with the leap second caught the attention of the West. In 
the 1990s, as networked computing became important and reliant on 
precision timing, some began pointing out problems generated by the leap 
second. Timestamps are a means of maintaining computer security across 
networks. If a computer receives a bit of code from another computer with a 
timestamp outside of the expected range, then it is deemed a security 
threat—it is considered as either a fraudulent timestamp or, if the timestamp 
indicates an unexpected delay in the signal’s travels then, it indicates the 
possibility of somebody inserting malicious code somewhere along the way, 
thereby causing the delay. So, unexpected timestamps tend to result in 
computers rejecting the associated information or commands. If such 
rejection occurs throughout a networked system, it can cause system-wide 
problems and eventually cause servers to crash.  
Since leap seconds are not predictable the way that leap years are, they 
cannot be written into operating systems. Instead, when a leap second is 
announced, software patches need to be developed to ensure that a 
computer handles the leap second correctly. If a systems administrator does 
not handle the leap second correctly, then the system might go down, as 
when Qantas Airway’s reservation system crashed after the 2012 leap 
second.
The leap second policy is decided by the Radiocommunication Sector of the 
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International Telecommunications Union (ITU-R)—an agency of the United 
Nations. In 2001, the ITU-R called for research on the leap second question, 
and there has been a policy debate ever since then over whether or not to 
keep the leap second. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the 
People’s Republic of China have adopted differing positions and different 
argument style in advocating their positions.
Given the militaristic sentiments of the United States, it is no surprise that the 
leap second debate emerged in association with an American military 
technology as it was made available for civilian use: GPS (McCarthy and 
Klepczynski 1999). As the debate has unfolded, those most vocally involved 
have been American astronomers, computer programmers, time metrologists 
associated with the United States Naval Observatory or the United States 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, and those who work for the 
Department of Defense or military contractors. Consistent with American 
cultural logic emphasising death, one of the most common arguments for 
eliminating the leap second policy is that eventually a leap second will cause 
a problem such that ‘planes will crash and people will die’ (Allen 2013; Sobel 
2013; Wolman 2013).  
The British position is to keep the leap second. This position is closely linked 
to the sense of the prime meridian in Greenwich being a part of British 
heritage. Eliminating the leap second would decouple timekeeping from the 
prime meridian, and as the former minister of Science and Universities 
complained, eventually the meridian for midnight would be over the United 
States (Swinford 2014). Truthfully, it probably would not even reach Big Ben 
in that minister’s lifetime, however. In 2014, the United Kingdom hired a 
research firm to conduct a study to learn how the British public felt about the 
issue (Silver et al. 2014). Since most members of the public knew nothing of 
the issue, much of the study involved educating focus groups about the leap 
second, and not surprisingly, such efforts at education contained subtle 
biases towards the British position to keep the policy. That said, the 
conclusion of the study was that unless there were strong technological or 
financial cases made for getting rid of the leap second, most members of the 
British public would not support doing so (Silver et al 2014, 52).  
Once again, while the American position is tied to the military and people 
dying, the British position highlights banking and finance. The Chinese 
position has been evolving. Initially, representatives of the People’s Republic 
of China’s argued that since the solar day was important to the Chinese 
people, decoupling the global timescale from the Earth’s rotation would be 
disruptive (Han 2013). In 2015, at a conference in Australia, the Chinese 
representative, Dr. Han Chunhao, offered a different argument. He 
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documented traditional Chinese timekeeping practices and made the 
argument that those practices were just as scientific as the timekeeping 
practices of the West. Therefore, while he supports eliminating the leap 
second policy, he advocates creating a means of disseminating Earth 
rotational information so that traditional Chinese timekeeping could be 
maintained, and he suggests that the global navigation satellite systems be 
used for this purpose. Referring back to the People’s Republic of China’s 
secular holidays—most of them are tied to the traditional Chinese calendar. 
The Chinese leap second position, like the US and UK positions, reflects the 
sentiments expressed in public holidays. Returning to the points made earlier, 
it also reflects the Chinese consciousness of being forced to adapt to Western 
time-keeping, and a desire for the West to reciprocally adapt to support 
Chinese time-keeping.
Conclusion
The relationship of time, politics, and globalisation involves the interaction of 
the global imposition of a Western timescale, local ideas of timekeeping, and 
how cycles of holidays shape sentiments and approaches to political 
challenges. Most of these issues lurk beneath the surface of consciousness—
overshadowed by ideologies such as the world being flat (Freidman 2005), or 
time being ‘natural’. Even in debates about time policies, such as the current 
leap second debate, the sentiments reinforced, if not shaped, by national 
holidays still influence the positions and arguments that representatives from 
different nations make. Consistent with the history of the global time system 
since 1884, when Universal Time and the prime meridian were determined, a 
few European nations and the United States have an influence over time 
policies that is disproportionate to their percentage of the world’s population. 
The leap second debate is largely a debate between Western time 
metrologists that the world has been asked to adjudicate through the ITU-R.
The discussion of climate change indicates that the way in which 
temporalities shape sentiments goes far beyond time policies, however, but 
affects other, if not all, issues of global importance. The similarity of 
arguments about leap seconds and climate change suggests cultural 
inclinations creeping into scientific and policy debates in ways that are rarely, 
if ever, acknowledged. Whether it is the sentiments cultivated by different 
calendars and holidays, or the conflicts generated when different 
temporalities collide, time exerts a subtle and pervasive force on political 
activity and negotiation—a force that is rarely recognised.
* The author would like to thank Sacha Stern for sharing his research on 
medieval Jewish calendars, the participants in the Utopias, Futures and 
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Temporalities symposium in Bristol in May 2015 for their feedback on some of 
the ideas expressed here, and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive 
comments on this chapter.
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Analogue Time, Analogue 
People and the Digital Eclipsing 
of Modern Political Time
ROBERT HASSAN 
UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA
…political time is out of synch with the temporalities, rhythms, 
and pace governing economy and culture. 
Sheldon Wolin (1997:4)
It has been said, perhaps apocryphally, that in 1972 when asked by a 
Western reporter of his assessment of the 1789 French Revolution, Zhou 
Enlai, the Chinese prime minister and long-time ally of Chairman Mao, replied 
that ‘It’s too soon to tell’. This is one of those tales where it does not matter if 
it is true or not—it’s amusing and thought-provoking at the same time. There’s 
value in that Cho’s alleged words may be read as both glib and serious; but 
what is interesting is that there’s a latency as well as a potential revealing that 
stems from the glibness, and this serves to accentuate the seriousness of the 
point being made. 
So what is the point? Well, at the risk of putting more words into Cho’s mouth, 
one could have him say that however suddenly a revolution may spring up, to 
achieve its aims it will necessarily be a long-run affair. The passing of a 
couple of centuries would be the least time it would take before an event so 
historically profound as the French Revolution—by many a hoped-for 
precursor of the utter transformation of the world by putting Enlightenment 
thinking into practice—could even begin to look some way assessable, either 
positively or negatively. When we speak of time in this broad and general 
way, though, as we tend to do, we miss something very important about the 
nature of time and about what might be called political time. And when we 
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think about the nature of political time in the present era, which we will do 
presently, then disturbing realisations about the future of the institutional 
political process—politics at both the local and global level—become 
noticeable. In short, the forms of politics that shaped our modern world were 
themselves evolved and shaped through a particular relation to time, 
analogue time. However, this time, and these political processes are being 
eclipsed and rendered less effective by a new temporal context, a digital 
context based upon computer networks. The internet and its myriad 
appurtenances generate and sustain a post-modern network time where the 
long-run political affair characteristic of the modern—be it the evolution of 
democratic processes between nation-states (Fukuyama, 2011: 245-458), or 
slow-burning gradualism within states (Havel, 1990: 115)—becomes less 
sustainable.
Network time suggests an accelerating time, an idea that political theorists 
such as Kimberley Hutchings (2008:17) and Bill Scheuerman (2004:26-71) 
argue, is becoming increasingly relevant to how we understand the political 
process. Some, indeed, such as William E Connolly (2002: 140-176) see 
social acceleration as potentially a positive thing for democracy. One can 
certainly agree with thinkers such as these that time is transforming how 
politics is enacted. However, much of this theorising takes place at a certain 
level: for example, Scheuerman’s otherwise excellent book on liberal 
democracy and the acceleration of time tells us nothing about why our 
temporal relationships have been transformed. Likewise, Connolly’s nuanced 
and flexible approach, says a good deal about speed, but little about the 
human experience of time—still less how it may be mediated through 
communications technology. What this chapter will do is locate the 
theorisation at what I understand to be the central issue in our new 
experience of time and politics—which is the relationship between analogue 
and digital processes, and how the individual and the collective and hence 
the political, are situated within this new technological context. Before we 
come to that, we need first to place time, technology and politics into a wider 
frame. 
Time and the Materialisation of Political Ideas
The rhythms of time for the revolutionary process that began in 1789 were 
generated by the communication networks that allowed political ideas to 
disseminate, take root and grow. To understand how this worked, French 
philosopher Régis Debray laid stress upon what he termed ‘the material forms 
and processes through which [political] ideas were transmitted—the 
communication networks that enable thought to have social existence’ (2007: 
5). In other words, to know how ideas materialise from abstract thought to 
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become social reality, we need to know the nature of the communication 
technologies that relay them. More succinctly: when we speak of political 
ideas, the medium is a major part of the message.
The epoch that stretched between the Storming of the Bastille and Zhou 
Enlai’s alleged aside to a reporter, Debray labelled the ‘graphosphere’, or the 
age of writing. Historian Dena Goodman (1994) referred to the early phase of 
this era as the ‘republic of letters’, where major philosophers and politicians 
and thinkers created their own networks of correspondence that served to 
materialise their thought and transform their world as a consequence; and 
more broadly the cultural theorist Benedict Anderson (1982) saw the period 
as helping to generate a modern culture that was based upon the writing, 
reading and circulation of the printed word to a growingly populous and 
literate public sphere. 
The temporality of the graphosphere was given precision and predictability in 
its rhythm by the clock, and the clock in its turn gradually regulated and 
disciplined society as a whole in its business, its industry and its cultures. It 
created what Paul Virilio (2012:23) termed ‘the administration of duration’. Of 
course politics and the political process were not exempt from this. And so as 
Western industrialising societies rose and developed to this clock-based 
rhythmicity, a ‘clock-time consciousness’ as social geographer Nigel Thrift 
(1996: 174) termed it, gave shape and context to what he saw as ‘the 
cognitive framework within which political knowledge is interpreted’ (p.167). 
All this rhythmic coordination was developed and interacted at a pace that 
was, broadly speaking, a human pace; one that humans more or less could 
cope with, react to, and reflect within. As noted above, with technological 
progress, the modern world seemed (has it not always?) to be accelerating—
to be slipping away from human control, and given over to the power of 
machines and industrialisation. Trains, telegraphs, motorcars and airplanes 
all contributed to the growing rapidity of the world as an increasingly 
sophisticated communicative space. However, the graphosphere was also an 
analogue sphere. By analogue I mean that its technologies have equivalence 
with nature and/or correspond with nature in some recognisable way. Indeed, 
writing – that fundamental communication technology – is itself analogue in 
both these senses: the written word has an equivalence with the spoken 
word, and early pictographic writing corresponded to the natural world in its 
depiction of people, animals, tools and so on. More recent transformative 
technologies are recognisably analogue also in that the motorcar has its 
correspondence in the horse, and the airplane finds its equivalent in nature in 
the bird. The centrally important temporal technology of the clock of course is 
analogue too in that it roughly corresponds with the rotation of the Earth and 
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its revolutions around the sun. 
As Silvia Estévez puts it, for most of human history technologies can be seen 
as analogue in that they were equivalent to the organic, unfolding and 
durational processes of humans and their environments and ‘whose 
operations simulated processes that people had seen in nature and in the 
functioning of their own bodies’ (2009: 401). The key point here is that the 
worlds that humans have constructed through analogue technologies are 
worlds that they could recognise through being modelled on themselves and 
the environments they lived in. It is a point made famous by Marshal 
McLuhan in Understanding Media, where he argued that mechanical 
technologies are ‘extensions of man’ into time, space and nature (1964). 
From this it’s possible to say that modernity itself, in all its diversity, and with 
its machine and clock-time foundations factored in, was analogue to its core. 
And it was so most clearly in its specific relationship to the natural world, the 
world that modern man tried to mimic in his technology development, and that 
‘industrial man’ with his newly acquired modern powers, tried relentlessly to 
master.
The Analogue and the Digital
Such analogising might seem to be a banal or obscure point. And it would be 
had it not been for the rise to domination of the antithesis of the analogue—
the digital computer, and its suffusion of every register of life. For his part 
McLuhan was clear that digital technologies, like analogue, were recognisable 
in nature and part of nature. He wrote, for instance, in his 1970 Counterblast 
that ‘The new media are not bridges between man and nature - they are 
nature’ (p.14). For all his insights McLuhan was a philosopher, and very much 
an epigrammatic one at that. However, regarding the qualities of digital 
technology in comparison with analogue, we might consider more carefully 
the opinion of the experts, such as the computer scientists and 
neurophysiologists who participated in the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics 
held in New York between 1946 and 1953. At the eighth conference in 1950, 
Ralph Waldo Gerard, a behavioural scientist, considered the differences in a 
paper titled ‘Some Problems Concerning Digital Notions in the Central 
Nervous System’. Gerard argued that analogue and digital processes both 
functioned in the human brain, but that each expressed a different logic. He 
wrote that: 
[A]n analogical system is one in which one of two variables is 
continuous on the other, while in a digital system the variable 
is discontinuous and quantized. The prototype of the analogue 
is the slide rule, where a number is represented as a distance 
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and there is continuity between greater distance and greater 
number. The prototype [of the digital] is the abacus, where the 
bead on one half of the wire is not counted at all, while that on 
the other half is counted as a full unit. […] In the analogical 
system there are continuity relations; in the digital, 
discontinuity relations (1953: 172).
‘Discontinuity’ is the key point when we speak of technologically metered time 
and the effects of this upon the individual and society. Clock time is unfolding 
and continuous and corresponds to nature and to the phenomenology 
of ‘becoming’. Clock time, throughout modernity, has given analogue shape to 
our understanding of ‘cause and effect’, which is important in the political 
process: ‘Why do things happen? And what stems from certain 
causes?’ Digital (network) time, by contrast is discontinuous and it is much 
more difficult for us to discern the ‘unfolding’ of events, especially at high 
speed, and likewise to discern cause and effect. Macy experts such as 
Gerard saw ‘discontinuity relations’ as little more than an interesting 
characteristic of digital logic. In the 1950s very few thought that computing 
would become what it became, and still less could many have anticipated, 
beyond science fiction writers, that digital computing would dominate society 
so comprehensively through its capacity to transform technology and network 
communications.
Since the 1980s this different category of techno-logic, one that was 
subordinate to analogue, has become dominant—with effects we have yet to 
fully understand. As Arthur C. Clarke (1973: 21) speculated in the early 
1970s, the computer is perceived by humans at some level of consciousness 
as a kind of ‘magic’, so different is it from any previous technology. It 
transforms (or consigns to obsolescence) existing technologies, and it creates 
whole new (virtual) realms of human experience. This is a radical qualitative 
change that we do not appreciate enough in terms of its pervasive temporal 
and political effects.
The networked computer’s key effects are acceleration and automaticity. The 
former functions at rates far beyond human cognitive and physical capacities 
in the communicative process; and the latter is a conscious engineering out of 
the human element from computer processes, a more recent flowering of the 
cybernetic discoveries that began in the 1940s. Both logics serve to de-link 
humans from the process of making and communicating—from the ‘material 
forms and processes’ through which humans functioned in a world they could 
recognise. The virtual worlds of acceleration and automation create worlds 
through means we cannot see, through functions we do not control, and 
through effects that are increasingly unanticipated.
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Such has been the rapidity and extensiveness of computerisation, and such 
has been our collective faith in their problem-solving capacities and life-
enhancing potentials, that not only have we not realised that an analogue 
world was being eclipsed by a digital logic that infiltrates almost every aspect 
of economy, culture and society, but we have missed something important 
about ourselves: that we are analogue people who are becoming trapped in a 
digital world. And it is only now with the domination of digital processes in our 
lives that we have cause to reflect upon and consider the contrast between 
two competing technological and ontological states. 
What does it mean to be analogue creatures in a digital world? And more 
importantly how do analogue institutions such as the processes of liberal 
democracy function in such a context? As we will see, the nature of time can 
provide answers to what still might seem to many a bizarre couple of 
questions. Yet the premise to the questions is not bizarre at all if you think 
about it—which is precisely the problem—we’ve never had occasion to 
contrast analogue with digital as an ontological question. Now we do. If we 
accept the definition of analogue having its basis in nature, and if the 
technologies we have created have their analogue in nature, then as part of 
nature we cannot easily exist outside of this interaction; we ourselves are 
nature and therefore analogue beings.
If we care to look, then many important aspects of human endeavour can be 
seen as analogue processes confronting the challenges of displacement or 
colonisation by digital logic. For example, the analogue technology of writing, 
and its mass migration from print to screen from primary school onwards, is a 
problem in respect to how we understand cognition. What we are and how we 
think is closely bound up with the technologies we use, and the possible 
consequences of the radical difference between print and digital writing has 
hardly been considered beyond marginal voices in remote corners of the 
academy.
The political process emerges from writing, and it follows that this too is (in its 
modern forms) irreducibly analogue. The democratic processes to which we 
still look to provide the means through which individuals and collectives 
create and enact their political rights and responsibilities within and between 
nations drew its philosophical energy from the 18th century Enlightenment. 
And these processes were entimed by the contemporaneous technologies of 
communication (print and machine and clock) that formed the basis of 
Debray’s graphosphere. 
A useful way to think about the modern political process and its temporality is 
through the usually derogatory term ‘machine politics’. Originating in late-19th 
93 Time, Temporality and Global Politics
century USA, the term denoted centralised and hierarchical communicative 
forms, with long-standing connections of political control, and with outcomes 
that were planned and often predictable. Usually machine politics is 
considered an undemocratic corruption: think Japanese politics from the 
1950s to the present day. Nonetheless to consider institutionalised political 
processes as machine-like does capture its essential elements—elements 
that can be democratic, or at the very least have affects that may be seen and 
recognised and have their own unfolding in time and space—for good or ill, or 
something in between. 
We see the rhythms of the political machine still at work in what are the 
relatively slow motion processes within the institutional spheres, from 
parliaments and congresses, to council chambers and constituency meetings. 
We see it in the workings of a modern system of control and of planned 
outcomes in the analogue rhythms of individuals convening to speak and 
discuss, of voting cycles, of calendar-driven parliamentary and congressional 
sessions, of research departments that gather information with which to 
reflect and project, of committee meetings, of published debates, of 
scheduled ‘hearings’ through which face-to-face and often conflictual 
interaction takes place, and of government bureaucracies that have set 
administrative procedures through which the political process is filtered and 
enacted.
These are the ‘forms and processes’ of Debray’s graphosphere in practice, 
with analogue people expressing ideas through analogue technologies 
(writing, print, clock and calendar) that functioned as a recognisable process 
through time and space—and though which people could enact politics to 
rhythms that (broadly speaking) reflected those of nature.
Traditionally, this machine-like activity had two specific outcomes. The first is 
impact. This is the very point of the political process—to have an effect upon 
its surroundings and to transform it at the local and/or global scale. The 
process is of course fraught and imperfect and subject to all kinds of power 
contestation. Moreover, the impact of politics may be more or less successful, 
and may be dependent upon how success is measured at the time, and this 
measure may change with the passage of time. 
The second outcome is more interesting for our purposes. This is the creation 
of a political environment. By trying to transform its environment, the political 
process creates its own, one that is analogous to nature and, more, was 
intended to improve upon nature (improve our lives) in tangible and 
recognisable ways. The political environment was the sphere wherein the 
philosophical Enlightenment idea of progress was created and given practical 
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expression in all kinds of ways since the 18th century. The political 
environment was thus one where an idealised version of the natural world, a 
Utopia, could be dreamed of, planned for, and sometimes made actual. This 
political environment unfolded in time and space through what Paddy 
Scannell (2007:17) called a ‘common public time’ and this was organised in 
an analogue mode that people could also recognise because it was a mode 
that corresponded to the natural world (more or less) and its natural rhythms. 
The analogue world created by analogue beings though analogue processes 
and analogue technologies was so ‘natural’ that we have barely considered 
this cornerstone of modernity. However, the digital computer, the machine that 
David Jay Bolter (1984: 15-40) termed the new ‘defining technology’ of our 
post-modern age, has upturned these assumptions.
Preternatural Machines and an Unnatural Political Process
To consider the computer as ‘non-analogue’ is perforce to consider it 
preternatural, that is to say it’s ‘beyond nature’. And if it is, then the computer 
is unprecedented in its importance and is a machine possessed almost of the 
magical properties to which our species has always been in awe of and 
susceptible to. 
Today we bow before and offer propitiations to a logic we don’t really 
understand and to processes (such as acceleration and automation) that do 
not exist in nature. The computer’s preternatural power stems from the fact 
that its digital immediacy (as an effect) transcends and makes obsolete the 
mechanical speed that comprised the speed limit of modernity and the 
institutional political processes it gave rhythm to. 
The networked computer pulls us sharply away from the outmoded modern 
sphere and its forms and processes. For the digital natives this old world is an 
increasingly sepia toned one anyway. But it is a world where the analogue 
institutions and processes of politics continue to function as though its impact 
and environment-creation capacity is unchanged. Nonetheless, analogue 
political time has found itself ‘out of synch’, as Sheldon Wolin (1997: 47) 
predicted it would be, with the high-speed temporality of the digital network. 
This has created a profound temporal contradiction. Politics, in its deep-level 
forms and processes—if not at its surface level of networked 
communications—continues as if the world were still analogue, as if it were 
still 1972; a world prior to the computer revolution and where Zhou Enlai’s 
longue durée could still shape the political process, and it could do so 
because analogue was all there was. 
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To understand the scale of the contradiction between political time and 
network time, the concepts of mechanical speed and digital speed need to be 
delineated. The former is analogue, as we have seen, and has speed limits; 
its processes can be accelerated only so far before they begin to break down. 
The latter has no inherent temporal limitations, and is constrained only by the 
current state of technological capacity, which continues to increase 
exponentially. Social acceleration and democracy don’t mesh particularly well. 
And as digital communication becomes the basis for the articulation of 
essentially analogue processes, then the ideas expressed in the political 
process, and of the democratic process in particular, become both displaced 
and deformed. It is the negative effects of this asynchronicity that gives form 
and content to the preternatural political process that rises to dominance in 
our post-modernity.
Perhaps the most consequential displacement occurs in the realm of political 
ideas and their mediation. With the ascendancy of neoliberal thought in the 
late-1970s, political ideas have become increasingly refracted through the 
logic of capital. And as Marx recognised a long time ago, capitalism thrives 
upon growing acceleration, and that technological development gets its 
dynamism from capitalist competition (time is money). The growing dominion 
of digital acceleration means that those ideas able to synchronise with the 
ever-faster pace of economy and society are those that find currency most 
easily. 
Jodi Dean sees the displacement of the traditional political realm by digital 
capitalism as an expression of the power of ‘communicative capitalism’, 
where ‘the market becomes the site of democratic aspirations’ (2005:54). 
Ideas that look to the longer term, or reach back reflectively to the past for 
guidance, or ideas that simply need time to articulate and develop properly in 
order to reflect the inherent need of the idea itself, become marginalised as 
they literally take too much time. When time becomes oriented towards 
instrumental ‘efficiency’ and when the mantra of ‘faster is better’ is largely 
unquestioned, then analogue politics becomes increasingly ineffective. It is no 
longer able to create its own environment wherein it can create and act upon 
a world that is equivalent to its own analogue capacities. 
The machine and clock based ‘cognitive framework’ that was the diverse and 
agonistic framework that formed modern political ideas has been captured by 
the singular ideology of the marketplace logic and the temporal acceleration 
that is valorised within it. It is in this context of displacement that we can now 
perhaps understand Perry Anderson’s lament that we live in a monopolitical 
world, where for the first time since the Reformation ‘there are no longer any 
significant oppositions—that is, systematic rival outlooks—within the thought-
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world of the West’ (2000:17). 
The politics of modernity—where political forms and processes have 
recognisable aims and objectives, recognisable as analogues of nature to be 
worked upon in the creation of a world made better—are being eclipsed. As 
the analogue political process becomes displaced and marginalised though 
the negative political power of digital acceleration, deformations of the 
modern political project fan out and proliferate to construct the unnatural 
politics of our digital post-modernity.
Post-modern Deformities
A post-modern political reality is that social acceleration through digital 
communication has meant that power percolates up to the level of the 
corporate boardroom and the political executive. Corporate capital is more 
powerful than ever before, and CEOs and senior executives need to respond 
rapidly to economic challenges and opportunities. This much is clear. Less 
apparent is that in our fast-paced globalised economy and society, the same 
time-pressures confront political institutions, and their analogue pace is not 
up to the task. Slow-paced political processes continue in their daily work, of 
course. Institutions with their committees and legislatures and party structures 
carry on grinding out platforms and policies and laws. At this level and at this 
analogue rhythm, politics carries some social meaning still and can function 
within a recognisable analogue context. 
But at the executive level, at the level of the 1% where politics, capital and 
power intersect, politics essentially flies blind. Political crises and economic 
imperatives are confronted in hasty and improvised and unrepresentative 
fashion. The executive is able to act with dispatch—but only to make rapid 
(and often poorly thought-out) decisions on our behalf. Alexander Hamilton, 
US founding father, recognised the innate folly in rushing the political process 
when he wrote that, a ‘promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a 
benefit’ (Hamilton 1788). 
An example of this was observed in the opening phase of the 2008 global 
financial crisis where stock market time pressure for governments to act 
rapidly was extreme. In September of that year, as the US economy seemed 
to be spiraling down, the U.S. Senate considered the first of its ‘stimulus 
packages’ for its stricken economy. The prevalent feeling was that officials 
had only had a weekend (before the stock exchange reopened) to fix the 
problem. Senator Lindsay Graham, a Republican representing South 
Carolina, and present at the crisis meetings declared to a Fox News journalist 
afterwards that: ‘The process that’s led to this bill stinks. There is no 
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negotiating going on here! Nobody is negotiating! We’re making this up as we 
go!’ (Graham, 2009). When markets are waiting impatiently for signals, and 
when individuals are not in possession of all the facts nor the necessary time 
to comprehend them, then ‘making it up’ is all that can be done. 
This is politics conducted in post-modern network time. It occurs in a world of 
acceleration wherein immediacy governs, not reflection, debate and reasoned 
decision-making. Power is abstracted and constantly shifts and dissipates 
and then concentrates and dissipates again, mirroring the random forces of 
the marketplace where nothing is certain and nothing can be held to proper 
political and democratic scrutiny. Paul Virilio (1995) termed such a context, a 
‘dictatorship of speed’.
Perhaps most ominously the alienated and inauthentic politics of network time 
flourishes among the 99% also. The ‘masses’ have reached out to information 
technologies as substitute means of political communication because the 
analogue political parties and institutions of class based organisation are 
either dependent upon the neoliberal consensus or are depleted of political 
power and/or credibility. The 99% no longer have a recognisable ‘other’ 
against whom struggles may be conducted, nor political institutions in which 
they can invest.
The buds of the 2011 Arab Spring, for instance, seemed to portend a political 
flowering through social media, a Facebook revolution where the digital was 
adapted for democracy. But its millions of activists were thrust into an 
accelerated sphere where their Enlightenment-derived aspirations were too 
far out of synch with both the temporality of the ideas and the political realities 
of the region. The political analogue of nature’s ‘grassroots’ could not find the 
soil in which to strike, nor the time for their cultivation. There were in fact no 
buds because there is no analogue for soil in the network. Here as in all 
putative ‘digital politics’ there is, as Moisés Naím (2014) observes:
a powerful political engine running in the streets of many cities. 
It turns at high speed and produces a lot of political energy. 
But the engine is not connected to wheels, and so the 
‘movement’ doesn’t move. Achieving that motion requires 
organisations capable of old-fashioned and permanent political 
work that can leverage street demonstrations into political 
change and policy reforms. In most cases, that means political 
parties.
Political parties that aspire to be democratic and connected to the people are 
indeed ‘old-fashioned’. They are also, necessarily, analogue. Old-fashioned 
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parties can be reactionary, too, of course, and those that were organised, as 
in Egypt, and were disciplined with intact institutions of economic, cultural, 
political and military power, were able to sweep aside forms of digital 
organisation that dissipated as rapidly as they formed.
Analogue Epilogue?
Like many artists, Václav Havel saw society at a slightly different angle from 
the rest of us. Often the artist’s insights are perspicacious. Also a democrat 
and philosopher living in Stalinist Czechoslovakia, Havel was acutely aware 
of the political role of temporality and of communication technologies. Time in 
prison, time in waiting and organising, perhaps confident that such a system 
could not endure over the longue durée, was an Enlightenment relationship 
with time that was analogue. In the pre-1989 Czech graphosphere 
communication between dissidents was fully analogue also: samizdat-based 
that was conducive to thought, debate, reflection, planning and establishing 
and nurturing political roots within the idealised environment that Havel and 
others created.
Havel did not naively imagine a Utopia in the West, however. In the late 
1970s, time and distance from the West had enabled him to see where 
western ‘post-totalitarian’ societies were headed through emergent 
information-based technologies. And he could recognise the coming inability, 
though ‘planetary technology’ that is ‘out of control’, for humans to recognise 
themselves in nature: 
What we call the consumer and industrial (or post-industrial) 
society…is perhaps merely an aspect of the deep crisis in 
which humanity, dragged helplessly along by the automatism 
of global technological civilisation, finds itself (Havel 1978:55).
And post-industrial (or what I’ve termed post-modern) politics give no 
protection against the onslaught of digital automatism. Havel continues: 
It would appear that the traditional parliamentary democracies 
can offer no fundamental opposition to the automatism of 
technological civilisation and the industrial-consumer society, 
for they, too, are being dragged helplessly along by it (pp.55-
56).
Havel could see clearly the symptoms but not the cause. How could he? The 
dualism of analogue and digital is only now emerging with the latter’s 
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ascendancy. But he could see the threat of technology upon the political 
process. Looking back it is possible to see that Havel and millions of other 
thinking, reflective people, West and East, were living in authentic analogue 
time and in an analogue political process in its end phase. We have the 
contrasting force of digitality to enable us to see that now—and to understand 
what knowledge of it allows us to see. We are now able to see the value of 
the analogue relationship with time, and to consider ourselves as analogue 
creatures that are part of nature. And we can also appreciate, at least 
vaguely, what the digital universe deprives us of—an authentic (at least in 
terms of analogue time) relationship with political process so deeply shaped 
by technology. Even the Stalinism that Havel fought against was temporally 
authentic, in its way, as was social democracy or old-fashioned conservatism.
Salutary to consider that unless we make the temporal within the political 
salient—and make efforts to give it back over to human and analogue 
agency—then the modern political process will slip further towards a state of 
acceleration and automation, and thence from any potential for democratic 
control. It would be a terrible and ignominious end for a modern political 
process (and project) to be eclipsed by technological speed and market 
imperatives. But, to quote the poet Lawrence Joseph from his ‘Visions of 
Labour’, this would be a mistake of our own manufacture: ‘Makers, we, of 
perfectly contemplated machines’ (Joseph, 2015:17) who will have become 
unable through lack of time to contemplate what we have actually made.
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Until recently, political theorists and scientists have had little to say about the 
political significance or nature of time. In contrast, this chapter argues that the 
ways in which time is used, valued and experienced are neither inevitable nor 
‘natural’; rather, they reflect and sustain deep-seated patterns of power and 
inequality. The analysis of time is, therefore, central to the understanding of 
political processes and outcomes. 
Written from the perspective of a British feminist political theorist, the chapter 
brings together some recent developments in ‘malestream’ political theory 
and international relations, critical discussion of time-use studies and feminist 
analyses of social reproduction. The starting point is post-industrial societies, 
seeing inequalities within these as intertwined with intersecting inequalities 
elsewhere in the world. It focuses in particular on the uneven distribution of 
‘free’ time, the unequal value attached to different patterns of time use and 
the prioritisation of the ‘time is money’ culture of both the capitalist workplace 
and the global economy over other temporal rhythms and needs. The chapter 
argues that our current relationship with time is both unjust and damaging. It 
extends feminist insistence on the economic importance of informal, domestic 
and/or unpaid work to explore the ‘time culture’ involved in reproductive work; 
unlike more mainstream writing on the political implications of the accelerated 
time culture of global finance capital, it is concerned with the uneven impact 
of temporal changes on unequally situated groups, and the subordination of 
‘other’, more ‘natural’ time cultures to capitalist imperatives.
‘Free’ Time as a Scarce and Inequitably Distributed Resource
In his later (2001) work, the eminent political philosopher John Rawls 
identified leisure time as a ‘primary good’, something that everyone wants; it 
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is also clearly a scarce resource, and he argued that its distribution should 
therefore be regulated by principles of justice. This means that those who 
choose leisure over work should expect to pay an economic price, so that 
there would be no place for either the idle rich or workshy welfare claimants in 
a justly organised society. Although Rawls did not make the point, free time is 
not simply desirable in itself, it is also a key political resource, for any political 
activity takes time, and those who toil without respite cannot choose to attend 
meetings or become involved in community campaigns, let alone stand for 
political office or travel abroad; any inequitable distribution of free time is 
therefore doubly unjust. Rawls focussed on justice within societies, but in an 
era of global interdependency it should logically apply also to the distribution 
of scarce resources between societies; clearly, such an extension has 
profound and radical implications for global justice.
Historically, unequal access to free time has frequently reflected and 
reinforced unequal access to economic resources, with lower status or class 
groups and manual workers putting in longer hours for less reward than large 
land or capital holders and managerial and professional employees. Today, 
some analysts argue that this class pattern has been reversed in many 
western nations, with long-hours working and lack of leisure seen as both a 
sign of status and a means to career success, so that the ‘money rich’ are 
now also the ‘time poor’ (Gershuny 2005; Sullivan and Gershuny 2004). 
Nevertheless, money can also ‘buy’ time, for example by taking a taxi rather 
than waiting for a bus, or by ‘outsourcing’ family responsibilities. Here, the 
concept of ‘discretionary time’, the time remaining after deducting the hours 
an individual needs to spend in paid work, unpaid work and personal care in 
order to keep out of poverty and meet minimal social standards, may be more 
useful than free or leisure time, as it helpfully highlights the choice that 
underlies much long-hours working in the West, whereby individuals work 
long hours in order to maximise their income and enjoy an affluent lifestyle 
(Goodin et al., 2008; Burchardt, 2013). Badly paid workers obviously have 
little scope for such trade-offs, their working hours are generally less flexible 
and they are more likely to involve anti-social working hours, while the 
outsourcing of their own domestic and caring work is not an option for those 
badly paid (usually women, often migrant) workers who provide services for 
wealthier groups and who may have to leave their own families or neglect 
their needs (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Litt and Zimmerman 2003; 
Peterson 2003, 2012; Runyan and Peterson 2014). Problems are often 
compounded for the growing number of part-time and/or temporary workers 
with unpredictable hours and pay: in 2015, an OECD report showed that ‘non-
standard’ work now accounts for around a third of total employment in 
industrialised countries, and that households depending on these wages are 
more likely to be living in poverty (OECD 2015); some commentators now 
refer to those trapped in such insecure, unpredictable employment as the 
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‘precariat’. Other issues arise for those working night shifts, who can be 
effectively excluded from the social and political life of their community and 
whose numbers are rapidly rising with the growth in international call centres; 
here A. Aneesh shows the global power relations involved, as Indian workers 
have to adjust to the time-zones of clients in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Australia and their ‘concrete social and personal lives are 
subordinated to global system imperatives’ (2012: 515). Although unemployed 
people might appear to have more than their fair share of leisure, their ability 
to take advantage of this is often limited by poverty, and also by the time-
consuming nature of welfare application processes and job applications and/
or the debilitating psychological effects of unemployment; many unemployed 
people also have time-consuming caring responsibilities.
Like most male political theorists, Rawls did not explore issues of justice 
within the home (see Okin 1990; Baehr ed., 2004; Abbey ed. 2013), and he 
equated leisure time with time left over from paid employment. The view that 
citizens should contribute to their society primarily through paid work reflects 
the dominant economic and political assumptions of global capitalism, but it 
has been challenged in different ways by both liberal and socialist feminist 
political theorists (for an overview, see Bryson 2016, Chapter 14), and also by 
feminist scholars in Development and International Political Economy, such 
as Diane Elson and V. Spike Peterson. As these writers argue, the focus on 
‘productive’ work loses sight of other forms of necessary work, not only the 
unpaid agricultural work central to subsistence economies, but also the 
domestic and caring work that is essential to the survival and wellbeing of all 
societies (most obviously, we all need care when we are born, and also if we 
become sick or frail). Because this work is often unpaid, it disappears from 
statistics on national production; however, an international feminist campaign 
succeeded in committing signatories to the Platform for Action that resulted 
from the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing to developing time-use 
studies to measure unpaid work and include it in national accounts. 
The resulting studies have confirmed feminist claims both about the 
importance of unpaid work and women’s disproportionate responsibility for it 
in all societies (Gershuny 2011), leading many to claim that men’s ‘domestic 
absenteeism’ underpins the gender gaps in pay, career progression and 
political representation that remain in all nations (for overviews of feminist 
arguments, see Lister 2003; Bryson 2007). However, the related claim that 
women have less access to free time has been disputed by leading time-use 
researcher Jonathan Gershuny, who argues that in western nations women’s 
longer domestic hours are balanced by men’s longer hours of paid 
employment, so that ‘work- and leisure-time totals … seem generally similar 
between women and men in each country’ (2000: 8-9). Gershuny also 
identifies some convergence of roles as women have increased their time in 
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the workplace and men contribute more in the home, particularly in relation to 
childcare. However, Gershuny’s finding on leisure time, which uses the 
evidence of time-use diaries in which respondents are asked to record their 
activities at fifteen minute intervals throughout the day and night, should be 
handled with caution. While they appear to provide objective information, 
these diaries depend on a particular view of time that sees it as unfolding in a 
series of discrete, measurable activities; this is often alien to the temporal 
experiences of providing care and it can under-record the sometimes 
overwhelming impact of domestic responsibilities and the extent to which 
these affect apparently ‘free’ time. Thus, some studies record only one 
activity during any given period, ignoring the fact that, for example, an activity 
such as ‘going swimming’ can be transformed from leisure to work if the diary 
keeper is responsible for young children; many studies have also disregarded 
the constraining impact of the ‘passive’ care of a sleeping child or an elderly 
relative suffering from dementia that does not appear in the diary, but that can 
prevent their carer from leaving their home. Gershuny’s focus on total leisure 
time also ignored the frequently brief, fragmented and unpredictable nature of 
carers’ free time, and the extent to which this leaves men with greater control 
over their leisure hours and more ‘usable’ time (for an expanded discussion 
of these points, see Bryson 2008). 
Unequal access to free, discretionary or leisure time is politically important, 
for it means that those who are most time deprived are least able to gain a 
political voice. One effect can be the absence of those with direct experience 
of caring responsibilities from positions of power (and because ‘successful’ 
women are disproportionately childfree and without caring responsibilities, a 
rise in the number of women in decision-making positions does not 
necessarily mean that the voices of carers are heard). The intersection of 
time poverty with other forms of social and economic disadvantage means 
that the poorest and neediest – such as many lone mothers, the ‘precariat’ 
and migrant care workers – are particularly unlikely to be heard. Such 
inequalities are not inevitable, but could in principle be addressed by a range 
of social policies, including state support for carers, employment policies that 
assume that ‘normal’ workers have family responsibilities and welfare policies 
that recognise that citizens who are not engaged in paid work are not 
necessarily idle or irresponsible, but may be contributing to society in other 
ways. As discussed in later sections of this chapter, there have been moves 
in this direction, but the power of nation-states to plan and implement such 
changes has been reduced by the global drive to short-term profit and a shift 
to a new, accelerated relationship with time.
In low-tech societies, the time-consuming impact of household 
responsibilities is of course often much greater than in the West, and the 
political exclusion of women much greater (Runyan and Peterson 2014). 
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However, some writers argue that in recent years the demands of grass-roots 
women’s movements and organisations have been filtered upwards through a 
wide range of non-governmental organisations to be heard in global forums, 
feeding into a global shift in thinking about women’s human rights, which has 
had a significant, if patchy, impact at the level of transnational political 
institutions and conventions (Okin 2000; Walby 2005). In practical terms, 
however, many apparent gains, such as moves to improve girls’ and women’s 
access to education and employment, coincide with capitalism’s need for 
docile, trained employees; such developments leave structured inequalities 
intact and can look more like ‘a depressing example of neo-liberal co-optation’ 
than ‘an inspiring example of feminist activism and democratic innovation’ 
(Squires, 2007: 51); as Sylvia Federici argues, claims by the United Nations 
to promote women’s rights ‘channel[led] the politics of women’s liberation 
within a frame compatible with the needs and plans of international capital 
and the developing neoliberal agenda.’ (2012: 98. See also Eisenstein 2009)
Valuing Time
While there are many exceptions, high pay and status are generally linked to 
time spent on non-manual work, with those who sit in offices earning more 
than those who get their hands dirty, and brain power and education 
rewarded more than physical strength. This is reflected in a global movement 
in manufacturing away from wealthier nations, whose workers in service 
sectors benefit (in the short term) from access to cheap consumer goods 
made in nations where cheap manual labour is readily available, while 
financial speculation rather than production is providing the basis for a new, 
global, super-rich elite. Meanwhile, ‘development’ and ‘progress’ are usually 
understood in terms of a shift away from subsistence activities and towards a 
market economy, with cash crops and economic growth prioritised over 
sustainability and all human values reduced to measurable, monetary 
transactions. 
This context compounds the global patriarchal denigration of anything 
associated with ‘the feminine’ (Peterson 2012), so that domestic and caring 
work is often seen as a form of unskilled manual labour or some kind of 
natural, instinctive extension of womanhood, rather than ‘real work’. Those 
who spend their time on it are therefore economically penalised rather than 
rewarded; and it often seems invisible to policy makers, who forget that not all 
value can be expressed in monetary terms, and that apparently ‘unproductive’ 
citizens may be making an essential contribution to society. For those who do 
this work for their own family, it is of course often enjoyable, often 
immeasurably rewarding, and often undertaken out of love. It is, however, 
also often physically and mentally demanding, sometimes tedious, frequently 
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exhausting, not always freely chosen and, as discussed above, it takes a 
great deal of time. Efficient housework and good quality care also require 
practical and intellectual skills; as with other forms of skilled work, some of 
these can be learned, and some require natural ability. For example, raising 
good citizens requires an understanding of child development, and supporting 
people with dementia requires understanding of their condition; both forms of 
care also require personal qualities of patience, empathy and the ability to 
communicate well.
As discussed above, this work is disproportionately done by women, often 
without pay; when it is done as a form of paid employment it is usually poorly 
paid, reflecting the low status accorded to both manual and women’s work. 
This low pay makes a major contribution to the global gender gap in pay. 
Many equal opportunity policies therefore seek to guide young women 
towards better-paid, traditionally male occupations such as information 
technology or engineering, and away from traditionally female sectors. At the 
same time, such policies also now often acknowledge that workplace equality 
requires childcare provision: for example, a recent report on gender equality 
by the European Commission argues that ‘Europe needs to fully utilise the 
talents of all its women’ (2015: 7) through supporting them into employment, 
encouraging them away from traditionally female occupation and providing 
childcare. Quite who is supposed to deliver this childcare if it is deemed too 
menial for talented and aspiring women is not addressed, but the logical (and 
presumably unintended) implication is that looking after children in their most 
formative years should be left to those deemed incapable of ‘better’ forms of 
employment or ‘outsourced’, along with other forms of social care, to female 
migrant workers, who leave their own families to look after children or frail 
elderly people in wealthier nations. The more radical option of raising the 
status and pay of childcare workers (which could have the side-effect of 
attracting men into the profession) is seldom on the agenda, and the global 
consequences are ignored.
More positively, gender equality policies today do usually acknowledge that 
some workers have demands on their time outside of the workplace, and 
there has been a general movement towards more ‘family-friendly’ working 
practices. In particular, most nations now provide some kind of support for 
employed parents through maternity, paternity or parental leave entitlements 
(although these are not always realised in practice), leaving the United States 
among a tiny handful of nations that provide no form of paid maternity or 
family leave for female workers (Rosen 2004). There is also now some 
recognition of the feminist argument that workplace equality requires that men 
do more in the home, and by 2013 at least 79 countries provided some kind 
of leave to fathers around the time of birth (International Labour Organisation 
2014). In general, however, the time that citizens need to care for others 
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outside the workplace is still seen as something to be fitted around 
employment, rather than the other way around, and more flexible, family-
friendly forms of employment are still largely viewed as special treatment for 
women workers rather than the norm. As discussed in the next section, this 
prioritisation of the values and needs of the workplace also involves 
prioritising a particular perspective on the nature of time itself, linked in turn to 
a weakening of the power of nation states and a crisis both in care and in 
capitalism itself.
Time Cultures
As many writers have now shown, the ways in which we experience and 
understand time are not straightforward and ‘natural’ but socially and 
culturally produced (from a wide literature, see in particular Thompson 1999 
[1967]; Adam 1995). Some historians have identified a shift in western 
societies from a pre-capitalist, pre-industrial time culture that was oriented to 
the cyclical rhythms of the seasons and tasks that had to be done to the time 
culture of the capitalist workplace, with its sense of time as something that 
steadily moves in one direction and that can be owned, measured, saved, 
spent or wasted. Such commodified clock time can be assigned an abstract 
monetary value and subject to considerations of cost efficiency; its results-
oriented, ‘time is money’ logic is the time of global capitalism, its effects now 
exaggerated by digital time, with its attendant notions of multi-tasking, the 
blurring of the distinction between work and leisure and the acceleration and 
compression of time, most obviously in the case of financial markets, where 
fortunes can be made or lost in a nanosecond. 
Some writers have built on William Scheurman’s (2004) claim that today’s 
‘social acceleration’ of time is having detrimental political effects, disrupting 
the slower temporal rhythms of liberal democracy and strengthens executive 
power, with its ability to respond rapidly to immediate demands and events, at 
the expense of the long-term planning or reflection on the past that 
respectively characterise legislative and judicial power. In particular, Robert 
Hassan argues that clock time has been superceded by a shift to digital, 
networked time and that this is linked to a shift in power away from nation 
states to abstract market and technological forces ‘not under any meaningful 
democratic control anywhere in the world’ (Hassan 2012:294). Wayne Hope 
further argues that the inescapable imperative to pursue high-speed, short-
term financial profit is in conflict with longer-term strategies of capital 
accumulation, producing a crisis of capitalism that is effectively a ‘crisis of 
temporalities’ (2011: 194), of which the 2007-8 financial collapse was an early 
manifestation.
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These points are important. However, what Hassan and Hope fail to see is 
that, while clock time ticked more slowly than digital time, an older, pre-
capitalist time that cannot be rationally planned and controlled, inevitably still 
persists in the rhythms of the seasons and our bodies, and in the often 
unpredictable patterns and needs of emotional and caring relationships. 
Today, these older times are increasingly subject to the logic of measurable, 
commodified time, both clock and digital, as the relentless pursuit of short-
term profit extends more vigorously into all areas of life in a world in which 
‘Infants, human organs, sexualised bodies, intimate caring, sensual 
pleasures, and spiritual salvation are all for sale’ (Peterson 2003: 78). In the 
case of the natural world, the effects are potentially disastrous in terms of 
sustainable agriculture and climate change; the effects on our human 
relationships are also deeply damaging.   
Caring for other people is an inherently relational and often open-ended 
activity, while the tasks it involves are often determined by need rather than 
by the clock (a child’s nappy has to be changed when it is dirty, not because it 
is four o’clock). Many caring tasks are very much focussed on the here and 
now, and attempting to speed them up can often be counter-productive (trying 
to rush a child through eating breakfast may provoke a temper tantrum that 
makes them even later for nursery). Care is also often repetitive rather than 
with an identifiable end product (that nappy will soon need changing again); it 
can involve a jumble of simultaneous activities, emotions and processes (the 
child may not just be ‘eating breakfast’, but exploring tastes and textures and 
developing their speech while learning the effects of particular forms of 
behaviour); and it can take the form of simply ‘being there’ in case of risk or 
need. As discussed above, the impact of such responsibilities cannot be fully 
captured by time-use diaries, which are inherently tied to measurable clock 
time.
All this means that the ‘temporal logic’ that good care requires is fluid, 
relational, often cyclical, and oriented towards contextualised and often 
unpredictable needs; this is very different from the results-oriented logic of the 
workplace that seeks to maximise output while using as little time as possible. 
However, when unpaid family time has to be fitted in around the demands of 
employment, it too has to be organised and planned to an extent that can feel 
like the ‘McDonaldisation of love’ (Boyd 2002: 466, quoting Anne Manne). 
Meanwhile, in a neoliberal age of austerity, paid care is increasingly seen as 
a profit-making industry that seeks to ‘process’ as many clients as possible 
and that loses sight of less tangible processes; when this care is publicly 
provided it is increasingly subject to considerations of cost-effectiveness that 
focus on measureable outputs and value for money, but that may be counter-
productive. For example, care workers supporting elderly people in their 
home may appear to increase their ‘output’ if they rush through the process of 
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getting them up and dressed in the morning; but if they are able to make this 
a leisurely process, involving a chat and a shared cup of tea, they may be 
enabled to remain in their own home and out of residential care for longer, 
saving public money in the long run. As with family life, the problem is not 
simply that people do not have enough hours and minutes to do their caring 
work, although this is important, but that their activities are being forced into 
an inappropriate temporal straightjacket based on the logic of market 
capitalism – that is, an economic system based on the pursuit of profit rather 
than the satisfaction of human need in which reproductive labour is 
‘increasingly organised for and undermined by neoliberal globalisation’ 
(Runyan and Peterson 2014: 200).
Because women throughout the world do more caring work than men, it is 
generally they who are most affected by the need to ‘straddle multiple 
temporalities’ (Everingham 2002: 338), and the extent to which the demands 
of the workplace are prioritised over other needs is bound up with the more 
general privileging of both typically male experiences and life patterns and 
gendered nature of social, economic and political inequalities. These 
gendered inequalities intersect with those of class and race within and 
between nations as the ‘care deficit’ experienced by some households, 
communities or nations is displaced onto others, producing a crisis in care 
and social reproduction that is linked to the more general temporal crisis in 
global capitalism identified above. In this context, as political theorist Nancy 
Fraser has argued, it is politically important to re-assert the values associated 
with reproduction, which are ‘pregnant with critical-political possibility’ and can 
provide powerful resources for anti-capitalist struggles (2014: 69. For related 
arguments, see Peterson 2012; Bryson 2011 and 2016).
Conclusions
Our relationship with time in contemporary societies is neither ‘natural’ nor 
just. On the contrary, time is used, valued and understood in ways that reflect 
and sustain economic, social and political inequalities. These inequalities 
operate at global, national, local and domestic levels to privilege some 
nations, classes and ethnic groups over others. In prioritising the temporal 
experiences and needs traditionally associated with men rather than women 
and generally providing men with more free time than women, today’s time 
culture also sustains deep-seated gender inequalities in all areas of life. 
These inequalities and injustices are deeply damaging to the health and 
welfare of citizens and their families throughout the world. It is in the interests 
of us all to rethink our human relationship with time, and to confront the 
conflicting, hierarchically ordered, demands of caring, clock and digital times.
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War through a Temporal Lens: 
Foregrounding Temporality in 
International Relations’ 
Conceptions of War
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For those focused on questions of security, war poses a paradox. On one 
hand, the concept of war seems obvious and intuitive. It operates as the 
organising concept around which contemporary security discourse positions 
itself. Whether one views the category of security in broad or narrow terms, 
war, armed conflict, and political violence remain solidly within the frame 
(Lipschutz 1995). Simultaneously, however, there always seems to be an 
increasing awareness of how the nature of war itself is changing and 
shifting.34 Great power wars and state-state conflicts over control of territory 
as traditionally understood no longer dominate the international space. Drone 
strikes, irregular warfare, insurgencies, terrorism, as well as massacres, 
genocide, peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions occupy increasingly 
central positions in contemporary security studies (see e.g., Boon and 
Lovelace 2012, Gleditsch 2013). The idea of war seems to be shifting 
beneath our feet and the concept itself seems difficult if not impossible to pin 
down in terms of meaning. The paradox this poses is that despite the ever-
present gap between the lived, present-day experience of political violence 
and its dominant representation as ‘war’, this concept still retains meaning in 
34  I recognise from the outset that this is primarily a matter of appearances and 
explicitly make the argument in later sections that this disjuncture between actual 
political practice and conceptual representation is an inescapable one, not, as some 
argue, a product of particular changes in contemporary warfighting. 
116War through a Temporal Lens
theory and practice. Much like terrorism, the concept of war remains nearly 
impossible to define with any certainty or consensus, yet it still remains 
resonant and foundational in the field of IR (Cronin 2009). The questions this 
raises are not merely academic. In Balibar’s assessment of the war on 
terrorism he states:
It seems to me that many, if not all, of the current discussions 
are in fact obscured and affected by the…preliminary question 
which remains undecided throughout...when it comes to either 
drawing lessons from the war, or deriving consequences, or 
proposing alternatives, is embarrassing for any speaker, 
namely, the simple question: what is a “war”? I shall try to 
show that this is not a verbal puzzle, a pure nominalistic 
requisite, that it has consequences for our reasoning 
concerning the current situation, and the kind of historical 
determinations that it reveals (Balibar 2008, 366).
The question of whether or not the United States is at war with the Islamic 
State, for instance, has significant impact on US behaviour and foreign policy. 
A debate has recently emerged within the United States regarding the 
necessity of a congressional resolution authorising the use of military force 
(AUMF) for the ongoing US military operations in Iraq and Syria. An AUMF is 
the modern American instantiation of an official declaration of war, and as 
such, it triggers a comprehensive legal shift throughout US policy. The 
Obama administration claims that they do not need authorisation on the basis 
of the 2001 AUMF authorising the war on terrorism and more recently 
narrowed by the Administration to the war on ‘Al Qaeda and its affiliates’ (US 
National Security Strategy 2010). At this point, however, the debate has 
largely been left behind as it has become clear that no new AUMF can be 
agreed upon (Leatherby 2015). This has left the administration position in 
place by default—military operations can continue against the Islamic State, 
as well as against Al Qaeda and whoever else the Administration decides 
constitutes ‘its affiliate’.  
The seemingly simple question—whether the United States is engaged in a 
war with the Islamic State—is a question that cannot be answered with finality 
at the moment and is now seen as a legal issue, but the conceptual 
implications involved in answering the question are much broader, just as 
Balibar argued was the case with the initiation of the war on terrorism. 
Answering this question with any precision goes well beyond the narrow issue 
of legal declarations of war. Two puzzles arise at the conceptual level that this 
chapter will explore. First, there is the question of how past, present, and 
future operate in the practice of war itself—e.g., temporal horizons that 
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appear obvious in retrospect are very much not so in the moment. Second, at 
the analytical level, the beginning and endings of war operate in a much more 
indeterminate manner than typically understood, especially in the study of IR. 
International relations (IR) has a conception of war that tracks largely to 
societal discourses where war is viewed as involving the use of violence 
between organised groups for ostensibly political purposes (Sambanis 2004; 
Harff 2003). What’s equally important to the behaviour the concept represents 
is the level of casualty and magnitude of destruction. We may disagree on the 
level at which a conflict becomes more than just a skirmish or battle, but we 
can all agree, for instance, that a war is different than an assassination. 
Regardless of where we draw that line, assessing whether a given conflict 
has crossed it cannot be known in advance. In other words, as a category of 
analysis, a war only becomes a war after the fact. Balibar captures this 
directly when he states: 
Wars are named: they have to be. Most of the time they are 
named after the event, by historians, which means in particular 
that they are named when they are considered to be finished, 
to have been brought to an end… They are named individually 
or collectively, e.g., the Wars of the Roses, or the Punic Wars, 
the Napoleonic Wars. But often they are not named univocally 
(Balibar 2008; 367).
A shooting at Fort Hood inspired by a terrorist group’s propaganda or the 
state execution of an individual identified as conspiring with that group are 
indeed acts of violence between groups in conflict, but alone neither are 
sufficient to constitute a war. That designation or ‘naming’, to use Balibar’s 
term, only arises with certainty in the future. War then seems to operate in a 
continuing space of temporal liminality where it is both outside and beyond 
our apprehension in the present, yet simultaneously meaningful in context 
and seemingly appreciable, even obvious.     
IR has seen recent movement towards recognising the importance of 
temporality in all facets of international political practice by foregrounding it as 
a stand-alone issue, rather than as an issue of history or methodology (Hom 
2010, Hom and Steele 2010, McIntosh 2015, Solomon 2013, Hutchings 2008, 
Hutchings 2007, Berenskoetter 2011, Stevens 2016). This chapter seeks to 
build upon these moves by illustrating some of the ways in which attention to 
the temporal dimension in IR can better inform the understanding of a 
foundational concept such as war. As with any move to incorporate more 
‘social’ aspects of political experience, moves to foreground temporality run 
into the criticism that these issues wash out when engaging ‘harder’ issues 
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such as war and the use of force (Mearsheimer 1995, Wendt 1995). This 
chapter uses a temporal frame to sketch out some of the important aspects of 
the concept of war as it is produced and reproduced in IR scholarship and 
practice. In doing so it also operates as an illustration of what can be 
illuminated by utilising it as a frame (Butler 2009). Wars are relational—both 
in terms of space and time—and rely on connections in order to come into 
existence (Jackson and Nexon 1999). As a concept that is already 
understood as an event—rather than a thing—war is necessarily produced 
through processes and relations over time and only comes to be understood 
through these representation(s). Events are difficult to pin down ontologically, 
yet most accept that they are distinct from things. MacKenzie identifies this 
distinction, drawing on Davidson, by emphasising that events are distinct due 
to the action that is intrinsic to the concept—e.g., ‘passing legislation’ is an 
event that may be captured by the word ‘legislation’ but is not synonymous 
with the abstract and fixed idea of a ‘law’ (MacKenzie 2008).35
This chapter will proceed in two parts. First, it sketches out some important 
aspects of war that are more clearly exposed when confronted from a 
temporal perspective. Framing war as constituted first and foremost 
temporally, rather than as an entity or outcome to be explained and/or 
understood emphasises the importance of process, discontinuity, 
transformation, and duration (Buzan and Lawson 2012, Musgrave and Nexon 
2013). The second section identifies some of the implications for future 
security studies scholarship if war is ‘fully temporalized’ and understood as a 
dynamic process. Reflexive criticism becomes increasingly important, as the 
concept of war is susceptible to reification by the very theorists who are 
seeking to better understand it. To accept the portrayed representations by 
political actors as real is to leave a critical element of political violence 
uninterrogated (Butler 2004, Butler 2012). As well, the concept of war should 
be more fully critiqued and provisionally understood as a category that 
captures multiple, disparate types of political violence. As such, it may—or 
may not—remain useful as time goes on.  
Identifying War’s Constitutive Temporal Dimension
In IR, war is typically treated as an outcome to be explained or predicted. Do 
arms races precede conflicts? Are great power wars more or less likely during 
times of transition? Is expansionism still a meaningful motivation for conflict 
initiation? In political practice, actors that consider themselves in an area of 
peace see it as something to avoid, an undesirable outcome, or evidence that 
the systems in places to prevent it have either failed or been insufficient 
35  It should be noted that MacKenzie’s concern is with the more specific ‘political 
event’ and does not necessarily share Davidson’s ontological account of this distinction.
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(Bialasiewicz and Campbell et al 2007). Regardless of how one chooses to 
understand or characterise it, however, war is an event. Like any event, and 
as Balibar argues, it is understood to have a beginning and an end. This 
section will address this constitutive dimension in three parts—the past, 
present, and future. While analytically I make this separation to show how the 
two puzzles operate in a more appreciable manner, it is not the case that 
there is a neat separation. Past, present, and future are each constituted by 
the other due to the interpenetration of past and present, present and future, 
as well as past and future—the separation I use here is purely heuristic.  
War’s (of the) Past
When considering events in social and/or political terms, temporality and 
temporal dynamics are especially important—historical sociologists like 
William Sewell, for instance argue that viewing historical events (like wars) in 
context requires a recognition that temporal relationships are much more 
complicated, non-linear, and dynamic than we may otherwise appreciate 
(Sewell 1996, Abbott 2001). Three aspects are particularly important. First, 
events and their causes are constituted by indeterminacy. To declare a war 
was ‘caused’ by single or even multiple factors requires an elimination of the 
contingency inherent to any historical event. Each historical event is made up 
of thousands of actors interacting many times over—the complexity involved 
is dramatic and deep as Becker observed many years ago in articulating his 
notion of a ‘historical fact’ (Becker 1955). Second, events are represented in 
the future—the Great War only becomes World War I after the fact and only 
even becomes ‘Great’ after enough time has concluded for that adjective to 
apply. Lundborg’s work on Deleuze and the ‘pure event’ in the context of 
‘9/11’ demonstrates that events are constituted by the constant interplay 
between past and future—overlapping, unfolding, and constantly interpreted 
and re-interpreted in the ongoing present (Lundborg 2012, Hutchings 2008). 
Third, the temporal dynamics of events reinforce the susceptibility of broad 
structures to transformation—these transformations can be slow and linear, 
but equally so they can be quick and abrupt. Given that international 
institutions are constituted relationally by interactions that produce and 
reproduce these institutions, international political practice would seem 
especially susceptible to these. In the context of war, given Clausewitz’ 
observation regarding the inevitability of ‘friction’, this only seems to be an 
even more important factor (Clausewitz 1984). 
Wars, then, are discursively produced as events with a beginning and an end, 
possessing temporal boundaries that are articulated as discrete and 
knowable. Mary Dudziak writes, ‘war…has temporal boundaries on both 
sides’ (Dudziak 2012). Despite this, the indeterminacy and contingency 
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Sewell and others speak to manifests particularly when one seeks to 
precisely articulate this event’s boundaries. In the context of war, this occurs 
when looking to identify a war’s originary moment. Take the example of the 
war on terrorism (Jarvis 2008). Most would place the beginning date of the 
war as 14 September 2001—the date Congress passed the AUMF. Some 
might argue that the Bush address the night of the attacks claiming that the 
United States would ‘win the war against terrorism’ constituted its beginning. 
Regardless of the precise moment, almost no IR scholar or political official 
would argue it began at any point before 11 September 2001 (Bush 2001). 
What is odd about this is that the adversary had already declared war on the 
United States many years before and the United States had even responded 
to these past threats with military operations. Shultz and Vogt argue that this 
exposed conceptual issues, not merely bureaucratic ones.  
Beyond the refusal of the US intelligence community, and for 
that matter the military establishment, to classify terrorism as 
warfare because it was not a serious enough danger, other 
reasons also contributed to this reluctance. Most important, 
terrorism was not war because it did not resemble modern war 
as the spooks and soldiers had known it, studied it and 
practiced it. Therefore, ipso facto, it could not be war (Shultz 
and Vogt 2003).
What appears a seemingly simple question—when did the war on terrorism 
begin—is one fraught by perspective and temporal framing. Recognising Al 
Qaeda’s declaration of war on the United States as the start of the conflict 
confers upon them a legitimacy that many would be uncomfortable with, but 
from the perspective of the IR scholar, that discomfort should be irrelevant. To 
act otherwise is to privilege one actor’s viewpoint over the other in their 
analysis of what appears to be an objective fact—the beginning of the war on 
terrorism. 
Some of this depends upon perspective. From the perspective of the IR 
scholar, the concept of war is important as a way of categorising an event in 
order to explain and/or understand it. In other words, IR scholars can wait 
until the war has concluded and is unquestionably a war due to the duration, 
magnitude, actors involved, etc. These are all things best assessed in the 
future with the benefit of hindsight. In practice, however, it is vastly different, 
as wars are declared (and fought) in a forward-looking manner. But even for 
the practitioner, the interpenetration of the present and future are at play. A 
declaration of war in the present, for instance, also operates as an articulation 
of a particular future. It is a future where there is a claimed willingness to 
engage in actions that would constitute a war, even if they have not as of yet 
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actually happened. Without that future informing the declaration in the 
present, the present declaration will not be understood as an actual war. 
Congress authorising war, for instance, articulates a set of futures that would 
constitute a war should they come to pass—a commitment to ongoing battles, 
acceptable levels of casualties, massive resource commitments, and a 
willingness to use force against the enemy. My declaration of ‘war’ on the 
spider occupying an unreachable corner of my office, does not, and is 
therefore appropriately not considered the beginning of an actual conflict.  
The United States’ current actions against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq 
express a similar indeterminacy. If we consider the current actions to be a 
war—even if ultimately it remains solely an aerial campaign36—when exactly 
would we describe the campaign as beginning? Equally complicated, what 
will we be saying it even is years from now? And if these ‘names’ change, 
then how does one act differently and how do our understandings and 
theories shift? For instance, future historians could read the past decade and 
a half of US military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Syria (as well as 
Yemen) as part of one broader war rather than separate wars. One could 
even imagine it being understood as a third world war or the beginning of a 
new cold war as some—admittedly ideologically motivated—have already 
done.37 Equally so, historians might take the view that each of these 
‘contingency operations’ are individual conflicts connected in some ways, but 
not constituting one continuous event. Legally, the picture remains murky as 
the US is currently justifying its operations in Iraq and Syria as part of a 
broader fight against Al Qaeda’s affiliates even as it asks for congressional 
authorization specific to this campaign. All this has occurred even while 
acknowledging that the Islamic State has publicly split with Al Qaeda and is 
no longer an affiliate. 
War’s Present
How the future reads our current present could have significant implications 
for conceptions of IR going forward and how future scholars and observers 
interpret the actions of those in the present. Future events have the potential 
to radically re-shape the understanding of present political practices. If the 
nuclear deal with Iran fails—as many in the US Congress are hoping—and 
results in an eventual military campaign against an Iranian nuclear 
programme—which a startling number of politicians are also hoping for—
36  Officially speaking this is the case, but historically the United States has employed 
covert operatives to assist when engaged in these types of measures.
37  US Secretary of State John Kerry somewhat unwittingly encouraged this in 
comments comparing the ease of victory in the Cold War to the conflict with the Islamic 
State. (Sydney Morning Herald 2015)
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present day events could look very different to scholars of the future, even 
though nothing has actually changed. Dick Cheney, for one, is already linking 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq to the effort to eliminate Iran’s nuclear programme, a 
position that could seem more reasonable if the US were to eventually begin 
a military conflict with Iran (Carter 2015). Under that scenario, it would 
become much easier to conceptualise the broad sweep of these events as 
part of one larger narrative. Previous operations throughout the region could 
be conceptualised as the beginning of one broader fight against Iranian-
backed fighters or as the emergence of a Shia-Sunni conflict. Some parts of 
the American political scene already seem to believe this is happening (see 
e.g., Jamie Dettmer 2015). But again, much of this depends almost entirely 
upon where one locates the origin of the war—regardless of which war we are 
speaking about.  
Separately, if these conflicts are seen as part of one broader campaign (a 
position the US is admittedly unclear upon) and they are also accepted by 
future scholars as prompted by the 2001 terrorist attacks, one could easily 
imagine literature comparing the causes of world wars I and II or Vietnam to 
the causes of this war given the time the war has taken as well as its 
(potential) scope. One can imagine under that scenario that the attack on 
Archduke Ferdinand becoming more broadly understood as a terrorist attack, 
prompting comparisons to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon in 2001. Audrey Cronin, for instance, has already asserted this 
comparison (Cronin 2009). Alternatively, if it is portrayed as a Sunni-Shia 
conflict as some argue, it could be compared to the Cold War where two 
entities are in conflict but refuse direct engagement except via ‘proxy wars’ 
(e.g., Yemen) or covert operations supporting rebels (Syria). All that said, it’s 
also possible that each conflict could continue to be understood as completely 
separate where the US invasion and occupation of Iraq is a single conflict, as 
was the war in Afghanistan, and as are operations in Syria/Northern Iraq, 
each possessing their own causes and effects.  
How one resolves these issues depends on a variety of concerns including 
ideology, data interpretation, historiography, and viewpoint and my intention is 
not to preemptively resolve the inevitable historical debate. But viewing the 
temporal aspects of this issue exposes two issues. First and foremost, 
present-based analysis of the conflict occupies a liminal space where the 
future and past are interpenetrated but contingent. If we believe the conflict is 
going to end soon our understanding of what it is that we are explaining and/
or understanding perhaps goes in one direction, but if we assume the 
conflict’s endpoint is in the distant future, it may be quite another. This leads 
me to the second point: this is not merely of concern for the scholars seeking 
to refine the analytic category of war in post-conflict theorisation, but it also 
shapes the actions of practitioners in the moment.  This distinction is an 
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important one, but not limited to this particular context, because the temporal 
experience of the observed almost necessarily differs from that of the 
observer.  Bourdieu identifies this as a ‘de-temporalising’ move where
Scientific practice is so ‘detemporalized’ that it tends to 
exclude even the idea of what it excludes: because science is 
possible only in a relation to time which opposed to that of 
practice, it tends to ignore time and, in doing so, to reify 
practices…The detemporalizing effect (visible in the synoptic 
apprehension that diagrams make possible) that science 
produces when it forgets the transformation it imposes on 
practices inscribed in the current of time, i.e. detotalized, 
simply by totalizing them, is never more pernicious than when 
exerted on practices defined by the fact that their temporal 
structure, direction, and rhythm are constitutive  of their 
meaning (Bourdieu 1977). 
The observation Bourdieu makes here is an important one, precisely because 
the shift in level of analysis from practitioner to scholar is one that intrinsically 
creates this ‘detemporalising’ effect. One can see this when approaching the 
near-past and present of US foreign policy regarding the ‘war on terrorism’ as 
broadly understood. Actions like the surge in Iraq or Afghanistan are 
articulated as a means of building up indigenous capacity so as to better 
enable a drawdown of US forces, but when read against the backdrop of a 
decade and a half with more engagement than not, they can appear as 
something else entirely—escalation rather than a de-escalatory move. 
Similarly, ideas like the Obama administration’s claim that the United States 
has ‘pulled out of Iraq’ at one point seemed quite viable, but given the current 
conflict and military operations in Northern Iraq and Syria the claim becomes 
much more complicated. From an IR perspective this complicates even basic 
questions of cause and effect because of the difficulty in assessing the 
temporal boundaries regarding when a conflict has started and when it ended 
(Dudziak 2012). In some ways this might point to a reason why objectivist IR 
largely ignores ongoing conflict and chooses to deal with the more distant 
past. 
What we think of as the war itself—the duration or middle of the event where 
the actual armed conflict takes place—is also an intrinsically temporally 
constituted activity that requires projections into the past and/or future. A war 
only becomes indisputably a war after the violence reaches a level of 
significance commensurate with extant discursive understandings of a war. A 
preemptive strike on a terrorist cell by US operatives in Somalia in and of 
itself does not constitute a war even though it may constitute an ‘act of war’. 
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Wars are not constituted by a single act, however, but by a series of such acts 
understood in relation to each other. While this begs the question of how 
many ‘acts of war’ it takes to become a war—echoing the morally bankrupt 
distinction the Clinton administration famously made in Rwanda between ‘acts 
of genocide’ and ‘genocide’—the lack of an objective answer does not mean 
that there are no answers accepted and defended in practice (Power 2001). 
Put differently, the future has a potentially defining role in conceptualising the 
actions of the present and past. Firing a gun across a border in and of itself 
does not constitute a war—even if it starts one—unless events that transpire 
afterwards can be read in conjunction with that act to make it so. The Great 
War only becomes World War I as a result of future events, but the argument 
here runs deeper than that. The first shot (as well as the second, third, and so 
forth) must be followed by other acts in order to be understood as the ‘first’ 
shot in a war and that is something of which one can only be certain of (if 
ever) in the future.  
The present of war, then, is temporally complicated and dense—the fog of 
war extends to the understanding of time and how it transpires for those in 
the midst of conflict. World wars do not begin as such and participants are so 
busy in the trenches (so to speak) that taking time out to step back and 
assess the situation as the historians will is unlikely and perhaps even 
counterproductive. The temporal present for these actors is constituted by the 
interplay of incomplete representations of past and future. Applied to today’s 
events it means in the future, when seeking to explain or understand the 
actions of practitioners of the present, we should take on the temporally 
appropriate perspective and resist the determinism that comes along with the 
privileged viewpoint of looking backward. 
War’s Future
Making sense of temporal boundaries is difficult at the outset of war, but 
similarly complicated when identifying the end point. When evaluating how 
wars end, three elements of temporal dynamics complicate thinking on the 
causes of conflict and cooperation. First, war appears largely as a 
representation of the past or projection of a particular future, and is not an 
objectively constituted, independently verifiable entity. While terrorism has 
seen a great deal of investigation into the term’s discursive construction and 
the power relations at play when identifying an act as ‘terrorist’ or a group as 
engaged in ‘terrorism’, there has been less of this with respect to the concept 
of war itself (See e.g., Cronin 2003, Hoffman 2006 and Jackson 2007). 
Generally speaking, IR seems to rely on a notion of ‘we know it when we see 
it’ when it comes to identifying wars. As a result, IR’s view tends to reflect the 
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viewpoint of practitioners, particularly amongst objectivist scholars. Naming a 
set of actions of political violence as war—rather than a massacre, civil 
conflict, terrorism, or police action, for instance—reflects dominant power 
relations and the privileged place of sovereign states as international 
subjects. For the scholar of IR, analytically identifying a set of actions as a 
war occurs in the present and extends backwards, much as Wendt and others 
have argued (Wendt 1999, Berenskoetter 2011).  
Second, and primarily because the notion of war itself relies upon 
understandings of the past and/or future, it is best understood as constituted 
by the intersection of both. David Weberman and Huw Price have both 
articulated the possibility of ‘backward causation’ in sociopolitical life. 
Weberman does this philosophically and Price from the perspective of 
quantum physics (Weberman 1997, Price 1996). Each ultimately identifies 
how events of the future can actually change things that have happened 
prior—physically Price sees this as theoretically possible at the quantum level 
and Weberman identifies how actions taken in the moment have effects later 
on that re-constitute the initial action as something different, such as an 
assassin’s bullet only becoming part of the assassination itself after the victim 
dies.  This outcome is not always co-terminous with the shot itself. Both of 
these analyses echo Lundborg’s (2012) analysis of ‘9/11’ to show how events 
become increasingly interrelated temporally the finer one’s focus goes. 
Independent of how one resolves these issues or even whether one accepts 
the potential of ‘backwards causation’, an inevitable aspect of conceptualising 
a set of events as a war relies on the future to shape the understanding of the 
past that operates in the present. In other words, to return to the war on 
terrorism example, we could be in the midst of what will be known as 
something much bigger than ‘contingency operations’ (perhaps the first half of 
the second Thirty Years’ War), but do not know it as of yet, because future 
events have not taken place that make it so.  
This leads to the final aspect of war’s temporal boundaries. Just as 
beginnings are reflective of the power dynamics in international discourse—
the war on terrorism only begins once a state declares it so—endings are 
equally the product of contested interpretation. Battles continue over the end 
point. In the modern imaginary with its bias towards state-state conflicts as 
the dominant conception of war, the idea of a war ending is a simple one. 
Instruments of surrender are signed and both sides agree that the conflict is 
over through mutual declaration. Rarely, if ever, in modern warfare is an 
actual war concluded through the annihilation of an actor in the conflict 
(Reiter 2003). But as is demonstrated by the increasing popular visibility of 
terrorist campaigns, civil conflicts, and insurgencies, the end of the war is a 
moment of interpretation. If citizens of their state choose to attack the 
adversary post-agreement it becomes a civil matter, not an indication that the 
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war has restarted. In the case of conflicts where states are no longer the sole 
actors, such as terrorist campaigns, this is especially difficult because groups 
could take it upon themselves to continue the campaign even after 
agreements are in place that have ‘ended’ the conflict, as was the case in 
Northern Ireland, throwing wide-open the question of whether the conflict has 
truly ‘ended’ (Little 2014).
Implications for IR 
Observing that temporal dynamics are at play in conceptions of war may 
possess some prima facia value, but what are the implications for future IR 
work? First, it emphasises that war is only one form of violence that exists in 
the international space. While this is not a particularly new argument as 
feminist theorists and peace studies scholars have identified the manner in 
which contemporary foreign policy devalues structural violence, what a 
temporal lens offers is another means of explaining why this is the case 
(Hutchings 2007, Blanchard 2003, Barash and Webel 2003). Temporal 
commitments regarding the understanding of war as an event with a definite 
beginning and end, duration and conclusion, contribute to the privileging of 
instantiations of violence like war and armed conflict over more diffuse, 
ongoing, structural forms of violence.  Conceptions of war as a time-bound, 
discrete event make it easier to understand and distinguish as something that 
is important and as a problem that is potentially solvable (Cox 1981). Actions 
that are not temporally compressed or time-bound remain harder to 
appreciate or approach in the collective political imaginary. 
The preceding analysis also reveals that war is not necessarily something 
that ‘breaks out’ or is ‘sparked’ by events, but rather a series of events and 
uses of force that get interpreted in the present and future present into one 
broader, linked event. Dominant discourses and narratives shape how we 
read these multiple disparate events. Given the role of sovereign states in 
constituting these discursive frames, it is unsurprising that war as a 
contemporary concept privileges state-centric notions. A narrative 
discursively ‘makes sense’ in the present what has happened in the past and 
allows the set of actions to be conceptualised as a war rather than something 
different and perhaps inevitable.  
Approaching war with a temporal frame also reveals that war is a category of 
violence, not an objectively occurring idea. It is temporally imposed and 
constructed. The future and the past meet in complicated and important ways 
that serve to frame our understanding of it and sovereign state subjects 
inevitably play a large role in policing the boundaries of the event.  The 
representation of the event also necessarily refers to that which is outside the 
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present and therefore absent. Much like terrorist attacks operate as an idea in 
process, an event that is in a constant state of becoming, wars are similarly 
fluid in interpretation (Lundborg 2012). Legal scholars have attempted to 
identify the meaning of the term and can only agree on the idea that it 
involves violence and organised groups (O’Connell et al 2004). Critical War 
Studies as a school of thought has provided important insight into these 
understandings of war’s ultimate ontology. Attention to temporality can benefit 
these moves and vice versa (Holmqvist 2013). In particular, if it is the case 
that the ontology of war is neither fixed nor objective, temporal relationships 
are intrinsic to these understandings. Wars are much like MacKenzie’s idea of 
‘legislating’ and the inevitable distinctions between the reified notion of war 
and its actual ontological foundation are distinctly about how we understand 
relationships across time.   
A third implication that arises from turning a temporal lens on the concept of 
war is that it exposes the value of reflexivity specifically when approaching 
the concept of war. This operates at two levels. At the scholarly level, given 
the indeterminacy of any understanding of war itself, making comparisons 
becomes increasingly complicated. This necessitates a reflexive analysis of 
the manner in which IR treats war as a category of violence similar enough to 
be compared across vast periods of time and space. If war is a temporal 
entity that is contingent and indeterminate, however, then IR needs to ask 
more nuanced questions regarding its cross-temporal comparisons and its 
privileging of generalisability when it comes to this foundational concept. 
Models of IR inquiry like the Correlates of War project that use linear time to 
make discrete claims and mark relationships might need to be rethought, 
especially with respect to their conclusions. Insights based on the Thirty 
Years War or even Vietnam when brought into the present or future 
environment may be comparing apples and oranges.  
This leads to the second level at which reflexivity comes in—asking the 
questions who the scholarship is for and what its purpose is? If IR scholarship 
is produced in the present and access to the present and near-future is the 
primary area we can influence as time-bound entities then it forces us as 
scholars of this discipline to take seriously the question of purpose and value 
in our actions (Berenskoetter 2011, Amoreux and Steele 2015). What is the 
value in studying counterterrorism, for instance, if we become sceptical of the 
objective accumulation of time-less political claims or truths (Krause and 
Williams 2004, Jackson 2015, Um and Pisoiu 2015)? If political claims, ideas, 
and knowledge are essentially time-bound, then the question of what value 
the claims have for the present and near-future become much more resonant 
and important. One can read the moves towards forecasting and mid-level 
theory as an implicit reaction to this issue (Mellers et al 2015, Dunn, Hanson, 
and Wight 2013). By narrowing their claims and/or taking an approach that 
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actively theorises how their model applies to particular futures—rather than 
relying on an assumption that adding knowledge to the world will make 
prediction ‘better’, these approaches take on a more temporally limited vision 
that has the potential to better capture temporal complexity in our scholarly 
work. If part of the goal of studying war is to better understand it so as to limit 
the future suffering it causes, then reflexive analysis can do important work 
along these lines. Valuing the constitutive temporal dynamics at play is vital to 
this work.  
Conclusion
To bring this back to the question of war in the present, it appears that the 
picture regarding what is going on between the United States and various 
terrorist groups and regimes in the Middle East remains murky. Declaring it a 
single war seems inappropriate given the multiplicity of adversaries, yet 
treating Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria (as well as potentially Pakistan, Somalia, 
and Yemen) as completely separate conflicts seems equally problematic. 
What this chapter has sought to demonstrate, however, is that this problem is 
not unique to present-day politics, but is intrinsic to the concept. On the eve of 
what would become World War II, Carl Schmitt observed
For several years now, in the most scattered parts of the 
Earth, sanguinary battles have been fought out while a 
consensus about the notion of and the term ‘war’ has been 
carefully avoided…It appears, what was always true, that the 
history of international law is the history of the notion of war…
hence the notion of war becomes a problem the objective 
discussion of which is appropriate, in order to disperse the fog 
of deceptive fictions and allow the [emphasis added] real 
situation of today’s international law to be recognized as such 
(Schmitt 1938, 1)
In some ways this captures how the currently unforeseeable future implicates 
the present but also the manner in which decisions in the present operate at 
the intersection of meaning in the past and future. What a temporal lens 
allows is the reintegration of the political imaginary of practitioners at the time. 
It functions as a tool to better interrogate and model ideas of temporality into 
predictions. It also reveals the temporal boundaries intrinsic to identifying 
particular acts of violence as occupying the privileged position of war. By 
revealing the temporal indeterminacy of the question Balibar asks, ‘what is 
war?’, attention to temporality opens space for similarly fundamental 
investigations to emerge via the de-naturalising of the conception of war itself. 
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As human beings we are bound by time. While we can probably all agree that 
our experiences have temporal coordinates, beyond this, the matter gets 
more equivocal. What exactly is time? How does it function? In what direction 
does it flow (and what does it mean to say that it ‘flows’)? Abstract 
discussions of such matters abound in modern scholarship and are the 
province of physicists and philosophers. The understanding of time structures 
human cognition and response to the material world, which makes it a 
fundamental concern in the social sciences and the humanities. Time is an 
element within sociocultural imaginations that can vary greatly between 
contexts. Attending to temporality can be an advantageous venue for 
exploring complex and internally variegated topics such as the contemporary 
politics of Islam.
I should clarify that my concern in this chapter is only with the human 
experience of time. Following David Couzens Hoy, I will designate this 
‘temporality’ in order to distinguish the matter from time perceived as an 
abstract universal (Hoy 2009: xiii). Temporality is implicated in human 
experiences and ways of thinking and has been the subject of extensive 
philosophical exploration (for example, Newton-Smith 1980). Within the study 
of international relations, temporal presumptions are the basis for value-laden 
categories that saturate popular media as well as specialised literature. The 
notion of progress, whether understood in liberal or Marxist frames, and the 
associated differentiation between economically developed and 
underdeveloped countries are premised on a temporal scale in which some 
people are seen as being ahead while others require catching up (Hutchings 
2008). Such distinctions follow from an earlier anthropological positing of 
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‘primitive’ societies, understood as the past of Western societies despite 
being contemporaneous in the literal sense (Fabian 2014). In ordinary usage, 
Western temporality that dominates in the international sphere has become 
synonymous with abstract time. The elision has reified this temporality and its 
associated hierarchies, causing observers to understand its inner logic as a 
natural fact rather than the effect of a particular political regime that has been 
dominant in recent centuries (Hom 2010).
The conception of the international system as an object of study too rests on 
a particular temporality. It takes the current norms of Euro-American societies 
as the future of those outside this sphere, without reference to contingencies 
pertaining to sociocultural and historical differences (Inayatullah and Blaney 
2004; Hobson 2012). Temporal presumptions underlie almost all 
understandings of international politics; occasional academic criticism of the 
hierarchical view of the world that results from this has had little effect on 
general public discourse in most parts of the world. While economic 
development is usually at the forefront of relative valuation, this always has 
sociocultural counterparts. Those who have less money are often thought to 
lag behind in moral, social, and cultural sophistication as well. In this way, 
Western temporal benchmarks that operate in the background of analytical 
paradigms tend to predetermine how the non-Western world gets portrayed in 
popular media and scholarship.
Islam between Medievality and Reformation
Temporal markers are a staple in present-day descriptions of the politics of 
Islam and Muslims, although this topic has not received extensive analytical 
attention. Consider, for example, the frequency with which the term ‘medieval’ 
is used to discuss contemporary individuals and groups claiming to act in the 
name of Islam.38 From the 1980s, influential authors have described anti-
establishment movements claiming Islamic identities as cases of 
amalgamation between medieval theology and modern politics (for example, 
Sivan 1985). In doing so, scholars, and the journalists to follow them, have 
taken the rhetoric of the groups they were attempting to understand at face 
value rather than seeing them as creative modern readers of selected 
premodern works. Western scholars were predisposed to this perspective 
because of the governing logic of orientalism, the academic and popular 
discourse that has framed Muslims as quintessential ‘others’ since the 
nineteenth century. In this view, Islam is seen to have an ahistorical essence 
that became settled at a point in the ‘medieval’ period. This essence has then 
38  The term medieval is commonly used also to refer to Islamic contexts coeval with 
the period identified as the European Middle Ages. Such usage presents its own set of 
conceptual problems that are beyond the scope of the present discussion.
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imprisoned Islam in some past time, making Muslims beholden to ‘tradition’ in 
a way that is not true for other religious communities. This perspective 
remains influential today: prominent scholars continue to argue for Muslims’ 
exceptionality as political actors on the basis of claiming features supposedly 
inherent in Islam irrespective of context (for example, Cook 2014). As I have 
argued elsewhere, this is a theological view that has come to be seen as 
‘secular’ history due to the way Western scholars have privileged certain 
Islamic discourses about the past as repositories of an essential Islam (Bashir 
2014). I believe this academic framing needs a wholesale corrective. An 
alternative approach, more compelling to me, is to see Muslims as active 
agents who have, through history, created multiple pasts to serve intellectual 
and sociopolitical interests perceived as being relevant for their present 
situations.
The use of the term ‘medieval’ for contemporary Muslims derives from a 
seemingly self-evident, valorised temporal scale that has its origins in the 
purported historical trajectories of European societies. The term’s efficacy 
rests on two steps. First, the adjective medieval is marked as a negative past, 
from which Europe and its socio-intellectual descendants are supposed to 
have progressed via development over time. As scholars of European history 
have emphasised, medievality is a modern intellectual construct whose chief 
purpose is to posit the superiority of the modern age (Symes 2011). And 
second, when contemporary Muslims actors are referred to as medieval, they 
are relegated to Europe’s negatively valued past. The result should look 
incongruous: people adept at the use of electronic media and advanced 
mechanical weapons, operating in Asia and Africa, are being imaged in a 
European world associated with manuscripts and swords. The ludicrousness 
of the juxtaposition misses the eye because medieval here is a marker of 
moral disapprobation rather than a description of the peoples in question. The 
term’s deployment accomplishes the double task of distancing ‘us’ from 
surpassed ancestors and unworthy contemporaries. Those who use the term 
for Islamic groups certainly mean it to be negative. Placing this judgment 
within a seemingly self-evident time scale reifies the commentators’ own 
temporality and renders it above critical assessment. The temporal argument 
enfolded within the use of the term medieval creates the illusion that the 
judgment on offer is an objective fact rather than being an expression of 
particular intellectual and sociopolitical interests.
While medieval implies adjudication on the basis of a scale of general cultural 
development, the view that Islam either needs, or is experiencing, a 
‘reformation’ transfers the same temporal logic to a specifically religious 
arena. The idea of a totalising reformation, which is different from general 
piecemeal change and reform, has been raised by Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike, belonging to many different places on the contemporary political 
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spectrum (an-Naim 1996; Browers and Kurzman 2004; Ali 2015, and many 
others). The obvious point of reference here is the history of Christianity, 
which is being universalised and made the supposed timeline for Islam. Just 
as the Protestant Reformation purportedly redeemed Europe from Catholic 
Christianity, the helping hand of modern European ideas is supposed to make 
Muslims into secular modern peoples (Mahmood 2006). The effect is to 
negate the possibility that the religion of Muslims may have a history 
independent of Christianity, connected not to views of Europe but to 
contingencies pertaining to the histories of their own communities. This kind 
of elision between Christianity and Islam is foundational also to the category 
religion, which evolved out of Christian ideas and has universalised the 
application of Christian patterns across non-Christian contexts (Masuzawa 
2005).
To call certain contemporary Muslims medieval, and to suggest that Islam 
needs a reformation, are matters that index unstated temporal presumptions 
and their associated moral verdicts. The use of such terms masks cultural, 
political, and military agendas and is helpful for generating public fervour for 
the actions of certain states. However, such usage should have little 
analytical purchase when it comes to understanding the actors to whom the 
terms are applied. In fact, judging Muslims and others according to historical 
trajectories of Western societies is a widespread fallacy that has been the 
cause of obfuscation rather than analytical advancement. To correct this 
situation, it is necessary to consider the particulars of temporalities 
embedded within non-European discourses. This has the benefit of 
relativising Euro-American perspectives while also providing more meaningful 
access to human experience in a broader, more universal frame. 
I should emphasise that my purpose here is not to posit a binary opposition 
between Western and Islamic temporalities. Ideas and technological 
developments that originated in the West have had a profound effect on how 
Muslims today understand their own pasts. And we can also show that 
Muslim and other temporalities matter for understanding the West. But 
crosscutting impact of this nature cannot be seen as preordained according 
to the way Euro-American societies may have developed. To assess Muslim 
temporalities requires analysis of data emanating directly from the subjects in 
question. Recent discussions in the philosophy of history have shown that 
Western societies have been (and are) host to many different understandings 
of temporality (Jordheim 2014). The same needs to be presumed for Islamic 
contexts: analysis should proceed from the fact that Muslim understandings 
of the experience of time are multiple and changeable. When it comes to 
temporality, neither the ‘West’ nor ‘Islam’ are hermetically sealed entities. 
Both words reference internally variegated fields, encompassing description 
as well as rhetoric, in which temporalities are critical elements within the 
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evolution of ideas and practices. To concentrate on Islamic temporalities is, 
therefore, the opposite of the effort to specify the exclusive essence of Islam 
as sought in orientalist scholarship or Islamic theological discourses.
The Rise of ISIS
In contemporary international affairs, the group that has come to be known as 
ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) or Daesh (ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fī 
l-Irāq wa-sh-Shām) is a particularly vivid case for the politics of temporality 
and Islam. Here is an entity that has frequently been called medieval since its 
appearance. Moreover, the group’s propaganda actively promotes the 
understanding that it is a kind of re-enlivening of an Islamic past radically at 
odds with orthodoxies identified with modernity. We can see this prominently 
in its declaration of the worldwide caliphate on 29 June 2014, recalling a 
religiopolitical formation with origins in the seventh century CE (Poirson and 
Oprisko 2014; al-Rasheed, Kersten and Shterin 2012). Its self-proclaimed 
founding leader is known by the kunya (part of an Arab name) Abu Bakr, 
referring to the name of the first successor to Prophet Muhammad. The 
choice of the name implies an erasure of time between the seventh and the 
twenty-first centuries CE. 
Reports issued by the United Nations indicate that populations of the territory 
under the control of ISIS have been subjected to policies that the group 
claims were the military-political norms of the early Islamic period. This has 
involved widespread summary use of force against groups identified as 
Yezidis, Christians, Kaka’is, Kurds, Mandeans, the Shi‘a, and the Turkmen. 
The treatment has reportedly included killing, torture, and forced conversion 
of men and boys, and the distribution of ‘unbelieving’ women and girls as 
sexually permissible ‘spoils of war’ among male ISIS fighters (UN Report 
2015).39 For the case of sexual slavery, the group has issued a five-page 
pamphlet that mimics traditional Islamic legal discourse in a highly reductive 
way (Anonymous 2014). It provides absolute opinions in the form of 34 
questions and answers that justify the group’s practices. To date, 
examinations of statements and acts attributed to ISIS have attempted to 
place them in the timeline of practices known from other Islamic contexts. 
Such discussions privilege an Islamic tradition continuous over time and 
adjudicate whether, and how, ISIS corresponds with earlier perspectives 
(McCants et. al. 2015). Inasmuch as ISIS ideologues do selectively cite 
Islamic sources such as the Quran and hadith, should we take their rhetoric 
of the unmediated return to an earlier Islamic era on face value?
39  I have had no direct access to proponents of ISIS or the territory controlled by the 
group. The scope of my analysis here is limited to what ISIS itself has disseminated 
and what has been reported widely in news media.
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I argue that we should be sceptical regarding the claims made by ISIS. 
However, my reason for saying this is not that I believe Islam to have 
essential characteristics that are absent in the group. In historical perspective, 
Islam cannot have an essence since a religion has to be understood as that 
which its proponents think and do in all its variety. Whenever an essence is 
invoked in a religious context, a theological rather than sociohistorical claim is 
coming into play. Islam should be seen as a perennially changeable affair 
described through reference to historically locatable ideas and practices. I 
suggest that ISIS operates on the basis of temporal processes and 
understandings that make its politics very much a contemporary affair. Rather 
than mapping continuities or discontinuities with a tradition, proponents of 
ISIS should be seen as producers of a discourse that deploys its temporality 
for sociopolitical ends. Temporal understandings and practices both structure 
its observable perspective and are available for manipulation for 
propagandistic purposes. 
An Electronic Caliphate at War
ISIS has weaponised time. While ISIS is neither the first nor the sole entity to 
do so, the movement is the most prominent Islamic case of the phenomenon 
present on the world stage at the moment. It is a warring faction operating in 
a region that has been subject to a foreign invasion and endemic political 
insecurity for more than a decade. Temporal elements projected in its 
propaganda are parts of the arsenal it deploys through present-day ways and 
means. In the movement’s ideological self-presentation, the world is divided 
between believers and non-believers, ‘us’ and ‘them’, on the basis of claiming 
absolute knowledge of a distant past. Through a kind of temporal telescoping, 
affinities and antagonisms sedimented over fourteen centuries are stripped of 
their historical contexts and are purveyed as absolute religious truths. This 
has resulted in practices that are justified through historical precedent but 
without allowing for contextual contingency or change over time. This is a 
temporality with a very shallow horizon whose very sparseness and crudity is 
presented as the guarantee of its veracity.
ISIS deploys the past as a weapon primarily through the internet, a medium 
that has become available widely only during the past quarter of a century. 
The internet provides a spatiotemporal field quite different from earlier media 
such as manuscript culture, print, and broadcasting. It allows for 
instantaneous dissemination of a universalising ideology, such as a caliphal 
state that is meant to administer the affairs of Muslims on a global scale. 
While the idea of the caliphate has appealed to Muslim ruling elites at various 
points in history, its deployment by ISIS is unique and is made possible by the 
availability of the internet. To the best of my knowledge, no other declaration 
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of the caliphate in Islamic history has ever brought adherents from many 
corners of the world into the lap of a political movement within a very short 
period. Here, the internet as a medium is not simply a novel way to distribute 
propaganda. Rather, the movement’s highly charged, yet minimalist message 
is engineered to maximise the potential inherent in the means of 
communication. Thanks to the internet, ISIS has a global audience that 
responds to its messages instantaneously, whether positively or negatively. 
The movement’s ideological output is keyed to this temporal advantage; the 
partial success of the strategy is visible in stories about people trekking from 
all over the world to join the group.
The internet has created a new kind of ‘Islamic world’ where it is possible to 
enact and maintain a globally interconnected Islamic identity irrespective of 
geographical distances. If al-Qaeda, deterritorialised after 2001, was an 
incipient stage of this development (Devji 2005), ISIS presents a more mature 
and administratively adept case of the phenomenon. The internet allows ISIS 
to disseminate its propaganda speedily, in high, uninterruptible frequency. 
The effects of this ideological projection vary based on the social context of 
the point of reception. Among likely sympathisers, the minimalism of the 
propaganda allows for it to be read variably, creating multiple paths through 
which people can join the movement. The resulting ‘community’ is one part 
virtual, spread around the world, and another part localised to the regions in 
Iraq and Syria where the movement holds political power. The movement’s 
virtual and real sides are mutually reinforcing: electronic messaging creates 
the conditions for people to join the group while the expansion in ranks leads 
to enlarging its presence on the internet. For the movement’s detractors, the 
shallowness of the propaganda makes it jejune, its attraction for some 
seemingly inexplicable. However, the minimalist message, and the medium 
through which this is delivered, are keyed to the low common denominator 
that is presumed to be dispersed in a global audience. The presence of ISIS 
propaganda on Euro-American television, computer, and mobile phone 
screens is part of the same process that carries Western ideologies in the 
form of cultural products to other parts of the world. In the enactment of an 
electronic caliphate, contraction of time and space resulting from recent 
proliferation of electronic communication may have turned out to have 
startlingly unpredictable consequences.
Archaeology of an Emblem
A consideration of the imagery found on the ISIS flag highlights a different but 
equally significant vector of temporality. The flag predates the prominence of 
ISIS and has been used by numerous other groups that have had similar 
political and cultural agendas. It contains two Arabic texts: on top, the phrase 
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‘there is no god but God’ in white with black background, and on the bottom, 
‘God, Messenger, Muhammad’ in black inside a white roundel. In themselves, 
these words are unremarkable in an Islamic context. They indicate the first 
part of the affirmation of faith and the declaration of Muhammad’s prophecy. 
The flag’s distinctive ‘message’ lies in its colour (black has been associated 
with revolutionary movements) and the crudeness of the script that is meant 
to signify closeness to Islamic origins. The flag of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia contains substantially the same text, in elegant script in white placed 
on green background. The use of this flag by ISIS and other groups likely 
reflects contestation over the sphere claimed by Saudi Arabia as the state 
that controls the lands of Islam’s origins and regularly portrays itself as the 
guardian of Sunni Islamic values.40
When considering temporality, the most interesting aspect of the ISIS flag is 
the crudeness of the script and the placement of the three words in a roundel. 
The latter is thought to represent the impression of a seal used by the 
Prophet Muhammad. No reliable data is currently available on the exact 
source of the seal image, which is an important point of information in itself. 
What matters is the image, differentiated from the flowing cursive of the flag 
of Saudi Arabia and asserting authority through a generalised visual appeal to 
antiquity. The purported seal, whatever its provenance, may have acted as a 
relic, an object of religious power utilised by elite patrons. What we have 
here, instead, is an image without the original, whose potency resides in its 
endless reproduction through mechanical and electronic means. The image’s 
lack of symbolic specificity invites varied interpretations, allowing it to be a 
unifying factor without requiring ideological depth or substantive conformity of 
purpose.41
The image contained in the flag signifies age through its form, recalling 
objects usually encountered in modern museums. Such institutions embody a 
40  The Saudi state is itself a valuable case for thinking about Islamic temporalities. It 
involves a blending of imperatives pertaining to a dynastic polity, a modern nation-state, 
and hyperterritorial championing of ‘Islamic’ causes around the world (al-Rasheed, 
2006; Lecroix, 2011). Examining the details of the issue can aid in getting beyond 
simplistic evocations of ‘Wahhabism’ that still proliferate in discussions of the Kingdom.
41  The use of the seal image by ISIS recalls Walter Benjamin’s famous 1936 essay on 
art in the age of its mechanical reproducibility (2002): ‘[T]echnology of reproduction 
detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of tradition. By replicating the work 
many times over, it substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence. And in 
permitting the reproduction to reach the recipient in his or her own situation, it 
actualises that which is reproduced’ (104). While Benjamin’s reference points were 
photography and film, the internet has further radicalised the issue. The electronic 
image is the central emblem of ISIS, available globally as an ideologically meaningful 
object without the need of an elaborate undergirding tradition.
142Islam and the Politics of Temporality: The Case of ISIS
particular ideological perspective on the past connected to Western 
epistemologies that have by now globalised (Karp 2006). Again, the contrast 
with the text on the flag of Saudi Arabia is instructive and reflects a mass 
objectification of the past that is of quite recent provenance. The image 
indicates an archaising appeal to authority, akin to the way modern states use 
images of objects unearthed and preserved by archaeologists as national 
symbols. The region in which ISIS predominates has received extensive 
archaeological attention since the nineteenth century. Iraqi and Syrian 
nationalisms have strong archaeological components (Bernhardsson 2005), 
reflected in the proliferation of images on common use objects such as 
currency and stamps in both countries. These usages project longue durée 
genealogies for the nation, displaced from the messy circumstances of the 
present, yet fully tangible in the form of museum objects and buildings of the 
past that can be visited in the course of nationalist pilgrimages.
The symbol of ISIS is the image of an old object—and not simply a text—that 
similarly attempts to eradicate sociohistorical complexities through appeal to 
pristine primordiality. The movement’s well publicised antipathy towards 
certain antiquities, exhibited in the selling or destruction of objects, is better 
understood as the effort to eliminate competition rather than the exercise of 
some age old Islamic iconoclasm. As in the case of Taliban destruction of the 
Buddhas in Bamiyan, Afghanistan, in 2001, locally immediate material and 
ideological conditions are far more significant here than religious ideas often 
portrayed as essential to Islamic belief. For both ISIS today and the Taliban 
earlier, the occlusion of these factors in most Western media coverage 
reflects the power of unconscious presumptions regarding Muslims and the 
past (Elias 2007; Bernbeck 2010).
The End of Time
Dabiq is an official online magazine published by ISIS in multiple languages 
since Ramadan 1435 (July 2014). Between the first and the tenth issue (July 
2015), it has grown in size from approximately 50 to 75 pages. The 
magazine’s contents are diverse: religiopolitical proclamations; reports about 
the heroics of ISIS fighters, accompanied by male faces, smiling, serious, or 
covered with scarves; condemnations of the movement’s enemies, identified 
in religious terms pertaining to non-Muslims or Muslims declared to be 
wayward; appeals to readers to join the movement; and, since issue 7 
(January-February 2015), a section especially for women. Matching the 
videos the group is known for posting on the internet, the magazine 
sometimes highlights gruesome images of dead bodies, whether of its own 
‘martyrs’ or of enemies. 
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The magazine has a glossy quality, including frequent artful deployment of 
the distinctive images on the flag I have discussed above. The writing is 
generally simple and declarative, with little pretence towards analysis. It 
does, nevertheless, have a highly cultivated quality so that the writers’ own 
speech appears very much the way Quran and hadith reports usually sound 
in English. This presumably carries to versions of the magazine in other 
languages too, although I do not have access to such texts to provide a 
concrete judgment. Overall, the magazine’s text has an archaising tone that 
matches the affect of the movement’s electronic messaging and its flag.
The magazine’s first issue states that its name is ‘taken from the area named 
Dabiq in the northern countryside of Halab (Aleppo) in Sham. This place was 
mentioned in a hadith describing some of the events of the Malahim (what is 
sometimes referred to as Armageddon in English). One of the greatest battles 
between the Muslims and the crusaders will take place near Dabiq’ (p. 4). 
The explanation is interesting in terms of the movement’s ordering of time: 
the name is anchored in an expected future justified through a past that has 
been flattened into a perennially existing binary between self and other. This 
is, I would suggest, a past constructed in the image of the future rather than 
the other way around. The religious battle presaged here carries the flavour 
of a coming apocalypse in the material sphere. This sense is confirmed in the 
magazine’s second issue (Ramadan 1435/July 2014), whose cover carries 
the partial image of a large wooden boat accompanied by the statement ‘It’s 
either the Islamic State or the Flood’. The larger story connected to this 
pronouncement (pp. 5-7) portrays the group as the world’s last potential 
saviour prior to the advent of the kind of divine punishment that is associated 
with Noah in biblical/Quranic accounts. The pattern of thematising the future 
through reference to iconic events placed in the past pertains to all the issues 
that have appeared to date.
The magazine’s overall coverage of topics as well as the tone of the writing 
indicate what I would call a profoundly ‘presentist’ orientation. That is, 
categories and concerns of the movement’s situation in the immediate 
present stand behind all its projections regarding the past. Given this 
attribute, it seems quite irrelevant to use terms such as ‘modern’ and 
‘medieval’ to describe the group. The most detailed treatments are devoted to 
stories picked up from news media, and the movement’s writers seemingly 
scour the internet for reports and commentary about themselves. Even when 
engaging matters beyond present interest, the magazine’s primary drive is 
towards proselytization aimed at immediate recruitment. For example, in 
issue number 10 (July 2015), an article published under the heading ‘From 
the Pages of History’ is ostensibly concerned with showing that the month of 
Ramadan is an auspicious time for military action. This is argued through 
brief, decontextualised presentations of Muhammad’s warfare as reported in 
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selected early Islamic sources, followed by direct address to the reader to 
take up arms in support of ISIS. The story is accompanied by two three-
quarter page photographs showing men with faces covered or barely visible, 
riding horses with swords in hand (26-28). These are all clearly theatricalised 
performances that are projecting an eternalised past usable for the immediate 
present.
In recent media coverage of ISIS, Graeme Wood’s article ‘What ISIS Really 
Wants’ in the 25 March 2015 issue of Atlantic Monthly has received 
considerable attention. Observing ISIS self-proclamations, Wood suggests 
that we take the movement seriously as an apocalyptic group that derives its 
programme from a ‘medieval’ Islam that can be tracked in literary sources. He 
is critical of those who argue that ISIS should be regarded as un-Islamic since 
the apocalyptic rhetoric has clear Islamic origins. Responding to Wood’s 
position, critics such as Caner Dagli have argued that ISIS ideologues are 
manifestly ignorant of the complexities of Islamic religious history and literary 
sources. This should, in the view of such commentators, disqualify the 
movement from being taken seriously as an Islamic perspective. Both these 
understandings are premised on the presumption that the Islamic past is 
something ‘out there’ that can be uncovered well or badly on the basis of 
universally applicable criteria. Both judge ISIS actors by evaluating media 
performances as unmediated windows onto the beliefs of the movement’s 
proponents.
Wood’s perspective is overly simplistic. He interprets rhetoric as 
straightforward reality, reflecting a problem that has been pervasive in media 
coverage of ISIS (Doostdar 2014). He is beguiled by the supposedly self-
evident logic of the apocalypticism articulated by ISIS and fails to see that 
such ideas are inseparable from the historical contexts of which they form a 
part. Messianism and apocalypticism have a long history in Islamic thought 
and their political appeal has waxed and waned based on circumstances. 
Such ideas should scarcely be seen as a supra-historical ‘true’ Islam that acts 
as the engine behind movements such as ISIS. Wood is surprised by the fact 
that supporters of ISIS spout age-old texts at the same time as they act in 
modern cosmopolitan ways. This observation makes eminent sense when 
seen in conjunction with the fact that the movement’s presentist orientation 
drives its severely minimalist vision of the past. For ISIS, the past is a very 
short script, easily placed within an overwhelmingly larger concern with an 
immediate present in which technological innovation and deployment are 
entirely normative. The views of Dagli and other similar critics of Wood are, 
on the other hand, expressions of Islamic theology in competition with ISIS. 
Their purpose is to differentiate between right and wrong Islam, on the basis 
of self-consciously Islamic ideological and political commitments. 
Sidestepping both these perspectives, I have suggested that it is more 
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analytically satisfying to excavate temporal features that are crucial to ISIS 
actions and propagandistic self-assertion.
Conclusion
My attempt to understand ISIS is invested neither in channelling the 
movement nor in competing with it on the basis of alternative religious truth 
claims. ISIS’s primary medium for self-expression (the internet), its all-
pervasive symbol (the flag), and its most elaborate propaganda instrument 
(the magazine) share a host of features pertaining to temporality. Its 
intellectually sparse yet absolutist propaganda utilises its vision of the Islamic 
past as a weapon against its detractors, Muslim as well as non-Muslim. The 
movement’s projections regarding the past are generated with attention to 
what works well in the context of communication over the internet. It has 
leveraged twenty-first century technology to create a shallow temporality in 
which its own purportedly eternal truth is pitted against the falsehood 
represented by all opponents. The movement has self-consciously created a 
visual brand, focused on the past, which is promulgated through wide 
circulation of the symbolism present on its flag. It manipulates the media 
(including, most prominently, Western news sources) seemingly with the aim 
of blurring the boundary between its global electronic presence and its control 
over specific territory in Iraq and Syria. The spatiotemporal collapse contained 
within this manoeuvre is of a piece with its severely impoverished 
understanding of the Islamic past and future. Both tactics serve the purpose 
of creating a political image whose potency is said to reside in its simplicity. I 
hope to have shown that the movement’s minimalist outward appearance 
overlays a host of complexities pertaining to the contemporary political and 
media environment. To continue to understand the movement through surface 
readings of the logic presented in its rhetoric may be a case of aiding in its 
success as a player on the world stage.
I have attempted to show that temporality is fundamentally a political matter 
that can be analysed through attention to its deployment in rhetoric and 
material production. ISIS is not unique when it comes to the significance of 
temporality in the creation of political programmes. Expanding the field of 
vision beyond the movement, issues pertaining to the past have been a 
constant factor in Islamic thought from the seventh century to the present 
(Bashir, forthcoming). In the contemporary setting, the kind of analysis I have 
attempted can be extended to other contenders, wherever they may fall on 
the political spectrum. Whether categorised as progressive, liberal, modernist, 
feminist, traditionalist, Islamist, radical, or extremist, contemporary Muslim 
sociopolitical actors create particular visions of Islamic pasts serviceable for 
varying ends. This is so especially in cases where a movement wishes the 
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future to be different from what it perceives as the present. Moreover, all 
temporalities are products of particular circumstances and none 
predetermines events and experiences that are yet to materialise. Whatever 
the wishes of proponents of ISIS and other movements, actual futures will 
follow new contingencies that will, in turn, generate their own versions of 
pasts and futures. Herein lies part of the special complexity of the topic at 
hand: while temporalities can be objectified for analytical purposes, all 
explanatory narratives we can produce will contain their own debts to 
temporal orders whether conscious or unconscious. 
*This publication was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie 
Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are 
solely the responsibility of the author.
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The Need to Disrupt Identity
In thinking about time, temporality, and global politics, I propose that we think 
about conditional (non)belonging in the context of identity, insecurity, and 
counterterrorism. If we are to better combat counterproductive consequences 
of othering that increase insecurity, we must critically investigate threat labels 
and the meanings and policies that they legitimise through exclusionary us/
them boundary-drawing. This requires that we dislocate status quo time 
horizons and associated identity assumptions, and that we prioritise empathy, 
imagination, and analytical risk-taking. It is through this disruption of time, 
being, and (non)belonging, I would argue, that we have the best chance of 
achieving effective and ethical security strategies.
This discussion contributes to ongoing conversations destabilising 
misperceptions of (non)belonging. This destabilisation helps us to see 
counterproductive effects of security practice, however unintentional these 
effects and their resultant insecurities may be. The consequences of 
dehumanisation stemming from narratives of threat construction affect 
individuals with no relation to violence, a consequence that is enabled and 
worsened by generalisations of collectives and characteristics as both ‘risky’ 
and ‘at risk’ (Heath-Kelly 2012). 
151 Time, Temporality and Global Politics
In this sense some actors are problematically positioned along what I 
consider a conditional state of belonging: as part of the self, but as somehow 
always on the cusp of otherness and insecurity. This is ineffective with 
respect to security objectives, and counterproductive with respect to human 
rights and social justice. Identity labels are not objective signposts but 
ambiguous signifiers, the allocations of which too often depend upon 
exclusionary us/them constructions. It is our responsibility to disrupt the 
presumed parsimony of such representations to fight the experiences of 
insecurity that they enable.
How can we think about identity disruption?
There are a number of cases through which we could situate discussion on 
conditional belonging such as the Mediterranean migrant crisis and 
exclusionary discourse in Europe, xenophobic debates on immigration in US 
presidential campaigns, and ongoing racism in society-police relations across 
the US. There are, indeed, too many cases. In these examples certain actors 
are positioned on the (often literal) borders of full belonging, even as they do 
not pose a threat to security. We must ask how a temporality of conditional 
selfhood is formed and exacerbated by processes of boundary construction 
separating ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is impossible to develop effective security 
strategy if we do not consider how insecurities are enflamed by identity (mis)
perceptions associated with security discourse and practice.42
For this discussion, I would like us to critically engage with the idea of 
homegrown terrorism, by which I mean viewing threat construction as a result 
of social and political practice rather than an expression of objective truth. In 
this sense the focus is on how we conceptualise the very idea of a 
‘homegrown other’ as well as how we observe articulations of homegrown in 
discourse. It is an admittedly messy focus given the tensions arising from 
examining both idea and articulation in such a short piece.43 However, it is 
hoped that this will still enable a useful starting point and introductory 
conversation. When counterterrorism relies so heavily on the liminal space 
between an imagined act of violence and an actual act of violence, the very 
idea of identifying a homegrown other in preventive security practice relies 
upon an uncertain and consequential temporal plane of targeting.44 A critical 
approach does not refute the possibility of violence from some identified as 
42  “Discourse” here refers to language from official reports and websites as well as 
media and academic discussion. It is thus methodologically broad, but serves the intent 
of this introductory piece.
43  This tension demands a much fuller response than given here.
44  With many thanks to an anonymous reviewer on the liminal spaces of 
counterterrorism.
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‘homegrown’, but does destabilise any notion of ‘homegrown’ as having self-
evident meaning.
This helps us consider temporal dynamics of conditional (non)belonging in 
how processes of boundary construction often rely upon an association of 
terror with already marginalised groups: those seen as not having been part 
of the self for ‘long enough’, such as immigrant and Muslim populations. It is 
not that this is the only way that homegrown is constructed. There is no single 
definition of homegrown and there have been instances where ‘homegrown’ is 
applied to actors unrelated to Islamic extremism. Importantly, the Assistant 
Attorney General for National Security at the U.S. Department of Justice very 
recently said ‘Homegrown violent extremists can be motivated by any 
viewpoint on the full spectrum of hate — anti-government views, racism, 
bigotry, anarchy and other despicable beliefs’, that ‘no single ideology 
governs’ (Williams 2015). Thus even as there was no reference to terrorism, 
some articulations of homegrown include white supremacist and anti-
government acts in addition to jihadist extremism.
At the same time, despite this plurality of meanings, a predominant 
connotation seems to stem from assumptions of distance and difference as 
danger in relation to homegrown and Muslim groups. Further empirical 
research is necessary, but as a starting point this chapter engages two 
claims: One that such research needs to be pursued, and two, that an 
identity-conceptualisation of conditional (non)belonging is one way to pursue 
it. Through this lens we can see how overcoming insecurity requires 
overcoming the damaging application of outsider status to those positioned 
as somehow not yet a part of ‘us’, as always encompassing some degree of 
otherness. Given local and international narratives that the West is at war 
with Islam, in addition to insecurity for those who are part of the self and have 
no relation to violence, we must ask how ‘security’ can create insecurity, 
regardless of intent. 
In considering the dehumanising tropes that ambiguous and consequential 
threat articulations often employ, the cost of using homegrown labels may 
outweigh the benefits. By breaking down labels we may better empathise with 
(without speaking for) victims of insecurity, combating politics of non-
belonging without falling into parochial, racialised, and/or orientalist45 
discourse (Said 1979; Biswas 2004). This breaking down is necessary 
because in ‘doing security’ discursive representations and material practice 
often (mistakenly) conflate groups of (often minority) individuals as 
collectively under-civilised and under-developed (Hindess 2007). When this 
45  For an important study of homegrown as the ‘orientalised insider’ see Chuang and 
Romer (2013).
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misperceived lack of civilised-being is linked to terrorism, assumptions of 
under-development are even more consequential. For example, in processes 
of externalisation, including specific counterterrorism law exclusion orders 
that enable state powers to send those under suspicion of terrorism ‘back to’ 
another place (Finighan 2014; Fisher 2015). In this way distancing self and 
other depends upon and reinforces mistaken associations of difference as 
danger. The homegrown identifier is one example with which we may better 
analyse the significance of such distancing.
Homegrown as Problematic Identifier
In 2013 James B. Comey, head of the FBI, positioned the ‘emergence of 
home-grown violent extremists in the United States’ (Horwitz 2013) as the 
threat that he wakes up to every morning and goes to bed with every night, 
and in 2013 President Barack Obama identified ‘homegrown extremists’ as 
‘the future of terrorism’ (2013). Given this as well as the known costs of some 
counterterrorism (Donohue 2008), we must consider homegrown in critical 
depth. Identity framings in this context can, however unintentional, reinforce 
boundaries of assumed foreignness by asserting exclusionary us/them 
representations. This generalises individuals along categories that act as a 
source of insecurity for those who fall into such groupings but have no 
relationship to terrorism. Associations of danger with characteristics that have 
no intrinsic relationship to violence, such as race, religion, and immigration, 
unacceptably marginalise innocent actors from a secure sense of belonging.
To trouble ‘homegrown’ as a signifier requires that we draw on critical 
sensibilities, encouraging us to not take the present as given, the past as 
known, or the future as predetermined.46 By viewing labels as always open to 
reconstruction, being critically reflective opens ways to counter terror beyond 
‘standard policing and military responses’ (Piazza 2009: 77). This does not 
ignore problem solving, but encourages us to problem solve by destabilising 
unnecessary limitations of identity. The increased alienation of, and violence 
against, minority groups underscores the urgency to disrupt temporal and 
geographic identity signposts. It is hoped that this will mitigate generalisations 
of danger that blur rather than clarify, focusing instead on strategies that are 
inclusive of long term security and social justice. 
Counterterrorism discourse and practice is connected to broader social and 
political relations, and as explained by Floris Vermeulen, local 
counterterrorism practice ‘quickly devolves into a complicated, multiplex 
46  See Agathangelou and Ling, (2009); Barkawi and Laffey (2006); Chowdhry and Nair 
(2006); Hindess (2007); Jackson et al. (2011); Mignolo (2010); Persaud (2006); and 
Shapiro (1997).
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discussion about immigration, belonging, citizenship, Islam, and the position 
of Muslim communities in Western cities’ (2014: 304). In this context 
representations of threat are used in legitimation struggles around 
exceptional policy by positioning suspects as somehow unlike ‘us’, as less 
human (Woods et al. 2013). The danger may be viewed as homegrown, but 
the processes of boundary drawing that position homegrown as an entity 
(Abbott 1995; Albert et al. 2001) do so by distancing actors within. Distancing 
creates ‘conditional selves’ and exacerbates the alienation and insecurity of 
those with no relation to terror.47 In this sense representations of threat 
counterproductively contribute to the idea that Islam is under attack by the 
West in how ‘Fear and distrust, especially against innocent Muslim 
Americans, can easily be sown and lead to a cycle of oppression that serves 
to validate jihadist claims’ (Rosler 2010: 66). This narrative built on complex 
intersections of time, space, and identity connects local conflict with global 
discourses, for example how in Chechnya militants are both ‘grounded in a 
post-colonial conflict with Russia’ as well as struggles in a ‘global war 
between Islam and the West’ (Swift).48  
A key point to consider is how social and political tensions are aggravated 
even when stated policy aims are to avoid such consequences. This can be 
seen in an attention to ‘self-radicalisation within the United States within 
immigrant communities’ (Lister and Cruickshank: 2013) whereby the focus 
becomes ‘immigrants, born in Western countries, who become radicalised’ 
(King and Taylor 2011: 604). Such discourses damagingly merge ’immigrant’49 
with ‘terrorist’,50 excluding from the homegrown category violence that is 
perpetrated by actors such as Dylan Roof. While Roof used terrorising 
violence in a political way, the perpetrator, target, and victims do not ‘fit’ 
simplistic categories of mainstream othering based on a racialisation and 
foreignisation of threat. 
When the meaning of ‘homegrown’ is not self-evident, we must ask at what 
point does ‘home’ become associated with non-belonging, and ‘grown’ 
become associated with violent radicalisation?51 How long is long enough to 
be considered part of the referent in need of protection rather than part of an 
other under suspicion? When the ‘homegrown’ other is stabilised by 
boundaries around migrant, immigrant, and/or Muslim categories, actors with 
no relation to violence but who identify with such groups are positioned as a 
47  One article cites ‘Alienated Muslim youths are considered by scholars and 
policymakers alike to be the primary source of homegrown terrorism.’ (Horn 2007). 
48  On this see Hunter and Heinke (2011), Sageman (2008:148). 
49  This is not to negate positive references to immigrants (Mantri 2011). 
50  See Huysmans and Buonfino (2008) on immigration in this context.
51  On radicalisation and grievance see McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) 
(radicalisation is a contested concept).
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threat. Such boundary drawing is counterproductive and unethical, not least 
given the creation durable inequalities (Tilly 1998). Different contexts 
inevitably demand different considerations. At the same time, even cursory 
observations into how conditional (non)belonging plays out in different 
settings can provide important examples, as in an account of externalisation 
by Kurdish-German journalist Mely Kiyak: 
KIYAK: In Germany, we always talk about a special group of 
people. Although they are Germans, we still say they are - in 
Germany, we call it Auslaender, the foreigner. Although these 
people have a German passport, they are still the Auslaender. 
We do not really use this term when we mean Italian people or 
Spanish people, but we specially use this term for people from 
- coming from Turkey or the Arabic countries. They cannot 
really reach the status of being a normal German just because 
of this term.
CORNISH: How long do you have to be in Germany before 
you’re not considered an Auslaender?
KIYAK: Until you die [laughter] (Cornish 2015).
This foreignising of the other along temporal lines in the German context may 
resonate with experiences in other areas, the significance of which would be 
even more problematic with respect to counterterrorism. As observed in 
studies on Irish and Muslim suspect communities in the UK (Nickels et al., 
2012: 351; Lynch 2013), the terrorist threat is often obscurely positioned, 
linked to ideas of ‘inside’ while simultaneously depending on misperceptions 
of the foreigner. Recent US policy focus also implies that sources of terror are 
based in places beyond the self, ‘from North Africa to South Asia’ (Obama 
2013),52 with one spatialisation of threat regarding terrorist detection stating 
‘Industrialised countries face the challenge of spotting international terrorists 
at points of entry and homegrown terrorists on their borders’ [emphasis 
added] (Koc-Menard 2009). An implication from such constructions may be 
that the targeting of threats continues to be based on assumptions of spatial 
belonging and movement, even as such belonging and movement is far from 
predictable. Processes of boundary construction position certain actors as 
conditional selves that are somehow forever on the perimeter of full 
belonging, with an analysis of ‘homegrown’ perhaps providing a useful 
empirical snapshot to consider.
52  On spatial imaginaries see Fisher (2014).
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Analysing ‘Homegrown’
The homegrown other has been observed as dangerous and unexceptional, 
with imminent plots coming from ‘unremarkable’ (Silber and Bhatt 2007: 5) 
individuals with ‘normal American lifestyles’ (Pregulman and Burke 2012: 3). 
To get a better sense of how homegrown has been constructed, a preliminary 
analysis of academic and policy-focused discourse presents observations 
including the difficulty of defining homegrown, the separation of homegrown 
from other domestic and international terrorists, the presentation of 
homegrown as largely synonymous with jihadi extremism, and the focus on 
Muslim communities – all of which contribute to an ambiguous yet 
consequential representation of homegrown as a ‘conditional self’.
Definitional dilemma
Possible consequences of insecurity from constructions of ‘conditional 
selfhood’ may be exacerbated by the confusion of defining terrorism, with 
boundaries around homegrown, domestic, and international labels 
increasingly blurred.53 As stated by Hinkkainen Kaisa, ‘there is an increasing 
amount of literature about homegrown terrorism, but often without a clear 
definition of what this constitutes’ (2013:163). Homegrown terrorism has been 
defined as ‘extremist violence perpetrated by U.S. citizens or legal U.S. 
residents, and linked to or inspired by Al Qaeda’s brand of radical Sunni 
Islamism’ (Pregulman and Burke 2012, 1); homegrown extremists as 
‘radicalized groups and individuals that are not regularly affiliated with, but 
draw clear inspiration and occasional guidance from, Al Qaeda core or 
affiliated movements’ (Ibid.); and homegrown extremism as ‘terrorist activity 
perpetrated by U.S. legal residents and citizens’ (Nelson 2010). Official 
websites have presented ‘homegrown violent extremism (HVE)’ 
(‘Countering…’ 2015), research has identified ‘self-radicalized, homegrown 
criminal extremists’ (Carter and Carter 2012:146), and a US Senate report 
has referred to ‘Homegrown Islamist Radicalization’ (‘Majority and Minority…’ 
2012).54 
The challenge of multiple labels and definitions is not exclusive to the US, for 
example in the UK context an individual is U.K.-based ‘only if he or she is a 
British citizen living in the United Kingdom or was a long-term resident of the 
United Kingdom during that period, regardless of immigration status’, with 
U.K.-related meaning ‘if he or she is a British citizen living outside the United 
Kingdom, or a foreign citizen who visited the United Kingdom or participated 
53  On conceptualising terrorism see Schmid (2004).
54  See also the DHS and FBI, Joint Intelligence Bulletin, ‘Use of Small Arms: 
Examining Lone Shooters and Small-Unit Tactics,’ 16 August 2011, 3.
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from abroad in a plot targeting the United Kingdom’ (Barbieri and Klausen, 
2012:414, note 17). Efforts have been made to specify ‘homegrown’, but it 
has also been acknowledged that any assemblage of specifics ‘would 
constitute such a strict criterion that hardly any organization would fit the 
category’ (Bjelopera 2013: 163). Indeed, a key observation is that 
‘Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization’ and 
‘No workable general profile of domestic violent jihadists exists’ (Ibid., 2). If 
there is a common definitional conclusion it seems to be that the homegrown 
threat ‘is very difficult to define’ (Giuliano 2011). 
An arguably productive complication of defining homegrown along varied 
iterations are recent articles on right wing extremism (Shane 2015),55 with 
another report on ‘jihadist terrorists’ that references homegrown explaining 
just ‘0.007 percent of Muslims in the United States have been involved in 
domestic terror plots since 9/11’ (Gilson 2013). Considering that ‘little 
research has so far examined the alleged distinctiveness of homegrown 
terrorism empirically’ (Kaisa 2013: 157), homegrown actors are said to have 
limited financial support and technical know-how (Bjelopera 2013: 6; Mueller 
and Stewart 2012:109), and that the number of ‘indicted extremists’ has gone 
from 33 in 2010 to nine in 2013 (Bergen 2013), definitional inconsistencies 
add further confusion to an already difficult threat assessment. With terrorism 
positioned in modern governmentalities as a ‘risk beyond a risk’ (Aradau and 
Van Munster 2007, 102), the consequential ambiguity of threat identification is 
exacerbated, not clarified, by identifiers such as domestic, international, and 
homegrown. 
Domestic, international, homegrown
The argument that ‘maintaining an artificial separation between domestic and 
international terrorist events impedes full understanding of terrorism and 
ultimately weakens counterterrorism efforts’ is a compelling one (LaFree et 
al., 2006: 6). At the time of research the FBI referenced ‘domestic terrorist 
threats’ as eco-terrorists/animal rights extremists, lone offenders, sovereign 
citizen movement, and anarchist extremism, separating homegrown Islamist 
extremist threats from ‘domestic’.56 Examples of domestic terrorism included 
the ‘Oklahoma City bombing’ and Eric Rudolph, but not ‘Jihad Jane’ Colleen 
La Rose or Nidal Hasan. Following the April 2013 Boston bombings, White 
House press releases stated that earlier investigations indicated no clear line 
if activity was ‘foreign or domestic’ (Carney 2013; Brennan 2013). One article 
was titled ‘Boston Bomb Suspect: It Was Just Us’ (Staff Writer 2013), but 
55  See also New America Foundation, ‘Deadly Attacks Since 9/11’, accessed 22 July 
2015 via http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html.
56  See FBI website ‘Domestic terrorism,’ http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/dt/.
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assumptions of terrorists as foreign (Bulley 2008)57 remained even as 
Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev had spent their adult lives in the US, and 
even as Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov said ‘We don’t know the 
Tsarnaevs, they did not live in Chechnya’ (Locker et al. 2013). Responses to 
the attack were not focused on Americans, but on how ‘Chechens are now 
going to be seen as bad people’ (Golovnina 2013), alluding to how a historical 
demonisation of the ‘Chechen other’ can persist over time and across space 
(Russell 2005; Swift 2010). 
Existing research has helpfully engaged with this difficulty of defining types of 
terrorism (e.g. Crone and Harrow 2011; Kleinmann 2012), and more research 
needs to be done on both disrupting threat labels and examining non-jihadist 
threats: ‘Terrorist threats against U.S. officials and police that have nothing to 
do with Islamist militancy are surely also worthy of the scrutiny of Congress, 
but neither the Senate nor House homeland security committee, nor it seems 
any other congressional committee, has examined the issue in any detail 
since 9/11’ (Bergen and Lebovich 2011). The point is not that there are no 
sources of insecurity self-identifying (mistakenly) with Islam. Rather, that to 
achieve greater security we must not let ‘homegrown’ enable a silencing of 
non-jihadist sources of terror, nor must we allow a silencing of the insecurities 
that stem from how counterterrorism affects those with no relation to violence.
Homegrown as ’jihadist’
Even as threats from ‘homegrown violent extremists’ increasingly reference 
both jihadist and non-jihadist extremism, there has been a particular attention 
to, and ongoing consequence of, constructions of terrorism as Islam-related 
(Jackson 2007; Croft 2012). These constructions of terrorism limit our 
possibilities for effective security because they encourage an almost 
primordial essentialisation of the terrorist, restricting our ability to 
conceptualise terrorism as a method of violence employed by state and non-
state actors, by far right and extremist Islamist contingents. Some research 
has underscored the threat of far right wing militants (Perliger 2013; Taylor et 
al. 2013), but in broader public arenas such research has been received as 
‘outrageous’ (Scarborough 2013), and ‘fears [have] focused on Muslim 
“homegrown” terrorism”’ (Brooks 2012).58 There are also competitions over 
resources, with questions ‘what about the homegrown extremists?’ in 
discussions of US State Department ‘foreign “Community Engagement and 
57  For example, a ‘Saudi man…running from the scene’ was under scrutiny in part due 
to ‘his nationality’ (Eligon and Cooper), and someone was ‘allowed to reenter the U.S. 
despite having a lapsed visa’ (Carney 2013a).
58  On radicalisation focused on homegrown as jihadist-related see Gartenstein-Ross 
and Grossman (2009).
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Resilience” projects’ (Mirahmadi 2014 ), and competing understandings ‘over 
what is international and what is domestic terrorism’ (Kaisa, 2013, 159).59 
Statements that ‘there is no real strategy to counter the homegrown threat’ 
(Temple-Raston 2010) continue to be convincing, and while efforts to 
coordinate local and federal law enforcement may be well intentioned, 
receiving Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) training and the ‘If You See 
Something, Say Something™’ campaign (‘Preventing…’ 2015) do not on their 
own indicate effective security practice. 
Instead, such practices may be counterproductive in how they can enflame 
insecurity from racial profiling, hate crimes, xenophobia, and Islamaphobia. 
Discourses that securitise Islam (Croft 2012) reinforce assumptions of 
terrorism as Jihadi-related, with those identified as Muslim mistakenly seen 
as somehow more innately terroristic than others. Immigration in this context 
amplifies such assumptions as the degree of threat is assessed in terms of 
temporal and spatial connections to ‘foreign’ places. ‘[N]ative-born 
European(s)’ are positioned alongside representations of ‘new generations of 
Western Muslims,’ (Barbieri and Klausen 2012: 418) with the ‘quintessential 
‘homegrown network’ composed of individuals born in the West…who 
embraced a radical Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the U.S.’ (Vidino 
2007:2). Engaging in ‘homegrown jihadism’ may relate to Al Qaeda’s ‘long-
standing subversion of migrant Muslims in the West’ (Acharya and Marwah 
2008), but such subversion is not all migrants, and the temporality of when 
and how someone identifies with a particular collective is not an indicator of 
threat. Discourses that link nonviolent communities to threats can in fact be 
highly destabilising, as seen in the late August 2015 attacks against migrants 
in Germany (Chambers 2015). Constructions of homegrown as Islamic and 
immigrant-related contribute to everyday insecurity for those connected to 
such categories but with no relation to violence, exacerbate a narrative of the 
West being at war with Islam, and increase the threat from anti-government 
extremists in how ‘Immigration further fuels nativist instincts and hostility 
toward a federal government’ (Jenkins 2012: 9).
Critical attention to constructions of homegrown as overwhelmingly ‘jihadist’ is 
not to disregard insecurity from actors espousing extremist jihadist views. 
Rather this is to encourage a focus on counterproductive consequences from 
exclusionary threat construction to better understand how phrases such as 
‘Muslim community’ may position Islam as from ‘outside’ and marginalise 
innocent individuals as suspect, even if the intention was to help.
59  As a counter example they state ‘Americans have been involved in terrorist 
activities’ (Kaisa, 2013, p. 159).
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‘Muslim communities’60
When I testified before the current House Homeland Security 
subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence chaired 
by Rep. King in March 2010 on ‘Working with Communities to 
Disrupt Terror Plots’, I specifically warned that solutions like 
Rep. King’s counter-productively ‘securitise the relationship’ 
between communities and law enforcement by presenting 
communities with only two avenues, either as suspects or 
sources to report on suspects (Elibiary 2013). 
It is not difficult to interpret a majority of representations of homegrown as 
being built upon misplaced assumptions of homegrown terrorism as almost 
exclusively from Muslim communities. Even as some attention to community 
may be well-intentioned, related discourse and practice such as ‘community 
based policing’ (‘Preventing Terrorism and Countering…’, 2014) can 
marginalise actors by positioning certain groups as needing more protection 
and more surveillance, as observed in the destructive New York Police 
Department surveillance programme (‘End of NYPD Muslim Surveillance…’ 
2014). This mistakenly establishes communities as ‘suspect’ rather than part 
of the self, and is an example of how identity framings can negatively position 
perceived difference as danger (Hillyard 1993; McGovern and Tobin 2010; 
Heath-Kelly 2012; Hickman et al. 2012; Eriksen 2012; Breen-Smyth 2014). 
By attending to the creation of suspect communities we can see how linkages 
between homegrown and immigrant intensify sentiments of alienation by 
connecting counterterrorism with the very narratives that counterterrorism is 
supposed to counter: that the West is at war with Islam. Insecurity is 
increased here in two ways: one, by the narrative being ‘persuasive enough 
to motivate a small but disturbing number of American citizens and legal 
residents to take up arms to prevent further perceived assaults on Muslims’ 
(Pregulman and Burke 2012, 4), and two, in how attacks ‘by homegrown 
groups’ heighten ‘distrust toward the Muslim population among ethnic 
Europeans and, consequently, Muslims’ sense of exclusion from mainstream 
society’ (Vidino 2007, 589). 
In looking at recent US discourse, some redirection may be under way, but 
more research is needed. The 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) 
does not mention Muslim once, and Islam only twice, compared to the 2010 
60  It is not my intention to speak for anyone self-identifying with the Muslim community, 
and it must be noted that listening to individuals directly affected by intersections of 
threat construction and ideas of Muslim community should arguably be the core focus 
of future analysis.
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NSS that focused on the need to ‘build positive partnerships with Muslim 
communities around the world’ to ‘protect our homeland’ (Brennan 2010). 
While this represents an effort to form a united front against terrorism, on the 
other hand such discourse also points to an interesting dynamic linking 
‘homeland’ with communities seen as external to the self. Earlier discourse 
positioning the best defence against ‘recruitment to jihadist terrorism in the 
Muslim-American community’ as being ‘the Muslim-American community’ 
(Jenkins 2010: 3) and stating a need for ‘positive partnerships with Muslim 
communities’ (Obama 2010) is similar to calls for law enforcement to work 
‘with the Muslim-American community to identify signs of radicalisation’ 
(‘Background Briefing…’ 2013): that ‘the best way to prevent violent 
extremism inspired by violent jihadists is to work with the Muslim American 
community’ (Obama 2013). It has been said that the US should learn from the 
British by focusing on ‘law enforcement officers who come from a community 
that may be vulnerable to terrorist penetration’ (Dryer 2007), but such 
‘community-based’ efforts remain under-scrutinised and highly controversial.
As seen in mixed reactions to British Prime Minister David Cameron’s 2015 
speech on ‘extremist ideology’ (Gani 2015), in addition to important critiques 
on the exclusion of Muslim voices more broadly (Shafiq 2015), it is essential 
to consider the ways that such policies are counterproductive for security. 
Efforts at inclusivity are made, asserting that ‘Muslims are a fundamental part 
of the American family’ (Obama 2013). But ‘community’ can also signal 
exclusionary difference and conditional belonging. Even as Obama states 
that ‘violent extremism is not unique to any one faith’, he also says that ‘our 
best partners in protecting vulnerable people from succumbing to violent 
extremist ideologies are the communities themselves’, so that Muslim 
communities can ‘protect their loved ones from becoming radicalised’ 
(Obama 2015).61 A continued focus on Muslim communities targets these 
actors with suspicion (they are externalised from full belonging with the self) 
and with responsibility (they are responsible for protecting the self). In this 
sense reference to Muslim communities contributes to an ongoing 
marginalisation that can simultaneously be seen as a cause and 
consequence of the insecurities identified by countering violent extremism 
discourse. As stated by Bjelopera (2013, 4), ‘the prevention of terrorist 
attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, 
Arab, and Sikh communities’ but ‘Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans 
recognised the need to define themselves as distinctly American 
communities’ [emphasis added]. 
Insecurity is evident in that ‘Muslim community activists fear that law 
enforcement coerces immigrants into becoming informants’ (Bjelopera 2013, 
61  With thanks to an anonymous reviewer for recommending this speech.
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5) and in how terrorist events are ‘likely to exacerbate many of the difficulties 
that Muslim Americans have faced since 9/11…official discrimination by 
government agencies, violent hate crimes against persons and property, 
blatantly prejudicial legislative efforts targeted at Muslim religious practices 
and subtle societal discrimination that impacts employment, housing, and 
other attributes’ (Belt 2013). Further complicating insecurity is how advocates 
of violence also refer to the Muslim community in the ‘ideological desire to 
protect the Muslim community, which they believe is under attack by the West’ 
(Pregulman and Burke 2012, 2). Opposing voices represent competing 
notions of ‘Muslim community’, and what it means to belong.62
Assumptions of difference as danger damage individuals unrelated to 
violence even as both ‘scholars and law enforcement officials have noted that 
no workable general profile of domestic violent jihadists exists’ and that 
‘generalising about the individuals involved is problematic’ (Bjelopera 2013, 2, 
25):
From Qur’an burning in Florida to legislation banning the veil 
in France, a growing number of American and Europeans view 
Islam as subversive value system. This fear informs research 
as well, with a recent report from one Washington think-tank 
describing Islam as ‘threat masquerading as a religion’ and 
warning against ‘U.S. leadership failures in the face of 
Shari’ah’. Some of this paranoia reflects nativist impulses, to 
be sure (Swift n.d.).
We are ‘repeatedly warned about the growing alienation of American Muslims’ 
(Vidino 2007:12) but threat labels continue to be established through oblique 
configurations of conditional belonging, marginalising certain individuals from 
full inclusion. This marginalisation is observed in the use of identity qualifiers 
that in one context may be celebrated as ‘diversity’ but in the realm of 
counterterrorism mark a dangerous, foreign other: a Pakistani American 
named Farooque Ahmed, an American of Nicaraguan descent named Antonio 
Martinez, and ‘Pennsylvania-based Emerson Begholly’ (Giuliano 2011). 
Mohammad Abdulazeez, responsible for the Tennessee 2015 shootings, is 
described as ‘Kuwait-born…a naturalised US citizen who lived most of his life 
in Chattanooga’, instead of an ‘American from Chattanooga’ (Bertrand 
2015).63 Individuals are distanced from the self by focusing on qualifiers 
aligned with us/them discourses linked to discriminatory images of the Global 
South, ‘a territory peopled by “Others” that can be labelled as “uncivilised”, 
62  See Soderman (2014). 
63  Adding to the ambiguity of identification was how the FBI referred to it as ‘domestic 
terrorism’ and ‘homegrown violent extremist’ (Bacon, 2015).
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“traditional”, “irrational”, and “violent”, much as they were two centuries ago’ 
(Göl 2010:2). Discursive efforts to distance violence at home from the home 
can thus reinforce damaging and orientalist tropes of temporal and 
civilisational underdevelopment, the resultant insecurities of which affect 
those with no relation to violence.
Reconsidering ‘Homegrown’ 
Homegrown terrorism has not generated much comparative 
literature and it seems that the debate of old and new terrorism 
has fused the concepts of international Islamist terrorism and 
homegrown terrorism into one. I, however, argue that 
homegrown terrorism is more similar to the other types of 
domestic terrorisms in Western Europe rather than its 
international Salafi counterpart. (Kaisa 2013, 165)
Given public imaginaries of ‘foreign fighters’ streaming to Syria and alarmist 
political discourse around the Mediterranean refugee crisis, communities that 
are already externalised from full belonging with the self in need of protection 
are increasingly seen as a target audience for counterterrorism. In the context 
of homegrown threats such targeting may prove problematic in a number of 
ways, and ‘mischaracterising and inflating the Muslim homegrown American 
threat could prove self-defeating to the country’s efforts to defend against it’ 
(2011, 45). As argued by Elibiary, ‘after facilitating more than 100 events of 
cooperation across our country between Muslim community members and the 
FBI in homegrown terrorism investigations, it is clear to me today that 
radicalisation is an individual or small group phenomenon that sometimes 
requires a community-based solution but is never a community-level problem’ 
(2013) [emphasis added]. 
Despite some well-intentioned community-based efforts, in addition to an 
awareness of how counterterrorism can be counterproductive, authorities are 
still ‘unable to conceive any coherent policy that would preemptively tackle 
the issue of radicalisation, preventing young American Muslims from 
embracing extremist ideas in the first place’ (Vidino 2007, 14). Some 
techniques even continue to exacerbate insecurity (Vidino 2007; Bjelopera 
2013), the most recent iteration being a 29 October 2015 story on how an 
undercover NYPD officer converted to Islam in order to spy on Muslim 
students. The acute insecurity experienced by one individual is powerfully 
explained through what could be seen as an example of damaging, 
conditional belonging: ‘I grew up here. To have this happen because of your 
religion, or your political views, it’s scary. You feel alienated. And you don’t 
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feel like this is your home’ (Stahl 2015).64   
The above is indicative of how security practice produces experiences of 
insecurity, and while ‘Some may recoil at grouping right-wing, single-issue, 
and left-wing terrorists with militant jihadists…there are several benefits to 
promoting a more comprehensive assessment of the domestic terrorist threat’ 
(Brooks 2012), such a shift may help combat counterproductive threat 
construction. Stereotyping rather than intelligence has been ‘a key factor in 
the use of counter-terrorism powers’ and led to ‘Asian people’ as ‘being 11 
times more likely to be stopped at UK borders’ (Travis 2013), and arguments 
slamming ‘political correctness’ are an insufficient and embarrassing rationale 
for not stopping ineffective and counterproductive discourse and practice. The 
need to critically examine how we label terrorism should be felt as a matter of 
urgency, not least when reading how ‘mothers and fathers, religious leaders 
and students, recent immigrants and American citizens by birth… spoke of 
their concerns, that their fellow Americans, and at times, their own 
government, may see them as a threat to American security, rather than a 
part of the American family’ (Brennan 2010), and knowing that ‘overestimating 
the threat could contribute to the adoption of counterproductive 
counterterrorism methods, especially those that threaten to alienate Muslim 
communities’ (Brooks 2011, 9).
Given that ‘we have not eliminated the sources of grievance at the United 
States that gave rise to Al Qaeda and could spawn other terrorist movements’ 
(Belt), and that we have a responsibility to uphold the highest standards of 
social justice and human rights, it is essential to interrogate how 
representations of the homegrown threat in security practice may instead be 
influencing insecurity. This chapter is a call to consider the idea of conditional 
(non)belonging to support further research in this context, with the hope that 
this may help us find ways to combat self-defeating security discourse and 
practice enabled by exclusionary assumptions of (non)belonging.
*The views expressed here do not represent National Defense University, the 
U.S. Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government entity.
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Introduction: The ‘Temporalisation’ of (In)security
In Chapter III of The Prince, Machiavelli declares that ‘it is necessary not only 
to pay attention to immediate crises, but to foresee those that will come and 
to make every effort to prevent them’ (1995). While perhaps a basic political 
truism, this idea of actively governing the future through targeted 
interventions in the present has been central to the Western-led response to 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Indeed, because transnational 
terrorism has been widely framed as a novel type of danger that is uniquely 
‘unpredictable in occurrence, characteristics, and effects’ (Anderson 2010b: 
228), the most pressing ‘security issues have increasingly been defined in 
terms of uncertain, potentially catastrophic threats’ (Aalberts and Werner 
2011: 2188, 2191). In this sense, the ever-present spectre of a seemingly 
inevitable next attack has inscribed a radically contingent, potentially 
catastrophic future as the primary threat against which security measures 
must be oriented. This has led the very idea of ‘security’ to be framed in 
65  This paper presents a condensed version of the arguments developed in my book 
Taming an Uncertain Future: Temporality, Sovereignty, and the Politics of Anticipatory 
Governance, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). I thank the anonymous reviewer(s) from 
E-IR for a number of productive comments and critiques that have helped me refine the 
arguments developed below.
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essentially temporal terms, and equated with taming this future through 
anticipatory action in the present. The advent of the War on Terror, in short, 
has ‘reconfigured the politics of space into a politics of time’ in the realm of 
(in)security governance (Kessler 2011: 2181). 
To be sure, there is an anticipatory element to even the most basic 
understanding of security, as its pursuit necessarily involves not only 
responses to attacks, but the identification and ongoing prevention of future 
threats. The novelty of the post-9/11 reorientation of global (in)security politics 
along more temporal lines should thus not be overstated. Yet its practical 
operationalisation has had significant implications for the way political power 
is organised and exercised that merit critical scrutiny. Among the most notable 
is the extent to which the attendant institutionalisation of ‘pre-emption’ as a 
security rationality has manifested as a politics of ‘exceptionalism’ under 
which precarious political subjectivities are enacted. In what follows, I 
consider how this correlation between pre-emption and exceptionalism is no 
coincidence, as the latter can be understood as an originary function of the 
former that stems from pre-emption’s underlying temporal imperative to tame 
a radically uncertain future. In other words, I argue that a pre-emptive politics 
of (in)security logically presupposes what amounts to a politics of 
exceptionalism in which the relationships between sovereign powers and the 
subjects they govern approximate the sort of unmediated confrontation often 
described in the Critical Security Studies literature informed by readings of 
Giorgio Agamben’s work on sovereignty.
Towards this end, I begin by describing how the post-9/11 ‘temporalisation’ of 
(in)security has taken the form of a politics of pre-emption in which radical 
uncertainty constitutes the basis for, rather than an impediment to, 
anticipatory action. I then consider how this requires a prioritisation of the 
imagination in the context of anticipatory decision-making, which in turn 
grants the deciding entity a significantly enhanced degree of discretionary 
authority. Through a brief examination of the Obama administration’s drone 
warfare programme and the targeted killing of US citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, I 
subsequently consider how, in practice, this enacts precarious political 
subjectivities. I conclude by considering the implications of these ideas for 
debates about the compatibility of anticipatory security rationalities with the 
norms of liberal democratic governance. 
Pre-emption in the Post-9/11 World
An extensive body of Critical Security Studies work has documented the 
recent proliferation of what can be generally characterised as ‘pre-emptive’ 
security strategies (see, for example, Amoore 2014; Stockdale 2013; 
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Anderson 2010a; de Goede and Randalls 2009; Massumi 2007; Elmer and 
Opel 2006; Cooper 2006). Addressing a wide range of issues—including, but 
not limited to: the indefinite detention (Ericson 2008) and targeted killing 
(Leander 2011) of suspected terrorists; the biometric monitoring of mobile 
populations (Muller 2010); the pre-emptive detention of refugees (Isin and 
Rygiel 2007); the anticipatory freezing of monies suspected of terrorist links 
(de Goede 2012); and the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ of pre-emptive inter-state 
war (Weber 2007)—this literature has comprehensively illustrated that a 
dominant trend in contemporary global (in)security governance is the turn 
towards a logic of pre-emption premised on intervening in the present to 
create alternative futures in which potential catastrophes are precluded. 
Looking at this trend from a wider perspective, it can be usefully understood 
as a function of broader shifts in the way the present and future are framed in 
the contemporary global security imagination. In this respect, the present is 
construed as beset by a radical contingency, with the global security 
environment in particular characterised by the breakdown of established 
certainties in the face of novel threats (Kessler and Daase 2008). The 
consequence is that ‘decision-makers are simply no longer able to guarantee 
predictability, security, and control’ to the extent that was once believed 
possible (Aradau and van Munster 2008: 23). Complementary to this framing 
of the present, the future is understood in terms not just of radical uncertainty 
but of ‘expected and undeniable catastrophe’, typified by the proverbial next 
attack, with the precise moment of its emergence remaining continually 
unknown (Ibid.). In other words, the future embodies an impending 
catastrophe that is seemingly both inevitable—in that it will at some point 
occur—and unknowable—in that we cannot be certain when it will take place 
(Anderson 2010a: 779-80; Opitz and Tellmann 2015: 107). What more broadly 
results is what Paul Virilio has termed ‘a culture of the imminence of disaster’ 
(2010: 7), in which—to wax Rumsfeldian—contemporary life is haunted by the 
spectre of a disastrous unknown that is paradoxically known to be lurking in 
the future’s unknowable depths.
Approaches premised upon taming these uncertainties by controlling the 
unfolding of the future through anticipatory interventions in the present have 
accordingly come to dominate the post-9/11 global politics of (in)security. In 
practice, this perspective implies the necessity of acting pre-emptively, even 
without an established base of verifiable knowledge upon which to make such 
decisions (Aradau and van Munster 2007: 101). In other words, radical 
uncertainty about both the nature of the threat and the moment at which it 
might emerge is not an impediment to acting anticipatorily; it instead provides 
the very impetus for it, such that ‘the absence of specific evidence serves as 
justification for action’ (Elmer and Opel 2006: 481). This places governing 
authorities ‘in the uncomfortable position of having to take drastic action in the 
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face of an inescapably elusive, uncertain threat’ (Cooper 2006: 119). 
A key consequence is that established mechanisms and logics of (in)security 
governance nominally premised upon data collection and deliberation appear 
inadequate, and strategies based primarily on conjecture and speculation 
emerge as the most viable options (de Goede 2012). The Obama 
administration’s use of ‘predictive assessments about potential threats’ as the 
basis for the inclusion of individuals on so-called ‘no-fly lists’ and other 
‘watchlisting’ initiatives central to US counter-terrorism efforts is an instructive 
example here (Ackerman 2015). At a May 2015 a federal court proceeding, 
for instance, two officials from the US Justice Department described the 
watchlisting programme’s chief goal as ‘identifying individuals who may be a 
threat to civil aviation and national security’ through ‘predictive judgement[s] 
intended to prevent future acts of terrorism in an uncertain context’ (quoted in 
Ibid.). This testimony provided official confirmation that decisions to place 
particular individuals on no-fly lists are ‘based on predicting crimes rather 
than on records of demonstrated offenses’ (Ibid.). And despite an FBI official 
telling the court that ‘mere guesses or ‘hunches’…are not sufficient,’ a former 
CIA counterterrorism analyst responded by testifying that ‘there is no 
indication that the government has assessed the scientific validity and 
reliability of its predictive judgments,’ and as such, these judgments ‘amount 
to little more than the ‘guesses’ or ‘hunches’ that [the FBI official] says are not 
sufficient’ (quoted in Ibid.). Considered in light of the importance of 
watchlisting practices to US counter-terror strategy (Herman 2011), the CIA 
analyst’s testimony and the revelations of the court proceedings more 
generally illustrate both how the importance of taking action in the face of 
radical uncertainty defines the post-9/11 politics of (in)security, and that this 
has a significant effect on the way decisions are made in the security context. 
Indeed, if the mere possibility of danger emerging at some point in the future 
can serve as the basis for anticipatory action in the present, the implications 
for the organisation and exercise of sovereign power in the security context 
are not insignificant.
The Future and the Imagination
To begin to understand these implications, it is useful to understand the 
reformulation of (in)security governance associated with a politics of pre-
emption in terms of the prioritisation of the future over the present. In this 
respect, we have seen that a pre-emptive approach requires that some sort 
of anticipatory action be taken for the purpose of governing an uncertain 
future; yet such action must necessarily take place in the present, since this 
is where humans agents act. The ontology of security is thus constructed in 
such a way that the future itself becomes the referent to be secured—with 
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catastrophic iterations thereof constituting the threat to be secured against—
while the present is instrumentally constructed as the location of the 
interventions necessary accomplish this. In other words, the logic of pre-
emption prioritises the governance of the future, which in turn implies the 
legitimation of potentially disruptive interventions in the present, thus 
effectively placing the latter in subordinate service to the former. 
Importantly, this prioritisation of the future alters the epistemic basis of 
political action by enacting a decisional logic that relies upon ‘knowledge’ 
derived primarily from the exercise of the imagination. Indeed, as Aradau and 
van Munster put it, ‘imagination acquires epistemic primacy in relation to the 
unknown’ (2011: 85); and because pre-emptive interventions act upon a 
radically uncertain (and thus ultimately unknown) future, the imagination is 
vital to rendering that which is to be pre-empted intelligible and therefore 
actionable in the present. In other words, ‘imagination is constitutive of 
security knowledge’ (Ibid., 84), and any security decision through which 
anticipatory action is taken will rely upon the imagination to a significant 
degree. The result is that a pre-emptive politics of (in)security shifts the 
epistemic basis for action from the realm of verifiable fact to the realm of 
speculation, conjecture, and suspicion (de Goede and Randalls 2009: 868). 
What follows is that anticipatory action is in practice based to a significant 
extent upon evidentiary foundations constructed by the deciding authorities 
(or their designated surrogates). Under a politics of pre-emption, therefore, 
those tasked with making anticipatory decisions are also ultimately tasked 
with creating the epistemic basis for these decisions through the exercise of 
the imagination. This has the effect of greatly enhancing the scope of 
discretionary authority granted to those who decide how and when to act in a 
pre-emptive security context.
An illustrative example can again help clarify these points. On 29 March 2011, 
Mohamed Hersi—a 25-year-old Somali-Canadian—was arrested by the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) as he tried to board a flight from Toronto to 
Cairo via London. Hersi was charged, tried, and ultimately became the first 
Canadian convicted of ‘attempting to participate in a terrorist activity’—an 
offence for which he was sentenced to the maximum of 10 years in prison. 
Like most Western states in the post-9/11 era, Canada has adopted a pre-
emptive approach to governing terrorism premised explicitly upon ‘protecting 
Canadians from terrorist acts before they occur’ (Government of Canada 
2011: 32). The country’s anti-terrorism guidelines have thus been developed 
to allow security agencies to act in such a way that threats are ‘dealt with on 
more of an a priori basis rather than more of a post facto basis’ (Svendsen 
2010: 320). The RCMP was operating under this regime when Hersi was 
detained, and the inchoate nature of his offence also highlights this pre-
emptive ethos.
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The RCMP alleged that Hersi intended to proceed from Cairo to Somalia to 
train as a militant with Al-Shabaab, a group designated as a terrorist 
organisation under Canadian law. At the time of the arrest, however, the 
RCMP offered a rather candid admission that their investigation ‘did not 
indicate that the suspect was a direct threat to his country or Canadians’ at 
the time of his detention (Teotonio 2011). In other words, the threat that was 
pre-empted by Hersi’s arrest did not tangibly exist at the moment he was 
detained. He was, rather, subjected to an intervention by the Canadian state 
based on an imagined future threat that he may have one day posed. This 
conjectural aspect of the case was used unsuccessfully in Hersi’s defence at 
trial, after which his lawyer promised to appeal, claiming that the conviction 
relied on speculative evidence that was ‘so far removed from reality as to 
make it a thought crime’ (Humphreys 2014). 
Of course, the decision to detain Hersi was presumably not entirely arbitrary; 
and liberal legal norms have long included conspiracy provisions permitting 
the anticipatory arrest of those taking preparatory steps to commit a serious 
crime who have not yet followed through. So while it is certainly arguable 
whether the Hersi case falls outside the normative boundaries of a liberal 
legal order, it still usefully illustrates how the praxis of pre-emptive security 
operates through the privileging of imagination as the epistemic foundation for 
action, which in turn enhances the discretionary authority of those tasked with 
deciding upon such action by requiring them to construct that foundation. 
When considered in a broader context, this suggests that pre-emptive 
security measures function through a paradigm of political power in many 
ways reminiscent of that which is associated with a politics of ‘exceptionalism.’
Pre-emption and Exceptionalism
The Critical Security Studies literature includes myriad engagements with the 
work of Carl Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben, and others who have extensively 
theorised the concept of political ‘exceptionalism’. Described most simply, 
exceptionalism denotes a condition where the prevailing legal order is 
effectively annulled and a more arbitrary, unconstrained form of power vested 
in a particular person or office emerges (Schmitt 2005: 12; Huysmans 2004). 
As I have argued elsewhere (Stockdale 2013), political exceptionalism can 
therefore be understood as characterised by two core components: the 
suspension of the juridical order (Agamben 2005: 23), and a ‘decisionist’ 
paradigm of political authority (Schmitt 2005: 33). With respect to the first, a 
politics of exceptionalism involves freeing the highest form of legitimate 
political authority—usually the executive—from limitations imposed by the 
rule of law (Schmitt 2005: 11; Lazar 2006: 260). Political action thus takes a 
more arbitrary form, since the absence of effective legal constraints grants an 
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enhanced degree of discretion to the acting authority. The decisionist 
component of exceptionalism thus follows from this, as it describes a 
condition where the executive does not simply apply the law, but rather is 
effectively ‘the source of law’ (Lazar 2006: 257). Under a state of exception, in 
other words, a decision taken by the relevant authority is purer, such that, in 
Schmitt’s words, it ‘emanates from nothingness’ (Schmitt 2005: 33). 
When these points are read against the discussion of pre-emptive security in 
the preceding sections, it becomes clear that a paradigm of political power 
comprising these two core elements of exceptionalism bears a close 
resemblance to that which accompanies the logic of pre-emption as applied to 
the contemporary governance of (in)security. Indeed, by prioritising the 
imagination and concomitantly augmenting the deciding authority’s discretion, 
a politics of pre-emption effectively presupposes what amounts to a politics of 
exceptionalism by both suspending the juridical order and enacting a 
decisionist paradigm of political authority. It is worth considering each of these 
points in more detail.
Regarding the first, a corollary of pre-emption’s focus on governing a radically 
uncertain future is that no imaginable possibility can be dismissed—which 
implies more specifically that no individual can be presumptively absolved of 
suspicion in the present (Ericson 2008). In other words, when dealing with 
imagined futures, there is no way to prove an accused’s innocence once the 
imagination has been activated, since accusations relate to an act that has 
not yet taken place. This undermines the basis of almost any type of juridical 
order, since the collection and evaluation of evidence via designated 
channels is rendered largely impossible when dealing with imagined future 
events. The power to assess an individual’s (future) guilt—and thus to subject 
her/him to (present) interventions—is therefore transferred from the 
mechanisms of the legal system to the whim of a designated political 
authority. Of course, in practice this rarely translates into the state detaining 
those suspected of posing a potential threat on entirely arbitrary grounds. The 
point, however, is that the logic of pre-emption conflicts in crucial ways with 
the established norms of a liberal juridical order, since the latter are not 
equipped to handle the extended temporal horizons and evidentiary 
uncertainties that inevitably accompany anticipatory action (Aradau and van 
Munster 2009: 697).66 In this sense, pre-emptive approaches to (in)security 
66  One way this tension has been negotiated is through what some critical 
commentators have termed ‘counter law’ (Opitz and Tellmann 2015, Ericson 2008). This 
term refers to legislative moves aimed at embedding practices that undermine the 
constitutive norms of a liberal jurdicial order within that order. Importantly, Ericson links 
counter law specifically to the emergence of pre-emptive security measures, describing 
it as the creation of new laws and/or ‘new uses of existing laws’ that ‘erode or eliminate 
traditional principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law that get in the way of 
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governance suspend the juridical order almost by default, since questions 
regarding threat, culpability, and response become the purview of sovereign 
political authorities.
Regarding the second core component of exceptionalism, the type of decision 
required by pre-emptive security strategies demands what amounts to a 
‘decisionist’ form of political authority. In this respect, we have seen that 
because the futures against which anticipatory decisions are framed exist in 
the realm of the imagination, decisions to act pre-emptively are premised to a 
significant degree upon knowledge constructed by the deciding authority. The 
purity of such a decision is thus quite striking, since it involves not simply the 
weighing of existing evidence, but the active creation of knowledge about the 
future to serve as the evidentiary basis for interventions in the present. In 
other words, precisely because the unknown future being acted upon is 
something of an epistemic abyss, any decision to intervene pre-emptively 
‘becomes in the true sense absolute’, to again quote Schmitt (Schmitt 2005: 
12). Just as they suspend the juridical order by default, therefore, pre-emptive 
security practices also enact a decisionist form of political authority by what 
amounts to logical necessity. These two points suggest an originary 
conceptual relationship between pre-emption and exceptionalism, whose 
consequences for the organisation and exercise of political power, as well as 
experiences of political subjectivity, are profound and must be taken seriously 
if we are to adequately understand the contemporary global politics of (in)
security. 
Precarious Subjectivities
A particularly important consequence in this regard is that the exceptionalist 
politics presupposed by the logic of pre-emptive security brings into being a 
relationship between sovereign authorities and those governed thereby in 
which the latter are rendered continuously vulnerable to sudden and 
potentially violent interventions by the former. This is because the only 
effective limitations on the exercise of sovereign power in this context are the 
limits of the sovereign imagination itself. Indeed, relevant sovereign deciders 
are tasked with taming the future’s radical contingency; and because the 
pre-empting imagined sources of harm’ (2008, 57). Prominent examples include 
exceedingly generous readings of entrapment provisions by the courts in cases where 
informants are used to goad suspects into hatching terror plots that are then pre-
emptively foiled (Greenwald and Fishman 2015), or the European Union’s expanded 
use of financial ‘blacklisting’ practices that significantly lower the evidentiary threshold 
for enacting ‘targeted sanctions’ against suspected terrorist financiers that effectively 
preclude their participation in any type of financial transaction (de Goede 2011, Sullivan 
and Hayes 2010).
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epistemic basis for action towards this end will rely on imagined futures of the 
sovereign’s construction, targets are identified based on subjective discretion 
rather than more objective juridico-normative guidelines. And since none can 
be summarily absolved of suspicion, all are always already constructed as 
possible targets for pre-emptive action (Ericson 2008). What thus emerges is 
a condition in which any individual may be subjected to what amounts to an 
arbitrarily decided anticipatory act at any time, such that regimes of (in)
security governance premised upon a logic of pre-emption enact a decidedly 
precarious experience of political subjectivity.
To be sure, for almost all individuals, this perpetual vulnerability to potentially 
violent interventions based on conjecturally imagined futures will never be 
translated into an act of arbitrary sovereign violence. But the conceptual point 
being made here concerns the ever-present potential of this occurring, since 
even if no such action ever takes place, the continuous possibility that it will is 
a defining feature of the relationship between sovereign and subject under a 
pre-emptive security regime. And this possibility is a direct consequence of 
the enhanced decisional discretion vested in the sovereign by the logic of pre-
emption, in that anticipatory decisions are placed outside the circumscriptions 
of the juridical order, thus removing the normative barriers that protect 
individuals from being targeted on the basis of speculative knowledge that 
they have no capacity to contest. The point, in other words, is that even if 
such arbitrary targeting never actually takes place, this will not be because of 
any normative constraints upon the sovereign’s decisional authority; it will be 
because the sovereign decides against it. 
The relations between sovereign and subject enacted by a logic of pre-
emptive security in this sense closely resemble those that characterise the 
‘exceptional’ political spaces theorised extensively in the Critical Security 
Studies literature. These are typified by what Agamben terms the ‘camp,’ 
which is characterised by sovereign power confronting its subjects ‘without 
any mediation,’—meaning the sovereign’s ability to act is unbound by legal 
norms while subjects are deprived of any agency to contest its decisions 
(Agamben 2000: 41; 1998: 171). Just as in the proverbial camp, therefore, 
the possibility for any individual to be arbitrarily subjected to violent sovereign 
interventions is always there under a pre-emptive security regime. Indeed, 
even in states ostensibly committed to the rule of law and human rights 
norms, the adoption of pre-emptive security strategies creates an ever-
present potential for anyone to be inscribed as the sort of ‘bare life’ against 
which ‘everything is possible’ (Agamben 1998: 170). 
The September 2011 targeted killing via drone strike of Al Qaeda operative 
and US citizen Anwar al-Awlaki provides a useful illustration of these 
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considerations, as the incident highlights both the type of action made 
possible by the logics of pre-emptive security and the precarious subjectivities 
that are thereby enacted. The Obama administration’s decision to target al-
Awlaki can be read as an exercise in pre-emptive security, in that the broader 
‘killing programme’ of which it was a high profile example has been framed in 
precisely such terms by its proponents (Leander 2011). In a 2012 interview, 
for instance, former National Counterterrorism Centre head Michael Leiter 
asserted that targeted killing was embraced by Obama as the most 
appropriate response to the ‘situation where he is being told people might 
attack the United States tomorrow’ (quoted in Becker and Shane 2012, 
emphasis added). This suggests the administration sees drone warfare as an 
effective strategy for ensuring that such catastrophic futures do not come to 
pass. Moreover—and with respect to the al-Awlaki case in particular—the 
pre-emptive character of the killing is highlighted by the administration’s 
subsequent framing of the incident, whereby its legitimacy was affirmed by 
specifically invoking a pre-emptive imperative. The administration’s initial 
response to critics thus asserted that al-Awlaki ‘posed some sort of imminent 
threat’, which justified such ‘extraordinary measures’ as the government 
killing a citizen without what would conventionally be understood as due 
process (Koring 2011). 
Besides being an exemplar of pre-emptive security, however, the al-Awlaki 
case also represented a prototypically ‘exceptional’ act, as it embodied both 
components of political exceptionalism discussed above. Regarding the 
first—the suspension of the juridical order—a strong case can be made that 
the killing was extrajudicial, in that it was not authorised through established 
legal channels or in accordance with associated standards of evidence, and 
as such, was both ordered and carried out absent the due process of law 
constitutionally guaranteed to US citizens. The act can thus be understood as 
having suspended the legal order at the moment of its occurrence. Moreover, 
that targeting al-Awlaki in this way would contravene the juridical order seems 
to have been apparent to the Obama administration, as it sought to further 
justify the killing through claims of executive discretion on issues of national 
security. This can be seen in an internal memo from the Justice Department 
obtained by the New York Times, which was prepared with specific reference 
to the al-Awlaki case and asserted that ‘while the Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee of due process applied, it could be satisfied by internal 
deliberations in the executive branch’ alone (quoted in Becker and Shane 
2012).
This circumventing of the juridical order hints at how the al-Awlaki case also 
embodies the second core component of exceptionalism—a decisionist 
paradigm of sovereign authority. In this respect, the decision to kill al-Awlaki—
as with nearly all instances of drone strikes—was made through a by now 
186Catastrophic Futures, Precarious Presents, and the Temporal Politics of (In)security
well-established process that assigns such life-and-death prerogatives to a 
highly select group of officials within the executive branch. This process was 
outlined in a controversial New York Times investigative report published in 
2012, which is worth quoting at length to illustrate the degree to which the 
exercise of sovereign authority in the context of drone warfare takes a 
distinctly decisionist form: 
Every week or so, more than 100 members of the 
government’s sprawling national security apparatus gather, by 
secure video teleconference, to pore over terrorist suspects’ 
biographies and recommend to the president who should be 
the next to die. This secret ‘nominations’ process is an 
invention of the Obama administration, a grim debating society 
that vets the PowerPoint slides bearing the names, aliases 
and life stories of suspected members of Al Qaeda’s branch in 
Yemen or its allies in Somalia’s Shabab militia (sic)… [N]ames 
go off the list if a suspect no longer appears to pose an 
imminent threat…The nominations [then] go to the White 
House, where by his own insistence and guided by [chief 
counterterrorism advisor Jim] Brennan, Mr. Obama must 
approve any name (Becker and Shane 2012).
This description highlights how the final authority to decide who is to be killed 
and when is granted directly to the president alone. Thus, starting from the 
assumption that executive branch deliberation followed by the president 
signing off constitutes due process, the executive is freed from any normative 
circumscriptions regarding this use of violence in this way. This vests within 
the person of the president the discretionary capacity to determine who to 
target, when to strike, and what counts as adequate evidence that someone 
poses a sufficient threat to be killed. Such prerogatives conspicuously mirror 
those ascribed to the decisionist sovereign under a politics of exceptionalism.
By thus illustrating how the anticipatory exercise of sovereign power shifts 
relations between sovereign and subject towards an effectively unmediated 
confrontation, the al-Awlaki case highlights both the originary relationship 
between pre-emption and exceptionalism, and the implications of this link for 
the character of political subjectivity under a politics of pre-emptive security. 
Indeed, once the president made the pre-emptive decision to target al-Awlaki, 
the latter could immediately be killed with impunity by the agents of American 
sovereignty. The law thus no longer served as an effective mediator between 
sovereign and subject, since despite being a US citizen, al-Awlaki could still 
be killed on the basis of what amounted to an executive decree. The juridico-
normative limitations on the president’s decisional authority were therefore 
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subordinated to an imperative to govern the future with which such limits are 
in many ways incompatible. When faced with a sovereign power that could 
unilaterally decide when he would be killed and against which he had no 
practical recourse, al-Awlaki was therefore constructed as precisely the sort 
of ‘bare life’ that Agamben and others associate with the exceptionalism of the 
‘camp’ without actually being located in the sort of explicitly defined space 
with which this term is more often associated (Agamben 2000). The al-Awlaki 
killing thus provides an instructive example of the sort of exceptional practices 
that are made possible by the logic of pre-emptive security. The crucial point 
in this regard is that, under the pre-emptive security regime being prosecuted 
through the American drone programme, if President Obama had decided not 
to kill al-Awlaki, this would not have been because of any perceived legal 
limits upon his doing so; it would have instead been because the president 
himself simply decided not to. 
To be sure, the heated debate over the legitimacy of the al-Awlaki killing 
suggests that alternative understandings of the case and its implications are 
also compelling. For instance, al-Awlaki’s propagandistic activities on behalf 
of Al Qaeda—with whom the US has been engaged in a ‘war’ since 9/11—
might be understood as rendering the killing neither pre-emptive in nature—
since it can be viewed merely as an operation against a combatant during 
ongoing hostilities—nor extrajudicial—since al-Awlaki can be seen to have 
forfeited his citizenship protections by actively aiding an enemy force on 
foreign soil. These considerations reflect the Obama’s administration’s views 
and must be taken seriously in any discussion of the strike’s legitimacy. Yet 
regardless of one’s position on this normative question, the incident still 
illustrates the key conceptual point being made in this section—namely, that 
the imperative to tame temporal contingency conflicts with key normative 
mediations between sovereign and subject in a liberal democracy. Indeed, the 
very fact that the al-Awlaki killing could take place at all suggests that a state 
of perpetual vulnerability to anticipatory sovereign violence is a defining 
feature of political subjectivity under a pre-emptive politics of (in)security, 
even if subjects are never actually targeted in practice. Again, this condition is 
a result of the de facto elimination of juridico-normative mediation between 
sovereign power and political subjects, which in turn stems from a 
prioritisation of the imagination that is itself a function of the imperative to 
tame a radically uncertain future. The creation of such precarious subjective 
conditions is thus precisely what is at stake with the implementation of pre-
emptive security strategies—a point that must be taken seriously whenever 
the adoption of such strategies is being considered.
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Conclusion 
What I have termed the ‘temporalisation’ of (in)security represents merely one 
example of a broader trend in societal governance characterised by a ‘shift 
from responding to past events to preventing future harms’ (Dershowitz 2006: 
7). Evidence of this shift can be found across myriad areas of human affairs, 
as sectors as diverse as financial regulation (Porter 2009), public health 
management (Cooper 2006), crime prevention (Ericson 2007), urban planning 
(Coaffee 2009), and natural disaster management (United Nations 2013) are 
increasingly characterised by strategies, technologies, and rationalities based 
on anticipatory logics. The arguments developed above suggest that framing 
key problems of societal governance in this way can pose significant 
challenges to the constitutive norms of the liberal democratic polities often in 
the vanguard of this trend. Indeed, the exceptionalist politics that I have 
argued are presupposed by the temporalities of pre-emption in many ways 
run counter to such basic precepts as the rule of law and associated 
limitations on the prerogatives of sovereign authority. Yet this need not to 
imply that a politics of pre-emption can never constitute a legitimate approach 
to a particular problem, as the radical contingencies of late modernity may 
leave few other options (Beck 2008). The point is rather to emphasise that 
only when the sorts of practices made possible by the underlying logics of 
anticipatory governance are adequately considered can decisions to 
implement practical strategies based thereupon be made responsibly. And in 
an era when the effective governance of a political space is increasingly 
reliant upon a capacity to govern the unfolding of time, such questions are 
perhaps more ‘timely’ than ever. 
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Making sense of politics in the modern world has always involved 
constructing conceptions of the ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ (Koselleck 2004 
[1985]; Toulmin 1992). In other words, as Kimberly Hutchings tells us, 
assumptions of time ‘fundamentally shape what we can and cannot know 
about world politics today’ (Hutchings 2008). Building on recent theoretical 
insights into the significance of time for thinking about politics (Chambers 
2003, Grosz 2005, Hutchings 2008, Widder 2008, Shapiro 2010, Lundborg 
2012), this chapter shows how questions of time and politics can be variously 
posed and explored. Rather than presenting a central argument, we seek to 
open up a number of different directions that research into time and global 
politics may take. This discussion is structured around four empirical areas, 
which can be thought of as potential case studies. The first explores 
competing temporalities embodied in the United Nations (UN) system; the 
second looks at apocalyptic visions of the global climate crisis; the third 
focuses on the instantaneity of global information flows; and the fourth 
examines practices of pre-emption in global counterterrorism measures. In 
each case, the dominant role of teleological understandings of time and 
history in modern political discourse is questioned, and at least four 
conceptions of time other than the teleological invoked: cosmological time, 
eschatological time, instantaneous time, and time as a flow of becoming. 
By tracing the competing temporalities at work in these given examples of 
world political affairs, this chapter provides an overview of the types of inquiry 
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that a focus on time in global politics might generate. They serve to illustrate 
the manifold ways in which questions around time and politics can be 
pondered and explored – mindful of the way in which certain discourses of 
global politics are permitted, promoted and excluded in various ways by and 
through different conceptions of time. As such, this quartet of ‘cases’ testify to 
the competing modes not only of explaining and understanding, but also 
practicing world politics, enabled by different conceptions of time. In other 
words, they point to the politics of time in global affairs. Before turning to 
these potential studies we begin by giving an overview of how time has been 
used as a point of entry into studies of global politics, as well as provide a 
brief introduction to the alternative notions of time that we use in each ‘case’ 
by contrasting them with the dominant linear and teleological time associated 
with modern political discourse.
Time, Politics and Globalisation
The most cited books on contemporary globalisation are based on a rather 
limited engagement with time and temporality, which mainly focuses on the 
significance of speed, acceleration, and the compression of time and space. 
Much of this literature is based on David Harvey’s (1990) concept of the ‘time-
space compression’, which refers to how the ever-increasing speed of 
‘transnational flows’ has collapsed distances in time as well as in space. The 
flows of, for example, money and information have become instantaneous, 
rendering spatial distances obsolete (Appadurai 1996, Urry 2003). The 
narrow focus on the significance of speed, acceleration, and the time-space 
compression is also evident in the literature more specifically concerned with 
the political dimension of contemporary globalisation. In this context, 
globalisation is mainly discussed by pointing to how the acceleration and 
speed of transnational flows challenge the static borders of sovereign territory 
(Der Derian 1992, Agnew 1994, Tuathail 1996, Scholte 2005, Held and 
McGrew 2007).
While the globalisation literature has opened up important questions about 
the potential significance of time for thinking about politics, there is much 
work to be done in order to advance our understanding of how different 
conceptions of time can be used for examining, analysing and understanding 
global politics and political life under globalizing conditions. In order to do this, 
a more expansive and nuanced analysis of time and its relation to politics is 
necessary. Therefore, we need other adjacent fields of study, which can be 
used in order to investigate the significance of time as a constitutive 
dimension of politics. 
On the one hand, there is a growing interest in time and temporality among 
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philosophers, social theorists, and scholars of International Relations (IR) 
(Hoy 2009, Hom 2010, Ruin and Ers 2011). On the other hand, there is a 
literature more specifically concerned with the politics of time and temporality. 
For example, in his book Untimely Politics Samuel Chambers (2003) has 
challenged the dominant linear conception of time and argued for an 
alternative non-linear way of thinking about politics, mainly by drawing on the 
work of Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida. Elizabeth Grosz has also 
problematised the linear conception of time in her book Time Travels: 
Feminism, Nature, Politics (2005), which analyses the significance of time as 
a productive force that conditions different forms of political struggles, in 
particular feminist struggles. Kimberly Hutchings’ work on Time and World 
Politics (2008) was mentioned earlier and stands as the most significant 
theoretical contribution to thinking about the relationship between theories of 
time and theories of world politics. Another important theoretical contribution 
is Nathan Widder’s Reflections on Time and Politics (2008), which offers a 
series of critical reflections on the limits of the linear progressive view of time 
and opens up to a more radical understanding of time and politics based on 
continental and poststructural philosophy. In a more empirical sense, Michael 
J. Shapiro’s book The Time of the City (2010) addresses the politics of urban 
life through the lens of various philosophical conceptions of time. Finally, Tom 
Lundborg’s book entitled Politics of the Event: Time, Movement, Becoming 
(2012) demonstrates how the concept of the ‘event’ can be used for analysing 
a sovereign politics of time seeking to reproduce ideas about a ‘modern’ 
political order through the inscription of ‘borders in time’ separating the past 
from the present and the future. Like many of these works we are interested 
in challenges to the dominant teleological concept of time.
Alternative Concepts of Time
According to the dominant teleological conception of time, past, present and 
future are conjoined linearly, suggesting a ‘forward movement’ or ‘progress’. 
The linear understanding of time is strongly associated with the grand 
ideologies that dominated the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: liberalism 
and communism. With the end of the Cold War came the declaration that 
history itself had come to an end (Fukuyama 1992). While Fukuyama’s thesis 
has been widely criticised, the teleological conception of time it relies upon 
continues to have formidable influence, not least on discourses of global 
economic development that express confidence in continuous growth and the 
promise of progress from ‘under-developed’ to ‘developed’. 
At least four additional conceptions of time to the teleological can be identified 
in the tradition of intellectual history. First, the cosmological conception of 
time derives from Aristotelian thinking and was further developed in 
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Renaissance philosophy via early modern science and entails a view of time 
as cyclical and repetitive (Cassirer 1979). This view of time has for example 
been used to think about the repetitive nature of politics in the modern era, 
and the eternal movements of inter-state politics in a world that lacks a higher 
authority than the sovereign state (Walker 2010). 
Second, the eschatological conception of time is concerned with time as 
finite and the world coming to an end, and is strongly associated with 
theological Judaic-Christian traditions (Löwith 1949, Taubes 2009 [1947]). 
This view of time has for example been used to think about the values and 
fears that often underlie ideas about the world suddenly coming to an end via 
nuclear war, terrorist attacks or environmental disasters (Bradley and Fletcher 
2010). 
Third, the conception of instantaneous time relates to the view of the 
contemporary era as one of ‘instantaneity’, characterised by the time-space 
compression and the ways in which time has become ‘radically present’ 
(Harvey 1990, Beck 1992, Heller 1999, Bauman 2000). This notion of time 
has for example been used to highlight the implications of the rapid increase 
of transnational flows – of people, money and information – which some see 
great potential in, while others point to the fears, dangers and risks commonly 
associated with them (Lundborg 2011). 
Fourth, the conception of time as a flow of becoming was developed by 20th 
Century continental philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Lacan, among 
others, and points to how time eludes the static being of the individual 
subject, prompting attempts to construct fantasies of the full presence of the 
coherent subject (Deleuze 1994, Lacan 2006). This view of time has for 
example been drawn upon to study a politics seeking to construct fantasies of 
the full presence of the individual subject within the limits of the sovereign 
territorial state, but also to express different modes of resistance that try to 
elude the authority of the state (Edkins 2011, Lundborg 2012).
We believe that some of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary 
global politics – including the global climate crises, global counterterrorism 
measures, global information flows, and the limits and possibilities of 
progress in the international order – can be rearticulated, rethought and 
analysed in a radically new light via a focus on conceptions of time. In this 
respect, while the dominant teleological view can be linked to a particular 
understanding of political life based on liberal ideals of freedom, progress and 
enlightenment, the other conceptions of time highlight alternative 
understandings of political life. 
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For example, discourses based on cosmological time can be linked to a form 
of political life that is reluctant to change and aims to continue, eternally, 
along the same road. Discourses based on eschatological time might instead 
point to a form of political life dominated by the constant fear of an abrupt end 
through, for example, apocalypse or disaster. In turn, discourses based on 
instantaneous time open up the possibility of new forms of political belonging 
through instantaneous connections between people located in different parts 
of the world. Moreover, time as a contingent flow of becoming can be linked to 
a more radical understanding of life, whereby life constantly eludes the full 
presence and completeness of the subject. To demonstrate how this may be 
accomplished we now turn to our four suggested case studies.
Studying Time and Global politics
Since our specific focus is on the relationship between concepts of time and 
global politics, we have chosen four suggested case studies that all point to a 
distinctively global or transnational dimension of contemporary politics. In 
other words, they all relate to that which transcends or happens beyond the 
limits of the sovereign territorial state. In this respect, different concepts of 
time can be used both in order to take us beyond the modern state as well as 
to point to the various tensions between what lies beyond and what lies within 
the state/state system; tensions that emerge when different concepts of time 
clash with one another.
I: Competing temporalities in the United Nations system
Coming to terms with the international and what may be said to constitute its 
‘order’ is perhaps the main preoccupation of the discipline of IR. While the 
category of space has dominated research into the international and the 
question of order, the category of time remains under-investigated and under-
explored. This is noteworthy: questions of how we think of change on the 
international level, of stability contra rupture, of possibility contra determinism, 
of duration and longevity versus finitude, and so on – all such questions are 
conditioned by understandings of time and temporality. This is abundantly 
clear when we turn to the organisation that more than any other can be said 
to embody the attempted construction of international order in the present 
day: the UN.
The inquiry into the competing temporalities at work in the construction of 
international order can be approached via a study of the UN as organisation. 
One way to structure such investigation would be to depart from the plethora 
of documents generated by the UN: from the UN Charter, key Security 
Council resolutions, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports 
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to speeches by the UN Secretary General. These documents as texts neatly 
encompass the on-going and necessarily incomplete construction of 
international order. By focusing on the sui generis global organisation, the 
UN, we expect that such empirical research would yield insight into some of 
the central themes of mainstream global political discourse, in particular 
discourses of security and social and economic development.
The international order that is embodied in the UN system is at heart a liberal 
order, vacillating between, on the one hand, the promotion of the ‘progress’ of 
individual human life and, on the other, the fundamental dependence on the 
active support and participation of individual sovereign states, with the 
attendant principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention (Chandler 
2002, Cunliffe 2011, Bellamy 2011 and 2005). Thus the investigation of the 
temporalities of the international à travers the temporalities embodied in the 
UN system is at once an investigation of the time of the international and at 
once an investigation of the competing temporalities of liberal international 
theory. While the teleological conception of time as everlasting progress is 
most strongly associated with liberal thought, we can expect this trajectory to 
be juxtaposed with a cosmological view of time as dominated by eternal 
cycles and repetition. In focusing on this interaction, the study of the political 
logics embedded in the UN system would shed new light on the limits of 
‘progress’ in a world governed by the eternal movements of inter-state 
politics. The conception of time as instantaneous would offer additional 
perspective on the workings of the international system as embodied in an 
organisation that struggles to deal with the long-term politics of poverty 
reduction, climate change and so on, incessantly challenged by states’ 
reactive concern for the immediate.
II: Apocalyptic visions of the global climate crisis
A second potential area of interest concerns the global climate crisis. It is well 
established that one of the root causes of this crisis is the continuous 
aspiration for increased productivity/economic growth and its detrimental 
effects on the environment and the sustainability of the earth’s ecosystems 
(Helm and Hepburn 2009). Thus, there is an important tension to be 
examined here: between the modern belief in the individual’s as well as the 
state’s right to continuous progress on one hand, and on the other hand an 
apocalyptic vision of the world, based on an eschatological conception of time 
as finite and the world rapidly coming to an end. 
The tensions created between linear and eschatological time in the context of 
the global climate crisis can certainly be expressed in different ways 
depending on the discourse one is looking at. While the linear notion of time 
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might be more dominant in discourses of national security, for example, 
eschatological time is often expressed in popular culture including films such 
as The Day After Tomorrow (2004), An Inconvenient Truth (2006), and 
Melancholia (2011). 
While studying the ways in which different discourses give priority to distinct 
notions of time, it would also be fruitful to look more closely at the interactions 
between eschatological and linear time. Another example of how this may be 
done is to study UN climate summits, in which clashes between opposing 
views of the climate crisis often become apparent. While some states 
highlight the extreme dangers of the climate crisis and point to the risks of 
inaction, others merely state that it is not in their national interest to take 
action in the present.
When studying the interaction between eschatological and linear notions of 
time we may also ask how they condition – rather than simply exclude – one 
another. For example, it could be argued that linear progressive time relies on 
the notion of a final end, which gives the search for continuous progress 
purpose and meaning in the first place, just like death gives meaning to life. 
On that basis, it is possible to investigate how fantasies of an absolute end of 
the world do not automatically threaten the idea of continuous progress of 
states and individuals but supplies the latter with its necessary and underlying 
condition: namely the constant risk of coming to an end. To progress then 
implies a contingent and unpredictable process of becoming, which is 
‘meaningful’ only as long as it may suddenly come to an end. Hence the 
concept of time as a flow of becoming is also relevant to include in this 
analysis – not in order to think of becoming as ‘eternal’, but to highlight an 
unpredictable movement based on elements of chance and contingency. 
Indeed, it can be argued that it is precisely our inability to fully predict the 
future that gives meaning to life, and which makes all attempts to calculate 
what will happen futile. Eschatological time can thus be seen as a condition of 
possibility for linear progressive time as it poses a constant threat to linear 
time of reaching a sudden end.
III: The instantaneity of global information flows
Investigation into the subject of global information flows presents a third 
potential avenue for investigation of the temporality of the global political 
domain. Recent decades have seen a surge in interest in how the spread of 
information and communication between individuals and corporate entities 
contributes to a distinct media sphere or global network society (Castells 
2010). While some commentators see real political potential in social 
networking (often citing the ‘Arab Spring’), more sinister manifestations of 
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global information flows can be found in the increased reliance on global 
surveillance techniques and the military use of remote killing through 
unmanned aerial vehicles. Hence there is striking contrast between the 
diagnoses of the political potential of temporal instantaneity: promise on the 
one hand and risks and dangers on the other (Lundborg 2011). As social 
theorists have asserted for some time: delving more deeply into the 
constitutive role of speed, proximity, acceleration (Virilio 2006, Rosa, 2013) 
and instantaneity for global political discourse is imperative for understanding 
the limits and potentials of political action today.
Exploring the paradoxical effects of the instantaneity of information flows 
requires attention to the active role of materiality in global surveillance 
techniques and its importance for the military use of remote killing (Gregory 
2011, Wall and Monihan 2011, Plaw and Fricker 2012). Previous research into 
the force of materiality in social and political relations (Lundborg and 
Vaughan-Williams 2011 and 2015, Holmqvist 2013) points to the ‘living’ 
potential of material force in political affairs; and the assemblage structure of 
contemporary political phenomenon (Latour 2005, Bennett 2010). From the 
range of empirical materials that may be selected as basis for such 
investigation, we have chosen to highlight elements pertaining to global 
violence, and the impact of violent materialities on how politics is (or can be) 
enacted. Here, testimonials from drone operators, reports from the locations 
where drone operations take place, and official documents from the United 
States’ defence and security establishment outlining the (current and future) 
use of unmanned weapons systems are noteworthy. 
The contrast between and clash of teleological and instantaneous 
conceptions of time are expected to be of primary significance in this area of 
research. While the wars of (classical) modernity were imbued with 
teleological conceptions of time – evident in the conception of wars as 
temporally demarcated, bracketed by dates of beginning and end – wars 
conditioned by instantaneous time oscillate between a radical sort of present 
and endlessness. The breakdown of the distinction between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ 
in our time – indeed the breakdown between the finite and the infinite in war – 
demands new political temporalities. Given that the surveillance-wars never 
‘start’ they can never ‘end’ in any conventional sense of the word either: 
reckoning with this is both theoretically and politically challenging.
IV: The politics of preemption in global counterterrorism policy and practice
The fourth case is linked to the politics of preemption in global 
counterterrorism policy and practice. The concept of preemption refers to the 
strategy of pre-empting future attacks before they materialise (Rasmussen 
201 Time, Temporality and Global Politics
2006, Massumi 2007). Following the discourses of the Global War on Terror, 
this strategy has been discussed extensively in recent years, with particular 
reference to the idea of protecting individual freedoms and liberties by making 
exceptions to international as well as domestic laws and norms (Neal 2010). 
By highlighting the conception of time as a contingent flow of becoming we 
are able to add another layer to this topic by looking at how the politics of 
preemption can be examined and analysed in relation to fantasies of 
controllability. In this way, we can also shed light on some of the most 
controversial elements of contemporary counterterrorism measures, including 
indefinite detention, extraordinary rendition, the use of torture and secret 
prison facilities. Examples of empirical material to be examined include recent 
human rights-reports from organisations like Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, as well as official documents from the US 
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Moreover, one may study 
the cultural expressions of these practices in films and TV-series like Minority 
Report (2002), Rendition (2007), 24 (2001-2010), and Homeland 
(2011-present). 
While much of this discourse seems to suggest that contemporary political life 
under globalising conditions is increasingly unpredictable, it also expresses a 
certain desire to control the unpredictable. The challenge of satisfying this 
desire lies precisely in how the flow of becoming renders impossible the 
existence of a stable and present ‘now’, from which we can safely observe 
what has happened in the past and make predictions about the future. The 
unpredictability of terrorist attacks and the invention of new methods with 
which they are carried out are thus responded to with new ways of dealing 
with the contingent flows of becoming. Crucially, much of this discourse seeks 
to respond to the ‘futurity’ of becoming by trying to imagine the ‘unimaginable’ 
of what might happen next. In this context, therefore, we need to study how 
counterterrorism policy and practice express a certain politics of time that 
prioritises the future over the present, and indeed appears to bring the future 
into the present in a remarkable non-linear fashion. The idea of acting on the 
future in the present brings us back to instantaneous time as it points to the 
ways in which policies are enacted immediately, without waiting for events to 
unfold. What needs to be studied, thus, is the interaction between the 
unpredictable flow of becoming and the instantaneity of the sovereign 
decision.
Conclusion
By using time as a primary analytical lens, scholars will be able to rethink and 
rearticulate the theoretical frameworks through which global political 
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discourses are examined, understood and analysed; provide new empirical 
insights into the conditions that shape political life in the contemporary world; 
and shed new light on our capacity to think about the limits and possibilities of 
‘change’ in global politics. This approach holds the promise of generating a 
series of inquiries, as part of new research agenda with the potential for both 
theoretical innovation and substantive contributions to current political 
debates. Perhaps most significantly, this kind of agenda would take us 
beyond the narrow concern with progressive, linear and teleological time that 
has dominated the ways in which time is understood as mere ‘history’ in the 
discipline of IR. Any attempt to come to terms with the profound challenges of 
global politics must look beyond that narrow understanding of time and open 
up an expanded view of the multiple temporalities shaping political life in the 
contemporary era. 
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